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“As crude a weapon as the cave man’s club, the chemical
barrage has been hurled against the fabric of life.” 
– Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (1962)
Virtually every manmade product involves the use of man-ufactured chemicals. The effects of the vast majority ofthese chemicals on human health are unknown, but
numerous studies have begun to link many  to cancer, reproduc-
tive ailments, developmental impairment, and neurobehavioral
disorders. While modern society could not maintain its current
standard of living without chemicals, global chemicals production
has the capability to impact environmental sustainability and
human health in both developed and developing countries.
Additionally, there is no way to shield oneself from the hazards of
these substances; virtually all children are born into this world
having been prenatally exposed to toxic chemicals. 
While the chemicals industry is at the center of economic
growth worldwide, accounting for seven percent of global
income and nine percent of international trade,1 chemicals pro-
duction has also caused significant harm across the world. Many
chemicals possess transboundary properties, allowing use by
one country to poison unsuspecting communities across borders
and even oceans. For instance, the breast milk of females in
Greenland’s Inuit population is so contaminated that it could be
classified as hazardous waste.2 In many cases, no data exist on
the dangers of specific chemicals or the dangerous cocktails that
they can produce. 
Countries have responded to these concerns through
domestic legislation, as well as numerous bilateral and multina-
tional environmental agreements. Unfortunately, many of these
efforts have failed to manage chemical production in a way that
minimizes public health risks. Sustainable Development Law &
Policy was inspired by the adoption of the Strategic Approach to
International Chemicals Management (“SAICM”) in February
2006 to explore what sound chemicals management entails.
Although SAICM is a significant step towards sound chemicals
management, more needs to be done. In particular, the public
needs to be educated about the risks that it faces; we hope this
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2 Marla Cone, Pollutants drift north, making Inuits’ traditional diet toxic,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 18, 2004, available at http://www.boston.com/news/
world/articles/2004/01/18/pollutants_drift_north_making_inuits_traditional_di
et_toxic (last visited Apr. 16, 2006).
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EDITORS’ NOTE
SPRING 2006 
The world in which we live has changed tremendouslyfrom that of previous generations. Synthetic chemicalsare ubiquitous in our environment worldwide, and traces
of these compounds are found in all humans and animals. The
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National
Human Exposure Report has amply demonstrated that such
chemicals are often pervasive, appearing in the vast majority of
blood and urine samples taken at random from the general pop-
ulation in the United States. Many chemicals are readily passed
across the placenta to the fetus or to the infant via breast milk.
Worldwide, around 15,000 new chemicals are introduced
every year. In the United States, at least 75,000 industrial chem-
icals are currently produced or imported.1 Public concern has
risen due to various studies linking hazardous chemicals to
increased occurrences of cancer, respiratory diseases, reproduc-
tive disease, impairment in the physical and emotion develop-
ment of children, neurological disease, and more. New sub-
stances are continuously introduced into domestic and global
markets, and the impacts of many of these substances are
unknown. For example, there is a growing number of nanoma-
terials that are entering the market with little regulation or data;
many of these are likely to have hazardous properties.
Children and their health should be the focus of our domes-
tic and worldwide chemicals policies: children are our future
and we need to assign a high value to preserving their potential
health and productivity. Pound for pound, children eat more
food, drink more water, and breathe more air than adults. Thus,
they are likely to be more exposed to substances in their envi-
ronment than are adults. 
In the United States, environmental chemicals are regulated
in numerous ways. Pollutants, pesticides, consumer products,
and industrial chemicals are each under different statutory and
regulatory guidance and frameworks. To properly regulate
chemicals, the United States needs to strengthen domestic regu-
lations and build up global interrelationships. 
A number of international, global, and regional agreements
have been developed to assist with chemicals management. The
enormity and complexity of this issue has led many nations to
accept the idea that harmonization is necessary to properly man-
age chemicals. Chemicals do not acknowledge political bound-
aries; thus, regulation must occur at the global level. 
Chemical regulation needs to occur in the context of coop-
eration on an international scale to protect children’s health. In
some ways, a high degree of worldwide cooperation on chemi-
cal assessment and safety already exists. For example, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Chemicals Forum has developed an internationally harmonized
2
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set of guidelines for chemicals testing, an agreement on good
laboratory practices, and an agreement on mutual acceptance of
data that allows all nations to adopt these agreements. 
This issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy
examines efforts to promote sound chemicals management at
the domestic and global scale. Contributors to this issue discuss
the next steps for chemicals regulation within the United States.
Articles encourage assessing and tackling the new risk posed by
nanotechnology. The establishment and implications of the
Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management is
analyzed, and the status of the Basel Convention is explored.
Chemical regulation in the European Union is examined, along
with a proposal for an independent entity to manage global
chemicals agreements and protocols. 
As a whole, these articles address the broad range of issues
and possible solutions in chemicals management. The con-
cerns, ideas, and possible solutions identified in this issue high-
light the obstacles that many individuals in the global commu-
nity feel are of the utmost importance to protect environmental
public health. In the end, it is important to remember that chem-
icals policies should be action-oriented and employ approaches
that are sufficiently protective to provide assurances that we are
acting cautiously to protect our children, future generations,
and the environment.
1 U.S. EPA Web site, http://www.epa.gov/region5/defs/html/tsca.htm.
Fuel industry analysts project that the production of methyltertiary butyl ether (“MTBE”),1 an oxygenated fuel addi-tive used to help reduce air pollution from automobiles,2
will decrease in the United States over the next two years, due
in part to the government’s support of ethanol over MTBE in
last year’s U.S. Energy Policy Act (“Energy Act”) and domestic
concerns over groundwater contamination.3 In recent years,
controversy has surrounded MTBE due to assertions that the
additive contaminates groundwater when leaked from under-
ground storage tanks.4 The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency and the World Health Organization labeled it as a pos-
sible carcinogen when consumed in high doses.5 Additionally,
26 states banned MTBE usage because of water contamination
concerns.6
The future of MTBE production in the United States is even
more uncertain due to the exclusion of limited liability protec-
tion for MTBE producers in last year’s Energy Act.7 The House
of Representatives (“House”) proposed to give limited liability
protection to MTBE manufacturers in product defect suits filed
after September 5, 2003, in exchange for MTBE producers’ con-
tributions toward a trust fund for cleaning sites contaminated by
MTBE.8 Domestic cleanup costs range from $2 billion to $25
billion.9 Following debates between the House and the Senate
over limited liability protection for MTBE producers in the
Energy Act, Congress redacted the limited liability provision
from the Act.10 Additionally, Congress substituted the Clean Air
Act’s oxygenated gasoline requirement with a renewable fuels
plan that supports the gasoline additive ethanol over MTBE.11
Valero, the second largest U.S. producer of MTBE,
announced that it will stop MTBE production due to the elimi-
nation of limited liability protection in the Energy Act.12 If other
producers follow suit, then the U.S. gas supply may face supply
disruptions, resulting in a rise in gas prices.13 Domestic MTBE
production is expected to further decline as ethanol is increas-
ingly substituted for MTBE.14
ENDNOTES:
1 MTBE, CHEMICAL WK., Nov. 9, 2005, at 59.
2 Chris Woodyard, Refiner’s Change Could Raise Gas Prices, USA TODAY,
Aug. 5, 2005, at B1.
3 MTBE, supra note 1.
4 Darren Goode, Barton Announces Deal on MTBE Liability, Trust Fund…,
CONG. DAILY, July 22, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Barton Deal]. 
5 Environmental Protection Agency, Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether, Drinking
Water, http://www.epa.gov/mtbe/water.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2006). The
World Health Organization released a document reporting that MTBE is a
potential carcinogen in rats, but cautioned against over applying these results
to humans. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BACKGROUND DOCUMENT FOR
DEVELOPMENT OF WHO GUIDELINES FOR DRINKING-WATER QUALITY: METHYL
TERTIARY-BUTYL ETHER (MTBE) IN DRINKING-WATER (2005), available at
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/dwq/chemicals/MTBE200605.pdf
(last visited Mar. 12, 2006). 
6 MTBE, supra note 1. 
7 Kara Sissell, MTBE Liability Relief Dropped from Energy Bill, CHEMICAL
WK., Aug. 3, 2005, at 11.
8 Darren Goode, Energy Bill Flash Points, 37(30) NAT’L J. 2380, 2381 (2005)
[hereinafter Energy Bill]; Barton Deal, supra note 4; Sissell, supra note 7.
9 ENSR International, a group supported by MTBE lobbyists, estimate cleanup
costs to be only $2 billion, while the American Water Works Associations esti-
mates cleanup costs to be closer to USD twenty-five billion. See Energy Bill,
supra note 8, at 2381.
10 Sissell, supra note 7.
11 MTBE, supra note 1; Peck Hwee Sim, Valero to Quit MTBE Production,
CHEMICAL WK., Aug. 10, 2005, at 12.
12 Sim, supra note 11.
13 Woodyard, supra note 2.
14 MTBE, supra note 1.
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THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF MTBE PRODUCTION:




When Congress enacted the Toxic Substances ControlAct (“TSCA”) in 1976, the Act was considered a“major step forward in providing urgently needed
authority to protect human health and the environment from
dangerous chemicals.”3 Practitioners, however, have long rec-
ognized that TSCA has failed to live up to its promise. 
As TSCA reaches its 30-year anniversary, a variety of sci-
entific, economic, and political factors have triggered a renewed
dialogue about reforming the U.S. chemicals management
framework. This article explains why a modernization of TSCA
is not only necessary from a public health perspective, but for
business reasons as well.
The public health case for TSCA reform is prompted by
undeniable new scientific evidence showing widespread human
exposure to industrial chemicals. For example, hundreds of
untested industrial chemicals have been detected in the umbili-
cal cord blood of the typical newborn baby in the United States.
While medical researchers debate whether this low level chem-
ical exposure is associated with the growing occurrence of can-
cer, neurodevelopmental disorders, or other diseases, there is no
doubt that U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA” or
“Agency”) has little information about the potential health and
safety implications of these chemicals. The last three decades
have demonstrated that the Agency lacks the tools needed to
effectively evaluate or respond to the potential human health
risks unveiled by scientific testing. 
The business rationale for modernizing the nation’s toxic
chemicals law is equally compelling. New laws in the
European Union and in several U.S. states are creating a patch-
work of inconsistent chemical regulations that will place many
U.S. businesses at a disadvantage. At the same time, business-
es are discovering that there is money to be made in producing
less toxic products. In addition, the rapid emergence of nan-
otechnology necessitates a more effective regulatory frame-
work that can encourage innovation and foster acceptance by
the public and investors.
The convergence of these factors creates significant pres-
sure to modernize TSCA. Taken together, modernization of the
U.S. chemicals management framework is inevitable in the
next several years.
THE PUBLIC HEALTH CASE FOR TSCA REFORM
TSCA’s antiquated framework is inadequate to meet the
challenges uncovered by modern science. Additionally, biomon-
itoring studies show widespread human exposure to industrial
chemicals, many of which have never been evaluated for poten-
tial adverse human health effects.
Recent scientific advances in analytic testing have trans-
formed our understanding of human exposure to manmade
chemicals. Through biomonitoring studies, scientists have now
detected well over a hundred industrial chemicals in the bodies
of most Americans. As discussed below, low concentrations of
flame-retardants, plastic softeners, and long banned chemicals
such as polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”) are virtually ubiq-
uitous in the blood and fat tissue of most Americans today. As a
result, biomonitoring (also known as body burden) studies have
created significant pressure to modernize the U.S. chemicals
management framework.
The new data gleaned from biomonitoring is defined as “a
scientific technique for assessing human exposures to natural
and synthetic compounds in the environment.”4 Typically, sci-
entists analyze human blood, urine samples, or fat tissue to
determine whether a person has been exposed to a particular
chemical. Advances in recent years have improved scientists’
ability to detect even small concentrations of chemicals in our
bodies. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(“CDC”) explains that “biomonitoring measurements are the
most health-relevant assessments of exposure because they
WHY MODERNIZATION OF THE U.S. TOXIC
SUBSTANCES LAW IS GOOD FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
AND BUSINESS
by Malcolm D. Woolf*
*Mr. Woolf is Minority Counsel to the U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and
do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Committee or any Member. 
“If we are going to live so intimately with these
chemicals – eating and drinking them, taking
them into the very marrow of our bones – we
had better know something about their nature
and their power.”
– Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (1962)1
“EPA has used its authority to require testing
for fewer than 200 of the 62,000 chemicals in
commerce when EPA began reviewing
chemicals under TSCA in 1979... Only five
chemical substances or groups of chemical
substances have been regulated...”
– U.S. Government Accountability Office evaluation of
the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (2005)2
measure the amount of the chemical that actually gets into peo-
ple from all environmental sources (e.g., air, soil, water, dust, or
food) combined.”5 Perflurooctanoic acid (“PFOA”) is one of
countless examples illustrating the gaps created by TSCA’s out-
dated framework. 
While numerous biomonitoring studies have been conduct-
ed in the United States, the CDC has conducted the most ambi-
tious effort. In July 2005, the CDC issued the third of its bien-
nial “National Report on Human Exposure to Environmental
Chemicals,” evaluating the U.S. population’s exposure to 148
environmental chemicals. Strikingly, they detected all but two
of the 148 chemicals in at least some of the samples tested.6 In
other words, CDC found human exposure to virtually every
chemical for which it looked. 
For example, CDC found “widespread” exposure to phtha-
lates, an industrial chemical used to soften and increase the flex-
ibility of plastics and vinyl.7 According to the CDC, phthalates
have been demonstrated to cause adverse reproductive toxicity
and other effects in animal studies, though little information is
available about the potential human health impacts.
Significantly, the CDC also detected continued human exposure
to chemicals banned decades ago in the United States, such as
PCBs, which were banned from intentional production in 1979.8
Another remarkable study focused on industrial chemicals in
human umbilical cord blood. Using donated cord blood samples
from the United States Red Cross, the Environmental Working
Group (“EWG”) found an average of 200 manmade chemicals
and pollutants in babies born in the United States in 2004.9
Alarmingly, a total of 287 chemicals were found to have crossed
the placental barrier into the baby. Among the chemicals detected
were polybrominated diphenyl ethers used as flame retardants in
furniture, polychlorinated naphthalene used as wood preserva-
tives, and perfluorochemicals used as stain and oil repellants.
Biomonitoring is already having a real world impact on the
marketplace. The most recent example involves the perfluoro-
chemical PFOA, widely used in the production of non-stick pans
and stain resistant clothes and carpet. Numerous biomonitoring
studies found that PFOA has become commonplace in the bod-
ies of most Americans. Researchers at Johns Hopkins Hospital
recently confirmed the presence of this industrial chemical in 99
percent of the umbilical cord blood of 300 newborns born at the
Hospital.10 PFOA is known to bio-accumulate in the human body
and an EPA Science Advisory Board draft report recently classi-
fied PFOA as a “likely carcinogen.”11 As a result of these devel-
opments, EPA obtained agreements from DuPont and the other
major manufacturers of PFOA to essentially phase-out produc-
tion voluntarily over the next fifteen years.12
This new information on the prevalence of human exposure
to industrial chemicals is dramatically different from the scien-
tific understanding of the 1970s. When TSCA was enacted in
1976, chemicals contained within consumer products were gen-
erally not believed to be a significant source of potential expo-
sure (except perhaps for chemical or farm workers).
Biomonitoring now has proven otherwise. While we still do not
understand all of the exposure pathways, it is undeniable that
human exposure to industrial chemicals is far more prevalent
than previously understood.13
The real question of course is – how safe are we? Some
medical researchers estimate that environmental toxins cause up
to 35 percent of asthma cases, ten percent of cancer cases, and
twenty percent of neurobehavioral disorders in children and
contribute to respiratory disorders, cancer, infertility, and heart
disease in adults.14 On the other hand, the chemical industry
argues that the extremely low concentrations of chemicals often
detected through biomonitoring likely are too minute to cause
adverse health impacts. 
What is undisputed is that insufficient information is available
about the potential human health impacts of many of the chemicals
commonly found in our bodies. As such, public concern about bio-
monitoring results and the rapidly growing body of scientific liter-
ature linking industrial chemicals to potentially adverse health
impacts is prompting a fundamental reevaluation of TSCA.
TSCA FAILS TO PROVIDE EPA WITH THE TOOLS
NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELY EVALUATE CHEMICALS
The discovery of widespread human exposure to industrial
chemicals raises the question – is TSCA up to the challenge?
Unfortunately, the answer is no. This article evaluates EPA’s
record with respect to chemicals on the initial 1979 Inventory
(so-called “existing chemicals”), the Agency’s new chemicals
program, its authority to take action to reduce chemical risks,
and its voluntary initiatives. In each respect, TSCA fails to give
EPA the tools needed to effectively evaluate and manage the
risks posed by industrial chemicals.
FEW CHEMICALS IN COMMERCE SINCE 1979 HAVE
UNDERGONE EPA REVIEW
By any measure, EPA’s record with respect to reviewing the
safety of existing chemicals is unacceptable. A recent report by
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) conclud-
ed that “EPA does not routinely assess existing chemicals, has
limited information on their health and environmental risks, and
has issued few regulations controlling such substances.”15
The data speaks for itself: of the 62,000 chemicals in com-
merce in 1979 when the EPA program began, EPA has used its
authority to require testing for fewer than 200.16 Further, EPA has
performed internal reviews of only an estimated two percent of
the chemicals on EPA’s original TSCA inventory.17 No wonder
that little information exists on so many of the chemicals now
being detected in human bodies through biomonitoring studies.
EPA cannot fairly be blamed for this intolerable record.
Rather, the program was doomed from the start. Congress
declared that it should be the “responsibility of those who man-
ufacture and those who process” chemical substances to develop
“adequate data” about their effects on health and the environ-
ment.18 While the purpose is clear, the statute fails to require
chemical companies to submit basic toxicity information to EPA.
Instead, EPA was forced to gather this information itself.
The Agency’s primary statutory tool for data collection, howev-
er, has proven ineffectual. Under TSCA section 4(a)(1), EPA can
require chemical manufacturers to conduct testing if the EPA
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Administrator finds that the chemical or mixture “may present
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”19
This creates a classic “Catch-22” situation. The Agency
must already have sufficient data to demonstrate that a chemical
poses an unreasonable risk of injury to human health or the
environment before it can start a data collection rulemaking.
Based on the circular logic of this provision, EPA must already
have the data needed to evaluate a chemical’s risk in order to
compel companies to submit the missing data.20
Another crippling gap in EPA’s ability to evaluate the
human health risks posed by existing chemicals is TSCA’s fail-
ure to require companies to develop and submit essential infor-
mation on chemical uses and potential human exposure. Risk is
often described as a function of hazard plus exposure. The
absence of a requirement in TSCA that manufacturers disclose
basic information on chemical uses and potential exposure path-
ways makes it impossible for the Agency to develop an effec-
tive, risk-based program. 
To partially address this concern, EPA issued a TSCA
Inventory Update rule in 2003, requiring among other things,
that chemical companies provide readily obtainable exposure-
related use and processing information at sites with production
volumes at 300,000 pounds or above. While a good first step,
the limited information required
under this rule is woefully
insufficient to allow EPA to
properly assess actual, real-
world human exposure. Without
more comprehensive exposure
information, EPA is left without
a meaningful way to calculate
risk.
As a result, EPA officials
acknowledge that TSCA’s
authorities are not an effective
means of testing large numbers
of chemicals. In 30 years, EPA
has issued rules requiring testing for only 185 of the approxi-
mately 82,000 chemicals currently on the TSCA Inventory.21 As
GAO concluded, “EPA has made little progress in reviewing
existing chemicals since EPA began reviewing chemicals under
TSCA in 1979.”22
EPA LACKS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO
ADEQUATELY EVALUATE NEW CHEMICALS
Without question, TSCA’s new chemicals review program
is much superior to that for existing chemicals. Nevertheless,
EPA remains hamstrung by TSCA’s limitations that prevent the
Agency from obtaining the toxicity and exposure information
necessary to protect public health. As a result, GAO found that
“EPA lacks sufficient data to ensure that potential health and
environmental risks of new chemicals are identified.”23
Under TSCA section 5, chemical companies are required to
submit a pre-manufacture notice to EPA of their intention to pro-
duce a new chemical. But companies are not required to submit
test data regarding the chemical’s toxicity and, not surprisingly,
most companies do not voluntarily provide such data. GAO
found that only about fifteen percent of pre-manufacture notices
included health or safety test data.24
Faced with the lack of actual data, EPA scientists have lit-
tle choice but to evaluate a chemical’s toxicity through
reliance on modeling techniques, such as structure activity
relationship analysis. Using this approach, a new chemical is
compared to chemicals with similar molecular structures with
known health and safety effects. However, these models have
never been validated for regulatory purposes. In fact, GAO
highlighted a joint EPA and European Union study in 1993
showing that the accuracy of EPA’s predictions varied depend-
ing upon the effect or property being compared.25 A 2001
study conducted by PPG Industries found a 25 percent error
rate when comparing the model’s results to actual test data for
certain environmental end points.26
The uncertainty surrounding the toxicity and health effects
of new chemicals is compounded by the inadequate data avail-
able on potential exposure. Under TSCA section 5, companies
are required to include basic exposure data as part of the pre-
manufacture notice, including information on categories of uses,
anticipated production volume, and potential exposure levels
and releases. While valuable, this data quickly becomes obso-
lete as production and market
conditions change. TSCA,
unfortunately, does not require
companies to update their pre-
manufacture notices. As a result,
EPA must rely on exposure data
that often is outdated soon after
production commences. 
Notwithstanding these limi-
tations, EPA’s new chemical
review program plays an impor-
tant role in screening out industri-
al chemicals that may pose a
threat to human health. Over the
30-year program, EPA’s reviews have resulted in some form of
Agency action to address potential risks to human health for over
ten percent of new chemicals submitted for review.27 Nevertheless,
more complete and up-to-date toxicity and exposure data about
new chemicals is needed to enhance EPA’s ability to respond to the
challenges uncovered by modern medical science.
TSCA’S STANDARD FOR RESTRICTING CHEMICALS HAS
PROVEN UNWORKABLE
While most chemicals do not pose potential human health
risks, public health agencies must be empowered to take action
when appropriate. TSCA practitioners have learned, however,
that the statute’s standard is simply impracticable. EPA officials
acknowledge that “even when EPA has toxicity and exposure
information on existing chemicals, ... [the Agency] has difficul-
ty demonstrating that harmful chemicals pose an unreasonable
risk and that they should be banned or have limits put on their
production or use.”28
Again, the data speaks for itself. Over the course of 30
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[U]ncertainty surrounding
the toxicity and health
effects of new chemicals is
compounded by …
inadequate data.
years, EPA has issued regulations to ban or limit the production
or restrict the use of only five chemicals. The Agency has not
even initiated such a rulemaking since 1989.
The landmark case illustrating the practical difficulties of
implementing TSCA’s safety standard concerned asbestos. After
scrutinizing the issue for a decade and evaluating over one hun-
dred studies, EPA determined that asbestos was a potential car-
cinogen at all levels of exposure and posed an unreasonable risk
to health and the environment.29 A federal court invalidated
EPA’s asbestos ban in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d
1201 (5th Cir. 1991). The court found that EPA “basically
ignored the cost side of the TSCA equation”30 and failed to ade-
quately consider less burdensome alternatives.31
The burden of proof imposed on EPA under TSCA section
6 is overwhelming and unrealistic. To limit use or ban produc-
tion of a chemical, the Agency must meet two tests. First, EPA
must have substantial evidence to prove that the chemical pres-
ents “an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environ-
ment.” This requires EPA to make an array of technically ardu-
ous findings, including an evaluation of (1) the effects of the
chemical on human health or the environment; (2) the extent of
potential exposure; (3) the chemical’s benefits; (4) the availabil-
ity of substitutes for each known use; and (5) the reasonably
ascertainable economic consequences of the rule.
If EPA is able to clear these hurdles, the Agency must then
determine that its proposed course of action is “the least bur-
densome alternative.” In other words, EPA must establish that
restrictions such as warning labels or use limitations would not
be sufficient to address the risks before imposing a more
restrictive limitation.
The asbestos decision has cast a long shadow, with many
TSCA practitioners believing that EPA could never meet the
statutory standard as interpreted by the court. EPA apparently
agrees since the Agency has not started a single rulemaking to
limit production or ban the use of a chemical since this court
decision over fifteen years ago.
EPA’S VOLUNTARY HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME
CHALLENGE IS INADEQUATE TO PROTECT HUMAN
HEALTH
Tacitly recognizing TSCA’s ineffectiveness, many chemical
manufacturers have worked with the Agency to develop the
High Production Volume (“HPV”) chemical challenge, essen-
tially to fill the data gaps left by TSCA’s unworkable regulatory
framework. Despite considerable progress, this voluntary initia-
tive was not intended and cannot substitute for an effective risk
based chemical management system.
The HPV Challenge program was prompted by a 1997
report by Environment Defense entitled “Toxic Ignorance,”
finding that EPA lacked basic toxicity information about the
great majority of the most heavily used industrial chemicals.32
EPA subsequently confirmed that 93 percent of chemicals pro-
duced in volumes exceeding one million pounds annually
lacked complete toxicity screening data.33 Forty-three percent of
these HPV chemicals had no health or safety data available.
Many chemical manufacturers stepped up to the challenge
in 1998 and pledged to develop basic screening level informa-
tion for roughly 2,200 of the 2,800 HPV chemicals.34 Health
and safety data is beginning to pour in for EPA and public
review. In addition, the industry announced plans in 2005 to
expand the program to include additional chemicals that have
reached HPV status since the program was initially launched.
While the success of this voluntary program is consider-
able, the program’s limitations should not be ignored. First, hun-
dreds of HPV chemicals lack industry sponsors, which means
no one has voluntarily agreed to provide the screening level test
data that EPA needs.35 It is unclear whether EPA has the politi-
cal will or statutory authority to require the generation of this
data for these so-called “orphan chemicals.”
Second, EPA pledged last year to evaluate this initial
screening data and identify approximately five to ten percent of
the HPV chemicals that merit additional scrutiny.36 President
Bush’s budget for next fiscal year, however, proposes a $2.2
million dollar cut for EPA’s HPV program.37 Without adequate
resources, the data on these chemicals – produced annually at
over a million pounds – will sit at EPA collecting dust. 
Finally, even if EPA can overcome the obstacles involv-
ing orphan chemicals and the annual congressional funding
battle for this voluntary initiative, the ultimate question
remains – can the Agency act to address the risks posed by a
dangerous chemical? As discussed earlier, the legal hurdles
imposed by TSCA – as interpreted by the courts – seriously
cripple the Agency’s ability to take action. A voluntary pro-
gram does not change EPA’s statutory limitations. While the
HPV challenge is a laudable effort, it is insufficient to fill the
gaps created by TSCA. 
In sum, recent scientific advances in biomonitoring have
revealed that all of us – even newborns – have industrial chem-
icals in our bodies. Adequate data does not exist to determine
whether such exposure causes cancer, neurodevelopmental dis-
orders, or other ailments. As such, renewed concern about the
public health impacts of chemical exposure is prompting the
need to modernize TSCA.
THE BUSINESS CASE FOR TSCA REFORM: THE
NEED FOR GLOBAL HARMONIZATION
TSCA MODERNIZATION NEEDED TO PREVENT
PLACING U.S.-BASED GLOBAL COMPANIES AT A
COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE
A comprehensive new chemicals law in Europe known as
REACH (for the Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of
Chemicals) is expected to be enacted later this year. REACH
will have a significant impact on U.S. businesses as the chemi-
cal trade across the Atlantic is estimated at $600 billion every
year, and U.S. companies reportedly have $2.5 trillion invested
in Europe.38 As a result, many predict that REACH will alter the
chemical industry worldwide. 
In short, REACH will compel U.S. companies that do busi-
ness in the European Union to develop and make public basic
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health and safety data on the chemicals used in production. The
increased scrutiny imposed on chemicals by REACH may put
global chemical companies at a competitive disadvantage com-
pared to their domestic U.S. competitors and creates new pres-
sure for global harmonization.
REACH is intended to reverse the existing burden of proof
by requiring manufacturers or importers of chemicals in Europe
to make publicly available basic screening level toxicity and
exposure information.39 It is based on the principle of “no data,
no market.” Each chemical manufactured or imported in Europe
over a minimum threshold will need to register by, among other
things, submitting a human health and environmental safety
assessment. Chemicals will be prioritized for evaluation and
authorization based on production volume and risk (e.g. priority
is given to chemicals known to have persistent and bio-accumu-
lative toxic properties or have endocrine disrupting properties).
Chemicals of concern will require authorization to continue in
use in the EU if the risk to human health or the environment is
“adequately controlled” or if the “socio-economic benefits out-
weigh the risk to human health or the environment … and if there
are no suitable alternatives.”40 The scale of potential health ben-
efits is enormous, with an EU Commission study illustrating that
the total health benefits of REACH could be in the order of mag-
nitude of 50 billion euros over the next 30 years.41
In the United States, REACH may have the perverse impact
of penalizing companies that develop health data to demonstrate
the safety of their products. Because REACH will apply to U.S.
companies that manufacture or export into the European Union,
those companies will need to develop – or join consortia to
develop – the health and safety data needed for EU authorization.
In comparison, a U.S. company that domestically manufactures
an alternative chemical will not be required by TSCA to conduct
similar tests and thus will avoid a potentially significant expense.
The result will be an unfair playing field. One can readily
foresee the day when a company that has conducted the studies
necessary to receive EU authorization seeks to level the playing
field by compelling a competitor’s products to undergo similar
reviews.42 Put differently, once a number of leading U.S. compa-
nies have brought their operations into compliance with REACH,
it is hard to see why they would want their U.S. competitors to
continue operating without conducting a similar safety review. 
At the very least, REACH will transform the U.S. political
dynamic on chemical policy. Once U.S. chemical companies
exporting to Europe have made basic health and safety screen-
ing data on their products publicly available, the industry’s tra-
ditional reluctance towards similar transparency in the United
States will likely change. Inevitably, therefore, REACH will
bolster TSCA modernization efforts.
NEW AND EMERGING STATE LAWS ARE CREATING A
PATCHWORK OF CONFLICTING CHEMICAL
REGULATIONS
Recent scientific developments, along with the lack of fed-
eral leadership on chemical issues, have led to increased activi-
ty by the states. In recent years, the number of individual states
enacting laws banning or restricting the use of certain chemicals
has escalated sharply. The emerging patchwork of potentially
inconsistent state laws creates a very difficult and unpredictable
business climate. Modernization of TSCA would help prevent
the confusion and needless duplication associated with 50 dif-
ferent state chemical policies. 
State regulation of brominated flame-retardants illustrates
this point. These chemicals, which have been detected in every-
thing from human breast milk to house dust, are linked in ani-
mal studies to thyroid, liver, and neurological developmental
disorders. Seven states have enacted bans on the manufacturing,
processing, or distribution of products containing certain bromi-
nated flame-retardants and legislation is pending in at least three
other states.43 Most of these laws limit the use of two specific
flame-retardants (pentaBDE and octaBDE), but a pending bill in
Washington State would also cover yet a third compound
(decaBDE).44 Similarly, most of these laws apply to concentra-
tions over 0.1 percent, but Maine’s prohibition applies only to
concentrations over one percent. 
A similar patchwork of state laws is emerging with respect to
mercury. Some states have banned mercury thermometers and
novelty items containing mercury (Rhode Island, New Hampshire,
Connecticut, Oregon, Michigan, Maine), others regulate auto
switches (Oregon, Maine), and some focus on the use of products
containing mercury in schools (Maine) or hospitals (Michigan).
California has banned mercury from landfills and restricted the
mercury content of vaccines to pregnant women and babies.
Trying to navigate the maze of differing state laws con-
sumes significant corporate resources. Unfortunately, business
will continue to shoulder the financial and human resource bur-
den until the federal government reasserts leadership on chemi-
cal policy. Until TSCA is modernized, a growing number of
chemicals are likely to be subject to conflicting State regulation. 
BUSINESSES ARE INCREASINGLY REALIZING THAT
THERE ARE PROFITS IN LESS TOXIC PRODUCTS
Even prior to final enactment of REACH or the adoption of
additional state-specific chemical restrictions, a growing num-
ber of businesses are discovering that the production and use of
less toxic products is profitable. Testing a chemical to obtain
more complete health and safety information prior to distribu-
tion in commerce helps validate a company’s product, enhances
a company’s reputation, and minimizes potential tort liability. In
addition, products that can be advertised as environmentally
safer alternatives increasingly have a marketing advantage over
competitor’s products. 
One reason for the growing profitability of less toxic chem-
icals is the increasing demand by downstream business cus-
tomers. For example, the major computer manufacturers,
including Intel and Dell, are demanding that their suppliers
avoid polybrominated flame-retardants.45 Similarly, the multi-
billion dollar health care group Consorta established an envi-
ronmentally preferable purchasing program and discovered that
non-polyvinyl chloride (“PVC”) based hospital feeding tubes
actually cost less than PVC based ones.46
Some companies are going even further. SC Johnson and
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Son, Inc., the manufacturers of products such as Windex, Glade,
and Pledge, established a “Greenlist process,” whereby the com-
pany evaluates each and every ingredient according to their
human health and environmental impacts.47 In the process, SC
Johnson has removed over ten million pounds of volatile organ-
ic compounds, reduced its overall environmental footprint, and
made the company among the most recognized and awarded
environmental leaders in the United States.48
The costs of ignoring a product’s potential impacts on
human health are staggering. A 2002 RAND study estimated
that the asbestos industry’s liability cost alone could reach
$210 billion, with more than 600,000 individual claims for
compensation.49 Lest one think that WR Grace’s asbestos lia-
bility is a unique case, consider the experience of RJ
Reynolds with tobacco or Merck after VIOXX.
Fortunately, the chemical industry seems to be learning this
lesson. In May 2000 for example, 3M phased out its use of
PFOS from Scotchgard and other products50 as a result of wide-
spread human exposure and concerns that the chemical was per-
sistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic. Wall Street rewarded 3M for
its responsible corporate leadership and the company’s stock
price rose.51 Based on similar concerns, DuPont and eight other
manufacturers of PFOA recently volunteered to eliminate all
sources of exposure by 2015.52
In short, the traditional profit motive and liability concerns
are accelerating the shift to less toxic substances. More and
more businesses are adopting environmentally preferable pur-
chasing programs and chemical manufacturers are already
working to satisfy this growing demand. As a result, this trend
is likely to reduce the chemical industry’s reluctance to mod-
ernize TSCA and builds support for chemical reform from the
industry’s influential downstream business customers. 
THE NEED TO PROMOTE PUBLIC AND INVESTOR
CONFIDENCE IN NANOTECHNOLOGY CREATES A
NEW DRIVER FOR MODERNIZING TSCA
In 2001, Science magazine described nanotechnology as the
“breakthrough of the year.”53 Nanotechnology – the term used to
describe the intentional engineering of materials at the atomic or
molecular level with novel properties – has the potential to revo-
lutionize fields as diverse as healthcare, energy, and manufactur-
ing. Nanotechnology has already been incorporated into experi-
mental treatments for cancerous tumors, self-cleaning windows,
wrinkle-free fabrics, and pollution-reducing fuel additives. Over
200 nanotechnology based consumer products are already on the
market,54 and over 600 raw materials, intermediate components,
and industrial equipment reportedly employ nanotechnology.55
The National Science Foundation predicts that nano-related
goods and services could be a $1 trillion market by 2015.56
One of the greatest challenges for this nascent industry is
public acceptance. The fear of nanotechnology run amok, as
exemplified in Michael Crichton’s best selling thriller, Prey, has
the potential to permanently shape the public’s perception of
nanotechnology and stifle it in its infancy. Europe’s experience
with genetically modified foods provides a cautionary tale about
the need for public acceptance of new scientific approaches. As
J. Clarence Davies, a senior advisor to the Project on Emerging
Nanotechnologies, warns, “past experience, as well as surveys
and focus groups, show that if the public does not think that the
government is exercising adequate regulatory oversight of a
potentially hazardous new technology, then it will mistrust and
likely reject that technology.”57
Many nanotech applications are subject to TSCA, which
broadly covers “any organic or inorganic substance of a particular
molecular identity.”58 Unfortunately, the gaps in TSCA become
gorges when considered in the context of nanotechnology. 
Some nanomaterials likely meet this definition and thereby
will evade government review (unless EPA chooses to issue sig-
nificant new use rules). The criteria for being considered an
existing chemical is having “the same molecular identity” as a
chemical already on EPA’s Inventory. Some nanomaterials like-
ly meet this definition and thereby will evade government
review. Nevertheless, nano-sized versions of existing chemicals
may pose unique human health risks due to their minute size and
increased surface area.
For those nanotech applications that clearly are subject to
TSCA’s new chemical program, the statute still is not an effec-
tive means to foster the safe development of nanotechnology.
Rather, TSCA discourages innovation of new nanomaterial by
failing to recognize the distinction between pre-manufacture
notification and pre-market notification. While some review
may be appropriate prior to manufacture for worker protection,
an in-depth EPA evaluation may be unnecessary for nanotech-
nologies that are years away from commercialization.
Furthermore, EPA lacks authority under TSCA to require
that a company provide health or safety data unless it has
enough information to show that a substance “may present an
unreasonable risk.” As a practical matter, EPA traditionally turns
to its structure activity relationship models as a screen for poten-
tial risk. Such models do not yet exist for nanotechnology, so
EPA is left without meaningful tools to evaluate nanomaterials.
Perhaps equally important, EPA’s review is entirely dependent
on the manufacturer’s intended use of the material and exposure
estimates, which are likely to change as new applications are
rapidly discovered without any notice to EPA (unless the
Agency by rule expressly requires such notice). 
Industry groups are beginning to recognize the need for a
more effective legal framework for nanotechnology. For exam-
ple, Chad Holliday, the CEO of DuPont, wrote in a Wall Street
Journal op-ed with Fred Krupp of Environmental Defense that: 
[B]oth public and business interests will inevitably
compel regulatory protection to ensure product safety
and to create a level playing field for business. Current
regulations, designed for a world before nanotechnolo-
gy, should be reassessed and changed as needed to
account for the novel properties of nanomaterials.
Business and government may need new approaches to
make sure workers, consumers, the public and the
environment are adequately protected.59
In short, the exploding field of nanotechnology is creating
yet another new challenge to the 30-year old U.S. toxic sub-
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stances law. Businesses (and their investors) are seeking to reas-
sure an uncertain public that nanotechnologies are safe and are
increasingly adding their voices to the growing chorus support-
ing modernization of TSCA’s antiquated framework.
CONCLUSION
Scientific advances in biomonitoring have revealed that
industrial chemicals are in all Americans, even in newborn
babies. While medical researchers continue to debate whether
such chemicals are the cause of the growing occurrence of can-
cer, neurodevelopmental disorders, or other diseases, it is undis-
puted that insufficient information is available about the poten-
tial human health impacts of many of these chemicals.
Unfortunately, EPA lacks adequate authority under TSCA to
require that manufacturers provide the data needed to review
existing chemicals or sufficient information to evaluate new
chemicals prior to manufacture. 
Businesses are quietly beginning to recognize the need to
modernize TSCA with an approach that better responds to the
needs of the global marketplace. The European Union and indi-
vidual States are adopting different approaches to chemical reg-
ulations. This emerging patchwork of duplicative and sometimes
inconsistent approaches, together with the growing business
demand for less toxic products and the emerging need to safe-
guard and establish the credibility of nanotechnology, is creating
new pressures for TSCA reform from the business community. 
As a result, the discussion in U.S. chemicals policy is shift-
ing from whether to reform TSCA to how best update the 30-
year old statute. The first comprehensive overhaul legislation,
the Kids Safe Chemicals bill, was introduced by Senators
Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Jeffords (I-VT) on June 25, 2005, to
jump start this debate.60 The bill would reverse the burden of
proof by requiring manufacturers to provide basic health and
safety information prior to distributing a chemical in consumer
products. It would also create a risk-based prioritization for
chemical review and a bright line safety standard that accounts
for children’s increased sensitivity to toxic exposures. 
While the bill is not expected to be enacted this year, the
increased congressional interest reflects growing public health
concerns along with business pressure for global harmonization,
the increased profitability of producing less toxic products and
the desire to promote the safe use of nanotechnology. The con-
vergence of these trends makes modernization of the U.S. toxic
substances law inevitable during the next several years. 
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the incredible potential of engineered nanomate-rials to advance cleaner, safer technology, emergingdata continue to indicate serious potential for harm to
human health and ecological systems. Nanoscale materials, engi-
neered to be one to one hundred nanometers (“nm”), currently
have a number of commercial applications, from high-capacity
computer drives to food packaging, shampoos, sunscreens, and
cosmetics. The word “nanos,” from the Greek word for “dwarf,”
indicates 10-9, or one-billionth. Nanometer-sized materials are
one-billionth of a meter in size; larger than atoms, but much
smaller than a cell. As a comparison, there are as many nanome-
ters in an inch as there are inches in four hundred miles
(25,344,000). The width of a human hair is 80,000 nm. 
Scientists predict that these
submicroscopic nanoparticles,
or ultra-fine particles, will give
rise to new cancer therapies,
pollution-neutralizing com-
pounds, more durable con-
sumer products, advanced
detectors for such biohazards as
anthrax, and higher-efficiency
fuel cells, among other things.
These predictions are due to the
unique properties of nanoscale
materials compared with their
normal-size counterparts.1
However, laboratory studies
already warn that nanoparticles can cause inflammation, dam-
age brain cells, and cause pre-cancerous lesions. Early research
also has found that nanoparticles easily pass through body tis-
sues from one area of the body to another. Responsible regula-
tion and oversight will be needed to prevent harmful exposures. 
Beyond some basic experimental data on cells and in ani-
mals, there is very little known about the toxicity of nanomate-
rials. For example, we know nothing about whether nanomate-
rials in products such as cosmetics and shampoos penetrate the
skin, or vaporize or off-gas from consumer products. When con-
sidering the potential for harmful effects from nanomaterials,
there are two lines of evidence that are helpful: first, what is
known from well-conducted scientific tests published in the
peer-reviewed journals; and second, what can be extrapolated
from the substantial data on the harmful effects of ultrafine par-
ticulate air pollution. 
SMALL SIZE, BIG RISKS
Carbon-based nanomaterials, such as miniscule carbon
cylinders called nanotubes and tiny carbon spheres called buck-
yballs, have desirable electrical, mechanical, and thermal prop-
erties, useful for such applications as developing strong, light-
weight building and packing materials, computers, and aero-
space engineering. However, the data thus far indicate that
exposure to various carbon nanomaterials may be harmful to the
brain, lung, cardiovascular, and immune systems. Carbon nan-
otubes tend to cluster into “ropes,” acting more like fibers than
particles when inhaled, giving rise to lung inflammation and
granulomas (clusters of cells with injury or inflammation) that
may form scar tissue (fibrosis). Nanotubes are also insoluble
and cannot be broken down by the body’s natural processes. 
Single-walled carbon nanotubes (“SWCNTs”) have been
reported by five different research groups to be associated with
lung toxicity.2 Government researchers from the National
Institute of Occupational Safety
and Health (“NIOSH”) reported
rapid lung inflammation, rapid
progressive fibrosis, and granu-
lomas within seven days after a
single dose of SWCNTs into the
lungs of mice.3 Cell damage
increased in a dose-dependent
manner by one day after expo-
sure. One year earlier, DuPont
researchers had reported acute
lung toxicity and transient
inflammation in rats associated
with a single dose of SWCNTs
of either 1 or 5 mg/kg adminis-
tered into the upper lung.4 That
same year, a collaboration between the National Air and Space
Administration (“NASA”) and the University of Texas reported
dose-dependent granulomas and inflammation in mice that were
administered a single dose of either 0.1 or 0.5 mg of single-
walled carbon nanotubes into the lungs, roughly equivalent to a
mouse inhaling nanotubes for about three and a half workdays
(low dose) or seventeen workdays (high dose) at the workplace
standard for graphite dust. 5
Despite these data, and the lack of complete safety testing,
a major supplier of carbon nanotubes, Carbon Nanotechnolo-
gies, Inc., has registered its product under the Toxic Substances
Control Act (“TSCA”) as a synthetic graphite. Workplace haz-
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ard labels or material safety data sheets reference the work-
place permissible exposure limits for graphite (15 mg/m3 of
total dust, and 5 mg/m3 for the breathable fraction).6 Scientists
have warned that workers breathing nanotube dust at a fraction
of the workplace allowable level “would likely develop serious
lung lesions.”7
Nanomaterials can also be composed of metal atoms.
Examples include nanogold, nanosilver, silicon nanowires, reac-
tive metal oxides such as nanotitanium dioxide, and quantum
dots – a closely packed semiconductor crystal with unique opti-
cal and light-emitting properties. Evidence suggests that metal-
based nanomaterials can cause damage to humans and the envi-
ronment. In 2005, researchers from the New Jersey Institute of
Technology reported that the root growth of corn, cucumbers,
cabbage, carrots, and soybeans was stunted after a 24-hour
exposure to high doses (2 mg/mL) of alumina nanoparticles in
water.8 Alumina nanoparticles currently are used in scratch- and
abrasion-resistant coatings on commercial products such as
safety glasses, car finishes, and flooring. Researchers from the
University of California at San Diego reported that cadmium-
selenium core semiconductor (quantum) dots used in biological
imaging were acutely toxic to liver cells in a Petri dish at doses
typically used for imaging.9 The dots are replacing traditional
imaging with fluorescent dyes, due to their enhanced and
longer-lasting brightness. 
University of Rochester investigators reported in 2000 that
nano-teflon fumes (about 16 nm) were much more acutely toxic
than Teflon, the popular brand name for polytetrafluoroethyl-
ene, when inhaled for only fifteen minutes by rodents, and rap-
idly passed through epithelial tissues to other parts of the body,
inducing severe inflammation, edema, and hemorrhage of lungs
within hours after exposure.10 In 1992, University of Rochester
investigators examined the effects of exposure to nano titanium
dioxide (TiO2; 20 nm), a material in sunscreen. The study
showed that rodents that inhaled ultra-fine TiO2 for three
months, under conditions simulating occupational exposures
(six hours/day, five days/week), had significantly more lung
inflammation and scar tissue compared with those that inhaled
larger TiO2 particles (250 nm).11
HEEDING THE RED FLAGS
Although there is a paucity of toxicity data on nanomateri-
als per se, the hazards of nano-sized (ultra-fine) air pollution are
well-documented. Particulate matter less than 10 micrometers
(PM10; 10,000 nm) is linked to increased disease and death from
lung cancer and cardiopulmonary disease.12 These diseases are
more closely linked with exposure to smaller particles than to
larger-sized ones.13 The risks are especially high among sensi-
tive individuals, such as those with pre-existing conditions of
the heart and lungs, including asthma and chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease.14
Some of the acute toxicity of ultra-fine particles is likely
due to their larger surface-area–to-mass ratio, ability to pene-
trate biological tissues, and their increased biopersistance com-
pared with larger particles of the same composition.15 Given
these characteristics and the results of targeted studies such as
those mentioned above, the potential for harmful effects from
widespread use of nanomaterials must be taken seriously.
MISALLOCATION OF FEDERAL SPENDING
Despite these early warnings, government response thus far
to the potential risks has been woefully inadequate. In spring
2005, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology issued its five year review of the interagency
National Nanotechnology Initiative, established in 1991 to
direct federal research activities on nanotechnology.16 Although
the text of the report is 46 pages long, the section addressing
“Environmental, Health and Safety” does not appear until page
35 and is less than one page long. According to the Project on
Emerging Nanotechnologies at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, only four percent of the fiscal
year (“FY”) 2006 federal nanotechnology funding was ear-
marked for research on health and environmental effects, and
another four percent on social implications and education.17
Meanwhile, federal funding for nanotechnology research and
development has soared from $464 million in 2001 to $1.2 bil-
lion in FY 2007.18 Of this investment, the National Science
Foundation will get $373 million. More than $600 million is
earmarked for the U.S. Departments of Defense ($345 million)
and Energy ($258 million). By comparison, only $142 million is
slated for the human health and environment protection branch-
es of the federal government, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) ($9 million), and the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services ($133 million), which includes the
National Institutes of Health. With this disparity in funding pri-
orities, it is hard to imagine how safety testing could ever catch
up with research and development.
Some federal agencies are addressing the potential down-
side of nanotechnology. The Department of Health and Human
Services’ National Toxicology Program is researching potential
health risks. In addition, NIOSH is developing a “best practices”
document on handling nanoparticles in the workplace to reduce
risks. In FY 2005 the EPA awarded $4 million for research on
nanotechnology impacts on human health and the environment.
However, much more needs to be done to better understand the
potential risks of nanotechnologies. 
RESPONSE BY INDUSTRY AND ITS FINANCIERS
The private sector response to potential health and environ-
ment threats has been mixed. Some corporations seem con-
cerned only about public perception and hope to disavow actu-
al risk by avoiding safety testing, keeping safety data confiden-
tial, and providing empty reassurances to the public. Fearing
actual or perceived risks, insurance companies such as Swiss
Re,19 and financial investment advisers such as Innovest20 and
Allianz,21 have called for safety testing and regulatory oversight
of nanomaterials. Other large corporations and many small start-
up companies also would welcome safety testing and regula-
tions if they were not overly costly or burdensome, because they
would contribute to market stability by reducing future risks of
liabilities and consumer rejection. 
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REGULATORY BLIND SPOT
Unfortunately, existing environmental laws render federal
agencies ill-equipped to regulate the nanotech industry.22 TSCA,
enacted by Congress in 1976 to gather information about chem-
ical substances and control those deemed dangerous to the pub-
lic or the environment, is the most obvious candidate for regu-
lating nanomaterials. But TSCA lacks an effective means of
requiring companies to provide risk data, and it places the bur-
den on the government to demonstrate unacceptable risk before
it can adopt regulatory restrictions of any kind. 
In response to a proposal by the EPA for a voluntary pro-
gram to “regulate” nanomaterials,23 in June 2005, Natural
Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) and other public interest
groups urged the EPA to identify all engineered nanomaterials
as “new chemical substances” under TSCA because they meet
the standard of “organic or inorganic substance[s] of a particu-
lar molecular identity.”24 This would trigger TSCA section 5
pre-manufacture notice (“PMN”) reporting requirements prior
to the commercial manufacture
or import of nanomaterials.25
The U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office issued more than 8,600
nanotechnology-related patents
in 2003,26 suggesting that at
least one arm of the govern-
ment already considers these
materials to be new.
In addition to PMN report-
ing, the 2005 NRDC comments
urged the EPA to issue test rules
under TSCA’s section 4 by
waiving the regulatory production volume thresholds that other-
wise would not be triggered by the miniscule product volume of
nanomaterials.27 The groups also called for regulations under
TSCA’s section 6, requiring the EPA to prohibit or limit anyone
manufacturing, importing, processing, distributing in commerce,
using, or disposing of a chemical if there is a reasonable basis to
conclude the chemical presents, or will present, an “unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment.” Tragically, the EPA
has failed to regulate any new chemical using the TSCA’s section
6 authority since that provision was gutted by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the 1991 case Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA (rejecting the EPA’s application of the TSCA’s
section six to asbestos).28 The court’s decision and subsequent
problematic EPA interpretations of that decision make it extraor-
dinarily difficult for the agency to adopt regulations under sec-
tion 6 of TSCA. Thus, NRDC stated that “while requiring [pre-
manufacture notice], issuing test rules, and promulgating regula-
tions under TSCA are necessary steps for nanomaterials, such
actions will be insufficient to protect public health and the envi-
ronment. Ultimately, additional legislative action by Congress,
the states, and potentially the courts will be necessary to ensure
that nanomaterials are adequately addressed.”29
Other laws also are inadequate. For example, the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) leaves all cosmetics essen-
tially unregulated, and the chronically under-enforced
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) does not ade-
quately protect worker health. Thus, neither the FDCA nor the
OSHA is viable as a vehicle for protecting the public. Other
environmental statutes are similarly ill-equipped to address
nanomaterials – for example, these materials would be effec-
tively unregulated under the Clean Air Act due to very small
production quantities.
VOLUNTARY SAFETY TESTING IS NOT ENOUGH
In response to the lack of a regulatory framework for nan-
otechnology, the EPA is developing a voluntary program that will
ask nanomaterial producers to submit basic information on mate-
rial characterization, toxicity, exposure potential, and risk man-
agement practices. A company would then be able to advertise its
participation as a means of dispelling public fears about its prod-
uct. A more in-depth level of participation would generate more
detailed risk information. NRDC participated in an ad-hoc work-
ing group with industry, academic, and public interest groups to
advise the EPA on a general
framework for such a program. 
While this program poten-
tially would fill a gap in the
absence of real regulations, it is
severely limited in several impor-
tant ways. Participation is not
mandatory, and would only
include those products that par-
ticipating companies choose to
disclose. Those companies with
the riskiest products, as well as
those with poor business ethics,
are unlikely to participate. The program also lacks punitive
measures; it will do little more than gather data – primarily
industry-generated data, which experience has shown are less
likely than data from the government or independent studies to
report products’ harmful effects.30 In the past, industries have
gone to great lengths to downplay the health risks of asbestos,
lead, vinyl chloride, and other toxic materials, only to have them
lead to devastating occupational and public health consequences. 
EPA’S WHITE PAPER RECOMMENDATIONS
In December 2005 the EPA issued the “External Draft
Nanotechnology White Paper”31 which made the following rea-
sonable suggestions as first steps forward:
• Support approaches to promote pollution prevention,
sustainable resource use, and good product steward-
ship in the production and use of nanomaterials;
• Support and undertake research on human health and
ecological impacts of nanomaterials;
• Conduct case studies on the risks and information
gaps of specific nanomaterials;
• Expand collaborations on the potential human and
environmental health implications;




impotent to regulate the
nanotech industry.
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information and regulatory activities; and
• Expand efforts to train agency scientists and man-
agers about the potential environmental applications
and implications of nanotechnologies.
PUBLIC INTEREST GROUP RESPONSES
An array of good stewardship approaches to nanotechnolo-
gy development would increase public confidence and market
stability. In NRDC comments to the EPA, signed by twenty
other public interest groups, including Greenpeace
International, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth,
Environmental Working Group, ETC group, and Silicon Valley
Toxics Coalition, the organizations insisted that the federal gov-
ernment take action on the following initiatives:32
• Prevent uses of nanomaterials that may result in
human exposures or environmental releases unless
reasonable assurances of safety are demonstrated
beforehand;
• Label products that contain nanomaterials or are
made with processes that use nanomaterials;
• Publicly disclose information on potential risks; 
• Include toxicity information about nanomaterials on
workplace hazard labels;
• Increase safety testing conducted by independent or
government laboratories subject to “sunshine laws”
that allow public access to information; and
• Conduct comprehensive assessment of the environ-
mental and human health concerns that may arise
across the life-cycle – including production, use, and
disposal – of nanotech products. 
CONCLUSION
While we know enough to want to avoid exposure to nano-
materials and releases into the environment, many issues need to
be further studied. For example, we do not know much about
how these materials harm our health over a lifetime of exposure;
long-term effects have not been studied in experimental animal
tests. While ingestion and skin penetration are potential routes
of exposure, most studies have only tried to mimic inhalation.
The majority of toxicological studies with nanomaterials have
been in vitro (such as skin cell toxicity), or short-term animal
studies. We do not know whether these materials penetrate
through our skin, even though consumers use shampoos, cos-
metics, and other household products with nanomaterial ingre-
dients. We do not know if nanomaterials are aerosolized and
then inhaled when we use shampoos with nano-ingredients. We
do not know whether ingestion results in toxicity, although we
have nanomaterials in food packaging and even in chocolate
chewing gum. We know that toxicity of inhaled particles seems
to increase as the particle size becomes smaller, but we lack effi-
cient and cost-effective ways to measure the size distribution of
airborne particles. 
Many other questions remain unanswered. For example, we
do not know the extent to which nanomaterials can penetrate the
placenta and transfer from mother to baby. In addition, we are
unaware whether nanomaterials are released from products
when they are incinerated, buried, or degraded over time. These
uncertainties indicate that a necessary first step to effective nan-
otechnology regulation will require investing in studies to eval-
uate the risks, as well as the benefits, of nanomaterials on
human health and the environment. 
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As the floodwaters slowly receded from HurricaneKatrina in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, the land-scape revealed not only demolished neighborhoods
but also the government’s discrimination against the region’s
poor Black and Latino communities. Covering this landscape
was a brown, filmy sediment left behind by Katrina’s polluted
floodwaters, which the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s (“EPA”) early tests showed had high levels of E. coli
bacteria, oil and gas chemicals, lead, and varying quantities of
arsenic.1 Other tests also found benzo(a)pyrene and petroleum
hydrocarbons at levels above the EPA’s safe limit standards.2
Coastal towns became contaminated when the hurricane lifted
up bayou sludge, polluted for decades by industrial chemicals,
heavy metals, and organic
petrochemicals.3
Several months later,
Louisiana State’s chief envi-
ronmental officer stated that
the floodwaters, and what they
left behind, did not contain
chemical contaminants capable
of causing harm.4 Local doc-
tors, however, reported wide-
spread coughs, sore throats,
runny noses, and respiratory
trouble – dubbed the “Katrina Cough” – amongst people return-
ing to New Orleans and other post-hurricane flooded areas.5
Environmentalists continue to caution returnees of the potential
exposure to hazardous chemicals and assert that the EPA has not
used stringent enough standards to establish the sediment’s
threats. At the same time, environmentalists demand that the
U.S. government stop denying the risks of exposure and commit
to a thorough clean-up.6
COMMUNITIES AT RISK
Poor people and people of color in Louisiana are already
more vulnerable to toxic chemical contamination.7 The U.S.
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) defines 24 of 64 parish-
es in Louisiana as “persistent poverty parishes” and “32 as
black high poverty parishes.”8 Some of these communities are
found in the 70 miles between Baton Rouge and New Orleans
called “Cancer Alley” because of the 93 oil refineries and
chemical plants that emit toxins into the air and water.9 A spe-
cial report from the Times-Picayune in 2000 stated that minori-
ties and the poor “bear more
environmental burdens . . . than
the rest of the population.”10
For example, in 1999, the
U.S. government highlighted
the alarmingly high rate of
organic pollutants found in the
citizens of Mossville,
Louisiana, a black community
surrounded by over 30 petro-
chemical and industrial plants
within a two-mile radius.11 In
an environment where communities are already over-exposed
to environmental pollutants, the disproportionate impact of
Katrina’s environmental consequences are predictable.
Speaking on the health impact of Hurricane Katrina on poor
and African American populations, former U.S. Surgeon
General David Satcher said, “the same things that lead to dis-
parities in health in this country on a day-to-day basis led to the
disparities in the impact of Hurricane Katrina.”12
If the U.S. government continues to pretend that post-
Katrina communities are safe to return to when they are truly
not, it will continue contributing to the long history of gov-
ernmental decision-making that disproportionately places
environmental burdens on poor communities and communi-
ties of color. This pattern was first reported in 1983 when the
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) examined the racial and
economic composition of the communities surrounding four
of the largest hazardous waste landfills and discovered that
all were located in majority black counties.13 Four years later,
the United Church of Christ studied the demographic make-
up of 415 zip code areas that were known to contain haz-
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that federal and state
governments continue to
engage in racist neglect.
ardous waste facilities, and found that race was the most sig-
nificant variable associated with the placement of these facil-
ities.14 A 1994 update of the study found that the concentra-
tion of people of color in these localities has only increased
in the interim.15
INCREASINGLY NARROWING RIGHTS OF ACTION
Courts have unfortunately foreclosed the possibility of
using traditional civil rights remedies to address proven dis-
criminatory effects in environmental policy. They have done so
by narrowing the grounds on which plaintiffs can sue, and by
requiring them to prove dis-
criminatory intent in these
policies.16 However, evidence
that governmental decision
makers discriminated on the
basis of racial animus is gener-
ally very difficult for plaintiffs
to produce.17 Government offi-
cials motivated by racism are
unlikely to memorialize this
intention in a discoverable
form in today’s world. Further-
more, it matters little to indi-
viduals subjected to such dis-
criminatory effects whether the decision maker intended this
discrimination or not. In the weeks following Katrina, media
reports highlighted the obvious role that race played in the
impact of the hurricanes. This consensus on the racial elements
of this environmental disaster should be used to create momen-
tum for legislative action against environmental racism. Hurri-
cane Katrina proves that federal and state governments contin-
ue to engage in racist neglect. More importantly, the federal
courts’ narrowing of the rights available under civil rights laws
highlight the need for Congress to create a private right of
action to allow individuals to file suit against the government
for disparate environmental impacts. 
DISPARATE IMPACT: 
A NEW PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
Appropriate legislation enabling the creation of a private
right of action for environmental discrimination would include
several key threshold elements: first, that a plaintiff prove that
a government environmental enforcement action had a dis-
parate negative impact on a racial minority or low-income
community as to be defined by the Department of Labor; and
second, that he or she is a member of such a racial minority or
low-income community. Expanding the class protected to
include low-income communities would eliminate the need for
courts to untangle the intimately related causes of race and
economic class. Although this proposed legislation would be
the first civil rights law prohibiting discrimination based on
economic class, this principle is relatively uncontroversial in
most countries in the world and is reflected in the United
States’ commitments under international human rights law as
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.18
Once the plaintiff meets these two threshold requirements,
the burden would shift to the defendant to prove that the deci-
sion was justified by environmental necessity or other com-
pelling governmental interest. Proof that a decision dispropor-
tionately burdening a racial minority or low-income communi-
ty is economically efficient would not meet the defendant’s
burden. To permit otherwise would render the proposed provi-
sions prohibiting class-based environmental discrimination
completely ineffective.
CONCLUSION
Years from now, Ameri-
cans may look back on Hurri-
cane Katrina as the event that
catalyzed concrete action
addressing the disparities in
race and class continuing four
decades after the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Katrina provides the opportu-
nity to make environmental
justice the next step in the civil
rights movement. 
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INTRODUCTION
Protecting human health and the environment from pollu-tion by chemicals and hazardous materials has become aglobal concern. Over thirteen key international chemi-
cals/waste agreements and initiatives exist.1 The United Nations
Environment Programme (“UNEP”) supports a majority of
these agreements, but some are under the auspices of other UN
bodies or governments, such as the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization and the UN Commission for Europe.2 As the need
for chemicals regulation increases, managing the intricacies of
these multilateral chemicals/waste agreements (“MC/WAs”) to
take advantage of their linkages and coordinate implementation
continues to grow more complex. 
This article explores the need for an independent governing
structure for all MC/WAs. Inevitably, chemical agreements and
initiatives inter-relate, and
should not be completely sepa-
rated. For example, there are
common themes in many of the
chemicals agreements such as
dealing with import/export con-
trols and developing strategies
for waste management. The
global chemicals community
should consider the possibility
of creating an independent enti-
ty to increase the effectiveness
and promote the synergies of existing MC/WAs. 
The goal of this article is to promote discussion on whether
creating an independent governing structure will help harmo-
nize existing and future MC/WAs, or just add bureaucracy to
the institutions. 
IS “CLUSTERING” ENOUGH?
The need for integrating MC/WAs is apparent through
UNEP’s current efforts to explore clustering multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements (“MEAs”) with similar focus areas.3
Clustering tries to enhance synergies and linkages between
MEAs by increasing collaboration among their secretariats in
areas where common issues arise and the agreements have com-
parable areas of focus.4 Clustering considerations take into
account the need to promote capacity building, science and tech-
nology, reporting and monitoring, and more.5
The UNEP Open-ended Intergovernmental Group on
International Environmental Governance has debated the con-
cept of clustering certain MC/WAs since its creation in February
2001.6 The three conventions widely considered for clustering
include the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,7 the Rotterdam
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International
Trade,8 and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants.9 Together these conventions cover elements of “cra-
dle-to-grave,” or more optimistically, “cradle-to-cradle.” In
other words, combined these three conventions regulate new
chemicals, existing chemicals, the import/export of chemicals,
waste management, and environmental releases. Therefore,
under these conventions chemicals are regulated through pro-
duction, use, and disposal. Clustering them may thus facilitate a
life-cycle approach to chemicals management.10
Clustering will likely increase the comprehensiveness and
cooperation of similar MC/WAs. However, cooperation within
clusters may be hindered by dif-
ferent stages of implementation,
variances in development, and
dissimilar memberships.11 For
example, different priorities
exist during each stage of
implementation, which may
lead a convention’s parties to
decide cooperation is not in the
convention’s best interest.12
Likewise, some conventions are
more mature than others, result-
ing in a variance in their development needs. While clustering
serves an important purpose in improving the chemicals/waste
regime, an independent governing entity may allow better coor-
dination for non-cluster concerns and crosscutting issues. 
THE FAILURE OF SAICM TO FULFILL THIS GOAL
The Strategic Approach to International Chemicals
Management (“SAICM”) is one example of an attempt by UNEP,
governments, and multi-sectoral stakeholders to increase coordi-
nation among MC/WAs. In February 2002, the UNEP Governing
Council adopted a decision that there was a need to further devel-
op SAICM.13 In September 2002, the World Summit on
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg called for the comple-
tion of SAICM by 2005.14 The aim of SAICM is to achieve, by
2020, the production and use of chemicals in ways that leads to
the minimization of significant adverse effects on human health
and the environment.15 The International Conference on
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should not be completely
separated.
Chemicals Management (“ICCM”) adopted SAICM in Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, from February 4-6, 2006.16
The original aim of SAICM, a voluntary agreement, was to
provide a basic blueprint for the global management of chemi-
cals. This included covering risk assessments of chemicals, har-
monizing labeling, tackling obsolete and stockpiled products,
and helping the developing world safely manage chemicals.17
However, many participants at the ICCM felt that SAICM fell
short of these goals, especially regarding perception of the glob-
al plan of action.18 It is widely agreed that the tools for imple-
mentation of the SAICM are a key to its success. From the point
of view of most developing countries, the main tool of imple-
mentation is money; however, at the ICCM new and additional
funds did not come forth, with the exception of the “Quick
Start” fund to provide seed money to start programs in the
developing world.19
It is questionable whether meaningful chemical safety will
be able to result from the implementation of SAICM. The main
issue is whether another MEA will be able to promote the syner-
gies of existing agreements. Each multilateral agreement comes
with bureaucracy and its own internal mechanisms. As such,
SAICM may just exacerbate the
issue of lack of harmonization
among MC/WAs by adding
another secretariat to the exist-
ing group. An umbrella organi-
zation, without its own mission
and agenda, would be better
equipped to increase coordina-
tion amongst MEAs. The key
feature of an independent entity
is that it would not have any
personal incentives; the impetus
for its existence should be to
promote coordination in the
global chemicals/waste community.
The probability that SAICM will be able to reform interna-
tional chemicals management appears unlikely; thus, there
remains a strong need for an independent governing structure
for all MC/WAs. 
CURRENT SHORTCOMINGS
Evaluation of some of the current shortcomings in the
MC/WAs regime helps distinguish necessary steps to increase
effectiveness; however, this discussion is far from conclusive.
Still, motivation can be drawn from this limited critique towards
creating a more effective organizational structure of all MC/WAs.
Current fragmentation between the various MC/WAs has
led to numerous inefficiencies. For example, these agreements
are not under the auspice of one governing body, and the secre-
tariats of these Conventions are located throughout the globe.20
This fragmentation, coupled with the increase in MC/WAs, has
led to a diversified body of rules for each MEA. Likewise, a
degree of “sovereignty” exists that some conventions are
unwilling to give away, resulting in their disinclination to coop-
erate with other MEAs.21 Such fragmentation places stress on
States considering ratification because of their limited ability to
handle the responsibility of complying with each MEA. 
Inadequate compliance and enforcement have also plagued
the MC/WAs. While the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer22 developed one of the first compliance
regimes in the 1980s that focused on assisting parties in non-com-
pliance, many of these regimes have only recently been formed.23
For example, the Basel Convention Implementation Committee
was adopted after three years of negotiations in 2002.24 Moreover,
numerous MEAs lack or have weak verification procedures.25
Additionally, a successful compliance committee needs to be able
to evolve based on experiences of the convention and must be
adequately monitored.26 The current structure of MC/WAs has
mainly failed to provide sufficient compliance and supervising
structures. A lack of compliance systems within MC/WAs makes
these agreements defective – what is the point of an agreement if
there are no provisions for enforcement? 
Established in 1972, UNEP acts as the coordinator of envi-
ronmental action and management within the United Nations.27
While UNEP lacks formal powers, it is suppose to be the nucle-
us of the international environ-
mental regime.28 However,
UNEP has not been given, or has
not used, the complete authority
necessary to fulfill its task as a
catalyst for MEAs.29 Limited
membership in the governing
council and lack of resources are
other factors that hinder the
authority of UNEP.30
MC/WAs utilize different
financial mechanisms, some of
which struggle with inadequate
funding. Insufficient funds may
hamper the implementation of agreements and prevent the
development of synergies and cooperation among conven-
tions.31 A recent study by the Rotterdam Convention found that
MEAs experience serious financial hardship when they rely
solely on “(1) voluntary contributions for their financial mecha-
nism, or (2) coordinating mechanisms instead of true financing
mechanisms.”32 For example, the Montreal Protocol’s “stand
alone” financial mechanism has been attributed with this MEA’s
success.33 Conversely, the voluntary mechanism of the Basel
Convention has lead to a non-dependable stream of discre-
tionary financial resources for the Convention.34
AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNING ENTITY SHOULD BE
JUDGED ON HOW IT RESOLVES THESE ISSUES
The creation of an independent governing entity for the
expanding number of MC/WAs would likely help harmonize the
conventions and increase effectiveness. The threshold question
is whether the creation of such a body would alleviate some of
the complications that currently plague the MC/WAs, or just
create another administrative burden. 
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All chemicals/waste agreements would be altered to exist
under the auspice of this independent entity, which would be
under the United Nations umbrella. Each MEA would retain its
secretariat and most of its other internal machinery. The chemi-
cals/waste governing entity would have advising power, but no
executive authority. Some of the functions of this organization
would be to monitor compliance, encourage coordination, assist
with dissemination of information, provide recommendations to
individual MEAs, and serve as a resource of information. A
major alteration would be the creation of a financing mechanism
under this entity for all MC/WAs. 
POSSIBLE STRENGTHS OF AN INDEPENDENT
GOVERNING ENTITY
Numerous strengths can be identified for uniting all
MC/WAs under one roof. For example, when decision-making
is integrated, it reduces the risk of
repetition, inconsistencies, and con-
flict.35 A greater chance of collabo-
ration and identifying gaps in the
research would also exist.
The pooling of scientific and
technical knowledge and the avoid-
ance of duplication would be one of
the benefits of an independent gov-
erning entity. Increased dissemina-
tion of science and technology has
always been an attraction to cluster-
ing conventions that are directly
related.36 An independent umbrella
organization would allow the creation of a technical body that
would facilitate the pooling of information on health and envi-
ronmental impacts of chemicals. This body would serve as a
library equipped with the information to help promote meaning-
ful chemicals safety. Additionally, gaps in research would be
identified more quickly. 
An independent governing structure would reduce frag-
mentation and increase communication between the conven-
tions. Instead of having numerous UN bodies responsible for
implementing MC/WAs, they would all be under the auspice
of one entity. Thus, a degree of conformity would exist among
all the MC/WAs, even if the secretariats are still located in
different regions. Additionally, overarching committees for
compliance, information, and financing will inspire the MEAs
to work together to instill full authority into the governing
entity, giving them the foundation that UNEP has not been
able to provide. 
Another strength would be the ability of the governing enti-
ty to try to establish an effective implementation and compliance
committee. While this will prove to be challenging, the governing
entity will be able to monitor the execution of each convention at
a national level, and search for non-compliance. Additionally,
there is a current need for a judicial instrument to help settle com-
pliance disputes.37 The governing entity could provide this venue,
allowing a much needed arena for dispute resolution leading to
greater compliance within the chemicals regime.
An independent entity would also lead to a more stable
financing mechanism. Combining the financing mechanisms of
all MC/WAs would increase the success of these agreements.
The Global Environment Facility (“GEF”) provides an example
of a successful multipurpose operational entity. As the sole
financing facility that serves more than one convention, the GEF
provides insight into the possible establishment of a similar
financial structure for chemicals.38 The GEF also provides a
sound model of sustainability since its donors have provided
between $2 to $3 billion of financing for each of its first three
replenishment periods.39 The possibility of creating a separate
entity, similar to GEF, with a focal area to support all MC/WAs
has promise to help accelerate the progress of these agreements
by assuaging financial problems. 
There is also the consideration of expanding the mandate of
GEF to include chemicals conventions that focus on more than
persistent organic pollutants, ozone
depletion, climate change, and inter-
national waters.40 In other words,
creating a “GEF Chemicals.” The
2005 study to find lasting financial
mechanisms for the Rotterdam
Convention identified the option of
“[e]xpanding the GEF focal area to
serve a cluster of chemicals conven-
tions and processes, including the
Rotterdam Convention.”41 A study
of financial considerations for
implementation of the SAICM con-
ducted in July 2005 also explored
the possibility of funding SAICM under the GEF.42
POSSIBLE WEAKNESSES OF AN INDEPENDENT
GOVERNING ENTITY
The possibility exists that creating a governing entity
responsible for implementing all of the MC/WAs will not
improve the current troubles experience by the agreements but
will merely transfer them to a new entity.
While an independent governing body may be able to
decrease external fragmentation among MC/WAs, it does not
mean that the individual conventions will be willing to give up
their autonomous nature. Each MEA has its own structure con-
sisting of the secretariat, a conference of the parties, advisory
bodies, technical experts, and more. An independent governing
body does not impact the organization of each individual agree-
ment. Thus, the people responsible for running each MEA may
still be unwilling to cooperate even if there is an increase in
external coordination. 
While it is undisputable that there is much overlap between
these agreements, it may be difficult to create effective machinery
that provides technical bodies and committees for MEAs with dif-
ferent members and focal areas. For example, differing research
needs of the convention may result in disputes of the allocation of
research funding by the scientific and technical knowledge tech-
nical body. The administrative backlog from trying to coordinate
the various chemicals/waste agreements may negate the purpose








of collaboration. Additionally, an MEA is not a stagnant agree-
ment. Most MEAs evolve over time, with their needs and goals
altering. The task of trying to create an implementation and com-
pliance committee that is able to
monitor and regulate all the
MC/WAs may prove extremely
difficult, if not impossible. 
An important goal of many
MC/WAs is to assist develop-
ing countries in protecting
human health and the environ-
ment. It is possible that the bal-
ance of power may become
skewed within an administra-
tive structure trying to coordi-
nate all of these important
MEAs. In the end, developed
nations, industry, and better
funded organizations may end up with more control than is in
the best interest of the parties of the Conventions. 
Moreover, the creation of an independent financial mecha-
nism for MC/WAs might experience a similar imbalance of
power. The triumph of an MEA can be directly attributed to its
financial resources, and developing countries are in dire need of
money in order to have the tools to implement the sound man-
agement of chemicals. However, wealthy developed countries
that contribute more financial resources tend to have a louder
voice on the allocation of funds
than developing countries. Pool-
ing the resources of the MEAs
into either a “GEF Chemicals” or
an independent financial mecha-
nism leads to issues of having to
deal with a large amount of
bureaucracy to accomplish the
fair distribution of funds. 
CONCLUSION
The creation of an independ-
ent structure to govern all
MC/WAs would allow the great-
est chance for successful interna-
tional chemicals management. It
can be debated whether creating this governing body to house
all MC/WAs will help coordinate existing and future agree-
ments, or just add another layer of complications. However, the
global environmental community is running out of alternative
options to help harmonize sound chemicals management. 
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INTRODUCTION
For almost a decade, the deliberative bodies and MemberStates of the European Union have been developing a newlegal framework to govern the marketing and trade of
chemicals. When adopted, the proposed regulation on
Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals
(“REACH”) will mark a fundamental change in the way chemi-
cals are managed in Europe and around the world. This REACH
reform process was driven by the recognition that the existing
patchwork of EU law on chemicals was inadequate to securing a
healthy environment for present and future generations. REACH
was coined in the EU Commission’s 2001 White Paper, but it
builds on years of European experience combating regional pol-
lution in the Baltic, the North Sea, the Mediterranean, the Rhine,
the Danube, and elsewhere. It now stands as the EU’s plan for
meeting the global 2020 goal to minimize the health and envi-
ronmental impacts of chemicals agreed by the governments of
the world at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in
Johannesburg in 2002. 
This White Paper’s high-minded proposal triggered a com-
plex process within the Commission to draft the legislative text
that was ultimately proposed in 2003. Economic concerns about
the competitiveness of the EU chemicals industry, as well as the
workability and transaction costs of proposed arrangements, led
EU institutions to scale back on the grander vision of REACH.
Very heavy lobbying by the chemical industry and some promi-
nent countries outside the EU forced concessions on the scope
of REACH, the duty of care, minimum data requirements, and
the consideration of alternatives.1 Intense debate within the
European Parliament and the Council has produced two critical
texts that supersede the Commission’s drafts: the result of the
Parliament’s first reading vote; and the political agreement
among the 25 Member States (the Common Position). At the
time of writing, the parliament was preparing to take up the
Council’s agreed text and consider amendments in the second
reading vote.
Despite the political influences, REACH is still guided by
some important principles. For the first time REACH places the
burden of proof on chemical makers and importers to demon-
strate the safety of their products, rather than relying on author-
ities to prove them dangerous. REACH will generate valuable
data about the properties and uses of several thousand chemicals
and mixtures, which will be available to downstream customers
and the public. REACH may drive adoption of safer substitutes
or the generation of inherently greener solutions, especially if
the Parliament’s first reading vote prevails in the final political
deal. Many countries outside Europe will feel the ripple effects
of REACH through global supply chains and evolving interna-
tional standards. Developing countries may benefit from safer
products from the EU and access to new markets for products
not requiring registration. 
This article provides an international legal perspective on
REACH. Since REACH is still under debate in the European
Parliament and the Council, this piece addresses the basic con-
tours of the likely political agreement expected in 2006, with a
special focus on the relevance of human rights and trade law.
After tracing the origins of REACH, this article explores the
role of the main EU institutions involved in the development of
the regulation. Next, this article looks at the core elements of
REACH, focusing on objectives, principles, requirements, and
impacts. An examination of some of the trade-related issues
debated at the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) sheds light
on a possible trade challenge against REACH. 
ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM: PIECEMEAL
APPROACHES TO CHEMICALS MANAGEMENT
Over the course of many years, European authorities, elect-
ed officials, industry, and civil society have concluded that the
existing EU legal framework for chemicals is unable to provide
adequate information about the impact of many chemicals on
human health and the environment. They are not alone. The
national chemical laws developed in the 1970s and later, both
inside and outside the EU, are antiquated and ineffective. At the
turn of the 21st Century the EU had managed to fully assess
approximately 140 chemicals; this nearly three decades under a
web of directives on chemical labeling, transport, and restric-
tions. Current EU law distinguishes between “new” chemicals
and “existing” chemicals. Existing chemicals were on the mar-
ket before September 1981 numbering more than 100,000 sub-
stances and over 99 percent of commercial chemicals in terms
of tonnage. 2 While existing EU Directives require that new sub-
stances are tested and their risks assessed, “existing” substances
are not subject to the same testing requirements. As a result, EU
law has not obtained basic screening data about the characteris-
tics and impacts of most chemicals. Without such information,
chemicals policy is blind to the risks posed by chemicals and
frozen into inaction.3
In addition to the general lack of knowledge about the prop-
erties and the uses of existing substances, current EU law on
chemicals suffers from other serious deficiencies. The duty to
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provide credible information about chemical safety falls on
authorities instead of the enterprises that make and sell chemi-
cals. The risk assessment process is slow and costly, allowing
continued production, marketing, and use of potentially danger-
ous chemicals. Further, the Commission is responsible for car-
rying out risk assessments and adequate cost/benefit analysis
prior to any regulatory proposal relating to marketing and use of
dangerous substances.4 Liability regimes are insufficient to
ensure redress for injured parties when cause and effect are dis-
tanced and if adequate data on the effects of chemicals are not
available. Finally, the EU’s current legal framework on chemi-
cals is a patchwork of Directives and Regulations that has been
characterized as a barrier to innovation by discouraging research
and favoring existing substances over new, safer chemicals. 
The European Union is
home to the 500 billion Euro
chemicals industry, the world’s
largest. As the source of a third
of global chemical production,
and with an educated and envi-
ronmentally aware citizenry,
Europe is at the center of the
contemporary struggle to recon-
cile its industrial economy with
protection of public health and
the environment. How REACH
is ultimately agreed and how it
is implemented will have
important implications for the
direction of international law
and the evolving role of the EU
as a leader internationally on
matters of health and environmental protection.
REACH’S BACKGROUND: EVOLUTION OF EU
CHEMICALS POLICY AND EU INSTITUTIONS
A comprehensive narrative of the EU’s reform of its chem-
icals framework would require extensive detail on the unprece-
dented and intense involvement of national governments, indus-
try, and civil society in a broad debate handled largely by EU
Institutions. Fortunately, up to 2004 that narrative can be found
elsewhere.5 This section provides a general overview of key
events and actors, with a view to contextualizing the interna-
tional law dimensions of REACH.
THE EVOLUTION OF EU CHEMICALS POLICY AND
REGIONAL AGREEMENTS
In the late 1960s, at a time of increased environmental
awareness, the first signs of what would later become a patch-
work legislation concerning chemicals began to surface. The
first EC legislative instrument on industrial chemicals was the
1967 Directive on Classification and Labelling of Chemicals,6
which focused on harmonizing trade in chemicals and protect-
ing workers from acute exposure, but did not require testing or
other data. Subsequently, the 1976 Directive on Restrictions of
Certain Substances7 was an attempt to harmonize chemicals pol-
icy in response to trade obstacles resulting from some Members
banning or restricting production or use of certain chemicals.
Under this Directive, the Commission committed itself to carry-
ing out risk assessments and cost/benefit analyses prior to any
proposal or adoption of a regulatory measure concerning chem-
icals. In 1979, an important amendment to the 1967 Directive
was adopted, establishing the “new” and “existing” distinction.8
In 1988, the Council replaced several directives concerning
preparations with the Directive on Classification and Labelling
on Preparations.9
By 1993, disparities in the national legislations implement-
ing the above-mentioned Directives and their impact on EC
trade, coupled with increasing awareness of the substantial
threat posed to human health and the environment by chemicals,
led to the 1993 Council Regula-
tion on Evaluation of Existing
Substances. According to this
regulation, certain categories of
data were to be provided to the
authorities. Progress on risk
assessment was slow, however,
and restrictions or bans could
only be adopted if the authority
could show strong evidence of
the substance’s negative effects.
This business-as-usual approach
ultimately proved unacceptable
to countries particularly affected
by persistent pollution. 
Meanwhile, regional agree-
ments were concluded to address
pollution issues. Nordic and
other countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and Germany have taken a lead in efforts to protect
the marine environment of the North Sea, for example, includ-
ing the phase-out of hazardous chemicals. The North Sea
Conferences have produced political commitments which have
played an important role in influencing legally binding environ-
mental management decisions both nationally and within the
framework of competent international bodies. The 1995
Ministerial Declaration adopted in Esbjerg, Denmark stands as
a landmark in that it defines an operational objective: to cease
all releases to the marine environment of human-made and nat-
ural hazardous substances, in order to achieve background lev-
els of natural hazardous substances by 2020 (in one genera-
tion).10 Similar wording was adopted in June 2001 by the EU
Council to define the objectives of the new EU chemicals strat-
egy and by the 2006 Strategic Approach to International
Chemicals Management, adopted under the auspices of the
United Nations Environment Programme.11
This objective was also adopted by the 1992 Convention
for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic (the “OSPAR Convention”) in its first meeting in
Sintra, Portugal in 1998.12 A review of its first five years expe-
rience in implementing activities to achieve the “one genera-
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tion” goal led to the 2003 Hazardous Waste Strategy, which ulti-
mately aims to achieve “concentrations in the marine environ-
ment near background values for naturally occurring substances
and close to zero for manmade synthetic substances” by the year
2020.13 In order to achieve this objective, the OSPAR
Convention actively engaged EU institutions, contributing its
expertise to the EU chemicals policy reform process.
EU INSTITUTIONS AND THE
POLITICAL BATTLE OVER REACH
Against this broader international legal background, in
1998 environment ministers of EU Member States initiated
intensive public dialogue about chemicals, public health, and
the environment. In an informal meeting in Chester, UK, the
environment ministers concluded that a comprehensive review
of the system was necessary, with a view to introducing princi-
ples of sustainable development in the chemicals sector. The
Commission conducted this review in 1998, identifying major
weaknesses in the current chem-
icals legislation. The Council
welcomed the Commission’s
progress and requested it to
organize a brain-storming meet-
ing open to all relevant stake-
holders that could inform a pro-
posal. In February 2001, the
Commission presented its White
Paper on a Strategy for a Future
Chemicals Policy (REACH), a
prescient nickname for one of
the hardest fought political bat-
tles in Brussels. All this led to an
enormously contentious and
complex political debate with unprecedented participation by
NGOs, business, and others.
As the administrative branch of the EU, the European
Commission has particular responsibilities in preparing legisla-
tion proposals.14 In the ambit of REACH, DG-Environment and
DG-Enterprise were tasked to draft REACH together. The
Commission has attempted an inclusive process of debate to
address the complex issues associated with chemicals policy. In
2001, for example, after presenting its White Paper, the
Commission organized a stakeholder conference and convened
technical working groups. In May 2003, the entire draft regula-
tion was posted on the internet for consultation, which enabled
unprecedented participation by governments, industry, and a
range of civil society. On October 29, 2003, the Commission
sent its proposed REACH regulation to the Parliament. Since
then, the Commission has been actively involved in consultation
with Council and Parliament, and also managing a range of
implementation projects with authorities, industry, and others.
The European Parliament is the elected political body of the
EU, with a key role in the co-legislation process. Its Members
(“MEPs”) are elected in national elections and they are organized
by political groups.15 While the Parliament had a role during the
discussion of the White Paper, when after the draft entered
Parliament, it became the focus of intense committee debate
(2003-2005). The Environment Committee took the lead, in what
turned out to be a hard fought turf battle, and other committees
gave “opinions.” On November 17, 2005, Parliament adopted over
one thousand amendments to the draft in its first reading vote. The
Parliament has subsequently been involved in dialogue with
Council on the draft, and is expected to hold a second reading vote
in 2006.
The Council of the European Union represents the (now 25)
Member States of the European Union and organizes its work on
the basis of specialized topics, e.g. Environment Council,
Competitiveness Council, etc.16 This arrangement means that
the Council reflects national political influence, but is also
informed by technical experts from ministries, competent
authorities, etc. This arrangement has also had profound influ-
ence on the Council’s stance before REACH. In fact, while early
discussions on chemicals policy were steered by the
Environment Council, the draft REACH regulation was placed
under the competence of the
Competitiveness Council, which
led to greater emphasis on issues
of workability, innovation, and
implementation costs. The
Council also operates under the
leadership of a presidency that
sets the agenda on a rotating six-
month basis. This has had impli-
cations for REACH process, as
key decisions were made under
the Italian, Dutch, and other
presidencies. In December 2005
the Council reached a prelimi-
nary political agreement under the UK Presidency. After regular
deliberations on most major aspect of the 2003 draft regulation,
and after the 2005 preliminary political agreement, in February
2006 the Council adopted its “common position” regarding the
Parliament’s first reading vote, which essentially defines the
practical bounds for an eventual compromise.17 Any remaining
differences between the Council and Parliament’s second read-
ing vote would be resolved through a formal conciliation
process. REACH is now expected to enter into force in 2007.
REACH IN FOCUS: OBJECTIVES, REQUIREMENTS,
AND THE NEW EUROPEAN CHEMICALS AGENCY
As the previous section shows, REACH is the result of a
complex process, where multiple interests and players have
engaged in a vigorous and heated debate over the future of EU
chemicals policy. Given that REACH is still a live document
and that a final regulation is expected in 2007, rather than
attempting a comprehensive analysis of REACH, this section
will only discuss some of its general features and central
requirements, based on the Council’s Common Position and the
Parliament’s first reading vote.
OBJECTIVES OF REACH
The political objectives of the proposed strategy for a future
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chemicals policy prepared by the Commission encompassed a
range of important public policy goals. Pursuant to the challenge
of sustainable development, and within the framework of the EC
common market, REACH attempts to integrate environmental,
economic, and social considerations in the design of the pro-
posed chemicals strategy. As elaborated in the White Paper, the
political objectives of REACH include:
Protection of Human Health and Promotion of a Non-
toxic Environment
This objective requires a process for ensuring the safety of
tens of thousands of chemicals, especially “existing” substances
that have been held to a lower standard than new ones. This
process would distinguish substances according to proven or
suspected hazardous properties, uses, exposure, and volumes of
production or trade, in order to prioritize actions. Industry,
including companies along the manufacturing chain, would be
responsible for generating and assessing data and assessing the
risks of the use of the substances. Ultimately, this process would
fill the large data gap concerning chemical hazards and uses,
thereby enabling a sound chemicals policy for the protection of
human health and the environment.
Maintenance and Enhancement of the
Competitiveness of the EU Chemical Industry
Given the economic importance of the chemical industry in
the EU, including with respect to jobs, the White Paper encour-
aged innovation and in particular the development of safer
chemicals. In addition, a workable and realistic timetable for
submission of data, coupled with flexible test data and other
measures (e.g. testing thresholds) would limit the cost for enter-
prises. 
Prevention of Fragmentation of the Internal Market
The White Paper places considerable importance on the
internal market, following the Commission’s role as the steward
of the EC market. In this light, the White Paper views health and
environment protection as fully compatible with the proper
functioning of the internal market in the chemicals sector, as in
any other industrial sector within the Union. The White Paper
also proposes that to meet its objectives, the new chemicals pol-
icy be based on full harmonization.
Increased Transparency
Transparency in the White Paper is addressed from two
angles. First is the “public right to know;” that is, the public’s
right to access information about the chemicals to which they
are exposed. The economic implications of the public’s right to
know will center on the public’s ability to make informed choic-
es in the marketplace, avoiding dangerous products and prefer-
ring safer substitutes. The second angle relating to enhanced
transparency is institutional and administrative; a single system
applying to all chemicals will improve the transparency of the
regulation. 
Integration with International Aspects
This objective encompasses several dimensions, including
recognizing test results carried out using globally harmonized
methodology in order to reduce costs and animal testing; pre-
venting distortions to the global market by covering importers;
and supporting multilateral environmental initiatives relating to
chemical safety. In this latter vein, the White Paper supports
efforts by the OSPAR Convention, the Stockholm Persistent
Organic Pollutants Convention, and the Rotterdam Convention
on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade. This objective
also addresses the need to strengthen developing countries’
capabilities and capacities for managing chemicals. 
Promotion of Non-animal Testing
The White Paper recognized the difficulties and dilemmas
surfacing from the need to tests chemicals in different ways,
including on animals, in order to assess hazard and risk. This
objective seeks to reduce animal testing to an absolute minimum
by maximizing the use of existing non-animal test methods.
Also, this objective calls for the development of new non-ani-
mal test methods, as well as for careful definition of testing
thresholds, flexible test regimes, and sequencing in the produc-
tion of information.
Conformity with EU International Obligations under
the WTO
The White Paper is explicit about the WTO obligations con-
tained in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT
Agreement”) (addressed below). In particular, this objective
calls for preventing discrimination against imported products;
ensuring that its measures are based on sound scientific evalua-
tion of the potential threats to human health and the environ-
ment; and ensuring that its technical regulations do not create
unnecessary obstacles to international trade. 
The analysis of the objectives of REACH shows the close
linkages between the economic, public health, and environmen-
tal dimensions of chemicals management under the broader
umbrella framework of sustainable development. In this light,
REACH is redefining the different roles of the various social
actors involved in chemicals production and trade, and has
introduced a “duty of care” approach to chemicals production
and trade, where industry takes responsibility of the products
that it places on the market. This duty of care is complemented
by stringent requirements regarding information on chemicals,
summarized by the “no data, no market” quote. REACH’s
requirements also show a preference for safer substitutes (with-
out having to fully prove dangers) as a means to gradually
secure health as well as stimulate innovation. These require-
ments and other specific obligations contained in the REACH
regulation are examined next. 
REQUIREMENTS IN REACH
As a regulation, REACH is directly applicable to EU
Members States and enforceable in their domestic courts.
Among other things, this “harmonization” feature contrasts
REACH from the current EC Directives that concern chemicals,
which have been implemented by multiple and varying domes-
tic laws in Members. Thus, REACH will ensure a common play-
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ing field within the EC internal market, where all chemical pro-
ducers and traders will be subject to the same specific require-
ments. The central requirements of REACH are found in its
acronym: Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization, exam-
ined in cursory fashion below. 
Registration
Registration requires a manufacturer to notify an authority
of the intention to produce or import a substance and to submit
a dossier containing the information required by the legislation.
Registration will be obligatory for all chemicals produced or
imported in volumes exceeding one ton per year, including
“existing” and “new” chemicals. In general terms, unless other-
wise exempted, failure to register means that the substance will
not be allowed in the market.
The timing and amount of information required for regis-
tration depends partly on the volume produced or imported.
While risk of a chemical substance towards human health and
the environment is not necessar-
ily proportional to the volume of
production, volume is a proxy
for exposure, as it allows a clear,
enforceable priority setting for
registration which also gives
legal certainty.18 For substances
above one ton, a technical
dossier (containing information
on the properties, uses, classifi-
cation, and guidance on safe
use) must be submitted to the
authorities. For substances
above ten tons, a chemical safe-
ty report (“CSR”) is required. A
CSR documents the hazard clas-
sification of a substance and the
assessment as to whether the
substance is persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic (“PBT”) or
very persistent and very bioaccumulative (“vPvB”). Further, the
CSR also describes exposure scenarios, including appropriate
risk management measures, for all identified uses of dangerous,
PBT, and vPvB substances.19
REACH allows for, but does not require, chemical makers
and importers to share data for registration. There are also cost-
sharing provisions among registrants, designed to respect prop-
erty rights to data and to fairly allocate the cost of producing the
required information. New tests are only required when it is not
possible to provide the information in any other permitted way,
in order to minimize animal testing. In these situations, the man-
ufacturer or importer would submit proposals for testing, which
will be scrutinized by the authorities in the evaluation process
before the tests are performed. 
Evaluation
The evaluation process consists of an examination of the
data contained in the registration dossiers provided by industry.
There are two types of evaluation: dossier evaluation and sub-
stance evaluation. The dossier evaluation includes a (1) compli-
ance check (or completeness check), where authorities test the
registration dossiers against the registration requirements, and a
(2) checking of testing proposals, where authorities evaluate the
animal testing proposals to prevent repetition of existing tests
and poor quality tests. The substance evaluation focuses on sus-
picions of risks to human health or the environment and may
lead to requests for further information or expedited action. The
new chemicals agency will develop guidance on prioritization
of substances for evaluation. Evaluation may lead to the con-
clusion that further action needs to be explored under the
authorization procedures.
Authorization
An authorization is required for the use and marketing of
“substances of very high concern.” There are several categories
of such substances of very high concern, constructed on the
basis of their properties: (1) carcinogenic, mutagenic, or toxic
for reproduction; (2) PBTs or
vPvB; and (3) equivalent to the
above in their potential to cause
serious and irreversible effects to
humans or the environment, such
as endocrine disrupters. Autho-
rization under REACH could
include bans or restrictions on
the manufacture or uses of these
chemicals, but banning sub-
stances or uses will not occur by
default. Of the estimated 30,000
produced above one ton per year,
an estimated 1,500 chemicals
may require authorization. 
The authorization process
consists of two steps. The first
step focuses on identifying the
substances that will be included in the system; the uses that will
be exempted because of sufficient controls; and the deadlines
that will have to be met. The new Chemicals Agency will make
recommendations for priority substances for authorization based
largely on risk, i.e. use, volume, and properties, while taking
into account workability considerations. The second step
requires industry to apply for an authorization for each use,
demonstrating that either the risk of the use of the substance is
adequately controlled, or that the socio-economic benefits out-
weigh the risks, taking account of alternative substitutes. In
order to enable costs to be minimized, REACH allows groups of
applications for authorization, such as by manufacturers,
importers, and downstream users.
Registration, evaluation, and authorization are the support-
ing pillars of REACH’s new approach to chemical safety. A crit-
ical question that surfaces with respect to the operation of the
proposed REACH regulation is its scope, i.e. which substances
are covered by these requirements. In that context, it is impor-
tant to note that REACH only covers substances (chemicals) but
does not cover preparations. Additionally, REACH exempts
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REACH ultimately …
contributes to improving
public health and the
environment globally, and
in meeting Europe’s
commitment to the global
2020 goal for a toxic-free
future.
inter alia radioactive substances, wastes, non-isolated interme-
diates and substances that Members States deem necessary for
their defense interests.20
Yet another controversial aspect about REACH’s scope is
that it does not cover products.21 This exclusion, however, is not
absolute, and REACH may apply if certain conditions are pres-
ent, such as if chemicals in products are dangerous and intend-
ed to be released from the article during normal and reasonably
foreseeable conditions of use. While there is considerable uncer-
tainty in regard to the exact meaning of this language, the exclu-
sion of products (including imported products) represents a
shortcoming of the system to the extent that these products may
have been manufactured utilizing dangerous chemicals that
could be released unintentionally to the environment, thereby
threatening public health. Further, while release may not be
intended, there may be cases or products where it could never-
theless be foreseen that some of the chemicals employed in their
manufacture would be released to the environment. In such
cases where substances may be released incidentally to the use
of the article, a simple notification is required. From another
perspective, the exclusion of products from REACH means that
a plethora of difficult questions concerning WTO-consistency
are left for a future day. 
Another key question regarding the implementation of
REACH’s requirements concerns the timetable for registration.
REACH envisages a tiered approach for registration to be
phased in over eleven years, where deadlines hinge on produc-
tion volume, e.g. above one ton, one-hundred tons, one-thou-
sand tons, etc. At the same time, the system is expected to be
flexible enough to allow for earlier registration of substances of
concern, including those having proven or suspected hazardous
properties and those intended for consumer use. 
It is readily apparent that the requirements in REACH are
varied and complex.22 Several developing countries have com-
mented on the difficulties that their chemical producers and
exporters will face to maintain their market presence in the EC,
as discussed further below. In order to facilitate the implemen-
tation of the new chemicals regulation, the creation of a new
agency is envisaged, examined in turn. 
A NEW EUROPEAN CHEMICALS AGENCY
In order to administer REACH and facilitate its implemen-
tation, a new European Chemicals institution is being estab-
lished in Helsinki. The new Chemicals Agency is expected to
build on the Commission’s experience with other agencies in
other fields, in particular those working on medicinal products
and food safety. The agency is also expected to provide Member
State authorities with technical and scientific support, as well as
to coordinate the evaluation of substances by national environ-
mental authorities. The Chemical Agency has no enforcement
powers, and would rely on the Commission to enforce REACH. 
A key aspect of the new European chemicals agency con-
cerns its role with respect to information on chemicals. The cen-
tral chemicals entity will manage the registration process, serv-
ing as receiving body for the registration dossiers and forward-
ing copies of the dossiers to the Member State authorities. The
agency will also undertake compliance checks and evaluation of
testing proposals of the dossiers. The agency will maintain a
comprehensive central database on all registered chemicals, per-
forming computerized screening for properties raising particular
concern. Crucially, the new agency will provide access to non-
confidential information about chemicals to the general public,
thereby contributing to a better understanding of chemical safe-
ty to the public worldwide.
INTERNATIONAL LAW IMPLICATIONS OF REACH
REACH’s multifaceted characteristics mean that it links
with various dimensions of international law. By its own nature
as an EC Council Regulation, REACH is binding on EU
Member States, and directly applicable before their internal
courts. This argues for a detailed analysis of EU law, however,
this section explores some of REACH’s implications for inter-
national human rights law and trade law. 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT DIMENSION
Under human rights law, States are under an obligation to
structure their legal systems in a way that ensures the free and
full exercise of fundamental rights, including the right to health.
In particular, international human rights law imposes upon
States the duty to take concrete steps towards the full realization
of the right to the highest attainable standards of physical and
mental health.23 More generally, the linkages between environ-
mental health and human rights have been clarified by the work
of UN Special Rapporteurs24 and recognized by a number of
international instruments.25
Further, States are under a positive duty to take reasonable
and appropriate measures to secure certain civil and political
rights particularly affected by pollution.26 The European Court
of Human Rights (“ECHR”) in Fadeyeva v. Russia observed
that the State’s responsibility in environmental cases may arise
from a failure to regulate private industry, and inquired whether
the State could reasonably be expected to act so as to prevent or
put an end to the infringement of the applicant’s rights.27 In
Oneryildiz v. Turkey, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR further
elaborated on the positive obligation to take all appropriate steps
to safeguard life, including the duty to put in place a legislative
and administrative framework. In the words of the Court, “This
obligation indisputably applies in the particular context of dan-
gerous activities, where, in addition, special emphasis must be
placed on regulations geared to the special features of the activ-
ity in question, particularly with regard to the level of the poten-
tial risk to human lives.” 28
When viewed under a human rights and environment lens,
REACH could represent (when completed and depending on the
final outcome) a concrete step towards the realization of the
right to health. This is important for the advancement of eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights, as well as for the protection of
civil and political rights enshrined in the European Convention
on Human Rights. In addition, in light of the persistence and
long-range travel potential of certain chemicals and given the
volumes of chemicals produced in the EU, REACH ultimately
also contributes to improving public health and the environment
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globally, and in meeting Europe’s commitment to the global
2020 goal for a toxic-free future. 
REACH AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM
Conformance with international trade law was an explicit
consideration in the crafting of REACH. While the draft legis-
lation was engineered by DG-Enterprise and DG-Environment,
they deferred to DG-Trade on ways to steer clear of WTO vio-
lations. The treatment of substances in articles (i.e. chemicals in
products) examined above illustrates the influence of trade law
in REACH design. As noted earlier, the European Commission
conducted a novel and broad Internet consultation in 2003 to
hear concerns, including on trade. 
On its part, the Bush administration worked with the U.S.
chemical industry to undermine REACH, as a House
Committee report describes.29 The administration said publicly
that REACH would threaten $20 billion in U.S. chemicals
exported to the EU. The House Committee report also contains
references to cables sent in March 2002 and April 2003 by U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell to U.S. trading partners in Latin
America and Asia as well as Europe to oppose REACH. It may
be that some of the submissions to the WTO, presented below,
are the result of the U.S. campaign against REACH. Further, the
U.S. Department of Commerce developed an extensive outreach
plan to influence “stakeholders” within the European Union and
generate opposition to REACH, and also targeted countries of
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”).30
In January 2004, in accordance with the WTO’s TBT
Agreement, the EU notified REACH to the WTO’s Committee
of Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Committee”).31 WTO
Members raised a number of issues relating to the compatibility
of REACH and the TBT Agreement, including questions con-
cerning national treatment, unnecessary obstacles to trade, inter-
national standards, and special and differentiated treatment for
developing countries. Some countries also mentioned concerns
with respect to intellectual property rights and the treatment of
confidential information in REACH. This section provides an
overview of the relevant TBT issues identified in these submis-
sions to the TBT Committee, with a view to identifying the
potential claims in a possible WTO challenge to REACH by the
United States or other nations. 
National Treatment
The TBT Agreement provides that the WTO Members shall
ensure that their technical regulations do not accord products
imported from other Members with less favorable treatment
than those accorded to like products of national origin.32 WTO
Members generally pointed out that REACH is more difficult
for non-EU manufacturers to comply than for EU manufactur-
ers, which leads to de facto discrimination.33 Singapore elabo-
rated on the de facto discriminatory effects by noting that due to
long distance and unfamiliarity with REACH, non-EU produc-
ers and suppliers will face more hardship than EU producers to
comply with REACH. Thailand also raised concerns about
REACH’s data sharing provisions (which allow the first regis-
trant to charge 50 percent of the cost from subsequent regis-
trants),34 noting that such a scheme favors EU producers
because they will likely register early and then charge subse-
quent non-EU registrants.35
Unnecessary Obstacles to International Trade
Under the TBT Agreement, technical regulations shall not
be prepared, adopted, or applied to create unnecessary obstacles
to international trade, and regulations shall not be more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate purpose.36 To
some degree, every comment submitted to the TBT Committee
regarding REACH raised concerns about unnecessary obstacles
to international trade. The high costs associated with implemen-
tation and compliance, it was argued, would drive many com-
petitors out of business, especially small and medium enterpris-
es in developing countries. Some commented that the scope of
REACH was broader than any OECD country, imposing admin-
istrative burdens on many substances that may pose negligible
risk to health and the environment. Several countries comment-
ed that the hazard-based and volume-based approaches in
REACH were incompatible with a scientific, risk-based evalua-
tion of substances.37 Finally, several WTO Members claimed
that REACH did not recognize test results generated outside the
EU, even where such data was obtained in conformity with the
OECD Principles of Good Laboratory Practice, increasing com-
pliance costs, frustrating cooperation, and imposing unneces-
sary obstacles to trade.38
Relevant International Standards
The TBT Agreement requires that Members use relevant
international standards that exist unless such standards would
be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of
the legitimate objectives pursued.39 This provision was direct-
ly at issue in EC – Sardines, where the Appellate Body held
that where a Member departs from a relevant international
standard because it considers it to be ineffective to achieve its
legitimate objectives, the burden of proof will nevertheless
fall on the complaining Member.40 It is of course open to
question whether existing international standards exist to
achieve the goals of REACH. Several comments charged that
REACH was incompatible with international efforts to con-
trol chemicals, such as the OECD High Production Volume
(“HPV”) initiative or the Globally Harmonized System
(“GHS”) for classification and labeling.41
Special and Differential Treatment for Developing
Countries
The TBT Agreement requires that in the preparation and
application of technical regulations, Members take into account
the special developmental, financial, and trade needs of devel-
oping country Members, with a view to ensuring that such tech-
nical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment proce-
dures do not create unnecessary obstacles to exports from those
Members.42 Interpreting a similarly worded provision in the
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phitosanitary Measures, the
EC-Biotech Panel noted that “taking into account” does not pre-
scribe a specific result to be achieved, and that in weighing and
balancing the various interests at stake, the needs of a develop-
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ing country did not have priority over, for instance, other legiti-
mate interests.43 The TBT Agreement also provides that the
Member imposing technical regulations shall take reasonable
measures to arrange for the regulatory bodies to advise other
members, grant them technical assistance on mutually agreed
terms and conditions.44
Brazil, China, Cuba, and Thailand raised particular concerns
about REACH and these provisions of the TBT Agreement, not-
ing that advice and technical assistance were necessary, includ-
ing by way of implementation guidance by sectors.45
NEXT STEPS
At the time of writing, the Council has been discussing the
Parliament’s November 17, 2005 vote. The Council struck a
political agreement on Dec. 13, 2005 under the UK
Presidency. A Common Position was approved in February
2006 reflecting some of the Parliament’s first reading. The
Parliament will take up the Council’s draft in second reading
in May or June 2006. The Parliament can then either accept the
Council’s amendments or pass certain amendments for consid-
eration in the formal conciliation process. In the international
sphere, the comments submitted to the TBT Committee may
prelude a brewing trade challenge to certain measures adopted
pursuant to REACH. 
CONCLUSION
REACH is coming. After years of dialogue, debate and
bruising politics, the EU has created a new model for regulating
chemicals. Did the EU over-reach? Will the final compromises
so weaken the system that few health benefits will result? Will
REACH lead the world toward greener chemistry or burden EU
producers and outsource pollution elsewhere?
REACH is motivated by a desire to eliminate substances
that negatively impact on human health and its underlying deter-
minants, including the environment. But this first requires an
adequate understanding of the basic characteristics of chemicals
– something that is impossible with the current level of knowl-
edge and built-in incentives. By ensuring that much of this
information on chemicals will be made publicly available, it is
likely that governments, companies, and civil society beyond
the EU will benefit as well.
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The commonly acknowledged meaning of “organic”“prohibit[s] the use of synthetic fertilizers, pesticides,growth regulators, and livestock feed additives, and
require[s] long-term soil management, emphasis on animal
welfare and extensive record keeping and planning.”1 Despite
these general guidelines, the world struggles to reach formal
agreement on a global definition of “organic.”  As a result of
this shortcoming, there is no uniform international standard
for what makes a product organic.2 The lack of a universal
definition and the absence of a common organic certification
standard presents formidable trade barriers to the expanding
organic industry.
To certify an organic product, an accredited agent for the
intended market must inspect each producer or manufacturer
for compliance with that market’s standards.3 For example,
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) has estab-
lished a set of national standards that “organic” food must
meet, whether it is grown in the United States or imported
from abroad.4 Thus, a Brazilian farmer seeking to export his
organic produce to the United States must obtain certification
through one of the 95 Accredited Certifying Agents
(“ACAs”) recognized by the USDA.5 Of the 95 ACAs, how-
ever, only 40 are located outside of the United States,
unequally distributed amongst eighteen countries, and only
one is located in Brazil.6 The limited access to certifying
agents makes certification difficult and expensive, and thus
raises obstacles to trade in the U.S. organics market.7
Moreover, the lack of uniform certification standards hurts
the efficiency of organic trade, contributes to higher prices of
organic goods, and fails to meet the growing demand for
organic products. 
The need exists to provide clear organic regulations for
consumers and farmers across national borders.  A progres-
sive example of this is an adopted European Commission
proposal that aims to unite the 25-member European Union
under a common certification standard.8 The proposal aims
to clarify the criteria of organic certification while still con-
sidering local conditions and stages of development.9
Despite this step towards uniformity, exporters will still have
to seek certification through multiple agents for each country
of import.
As the worldwide organics market continues to grow at
the rapid rate of thirteen percent per year,10 fluid mecha-
nisms of international organic certification become increas-
ingly necessary to satisfy demand and facilitate trade.
Countries must agree on a common definition of organic and
share the burden of certification.  In 2002, Japan became the
first company to accept organic products certified under the
USDA standard.11 However, Japan remains the only foreign
country to recognize the USDA seal.12 More recently, the
United States recognized the ability of Canada, New
Zealand, Denmark, and the United Kingdom to accredit
agents who will certify organics under the USDA standard.13
Sharing the task of certification with other governments is a
good starting point in the search for a common organic stan-
dard and shows the potential for a common definition of
“organic” sometime in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
Not far from the U.S. Capitol building in Washington, DC(the “District”) runs a railroad track that is part of CSXCorporation’s (a major North American railroad compa-
ny) North-South railroad corridor along the Eastern coast of the
United States.1 While a railroad track is not normally a cause for
concern, rail cars on this particular track carry large volumes of
some of the world’s most dangerous chemicals.2 For instance,
90-ton rail tankers filled with hazardous chemicals such as chlo-
rine gas regularly pass over a small bridge that is unsecured, in a
low traffic area, and easily accessible to anyone.3 A recent study
by the Naval Research Laboratory estimated that a terrorist
explosion set in such a strategic location, during a political rally
or celebration on the National Mall, could result in the release of
toxic gases with the potential to seriously injure or kill over one
hundred thousand people within half an hour.4
The possibility of such a catastrophic event should be of
major concern not only to the chemical transportation industry,
but also to the federal and District government. While the fed-
eral government has done little to address this risk, the City
Council of Washington, DC (“DC Council”) has taken measures
to regulate the transportation of hazardous materials (hereinafter
“hazmats”) around the Capitol.5 The Bush Administration and
CSX are currently fighting this regulation in the CSX
Transportation, Inc. v. Anthony A. Williams case. This article
will argue that the DC Council’s regulation of hazmats in the
District should be upheld, and will also explore other potential
means to secure transportation of dangerous chemicals in and
around the nation’s Capitol.
REGULATION OF HAZMATS AROUND
THE U.S. CAPITOL
THE TERRORISM PREVENTION IN HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCY ACT OF 2005
The controversy over hazmat regulation around the U.S.
Capitol began on February 1, 2005 when the DC Council
approved the Terrorism Prevention in Hazardous Materials
Transportation Emergency Act of 2005 (hereinafter “the DC
Act”).6 The DC Act creates an area deemed the “Capitol
Exclusion Zone,” defined as: “all points within 2.2 miles of the
United States Capitol building; provided, that the Capitol
Exclusion Zone shall not extend beyond the geographic bound-
aries of the District of Columbia.”7 The Act prohibits the ship-
ment of hazmats through the zone without a permit from the
District’s Department of Transportation (“DDOT”).8 The CSX
Corporation controls the only two rail corridors that carry haz-
mats through the District, the North-South corridor and the East-
West line, which originates in Washington, DC. This regulation
effectively banned CSX from transporting hazmats through the
District by either of these two tracks. Wishing to prevent
increased costs of transportation, CSX brought suit against the
District to enjoin the DC Act from going into effect.9 This suit
spawned continuing litigation that centers not only on the regula-
tion of chemical transportation, but also on national security and
federalism, including the precarious role the District has as both
the federally controlled capital and a local state-like government.
Although the DC Court of Appeals ultimately placed a stay on the
DC Act,10 CSX has agreed to temporarily halt transportation of
hazmats through the District during the pending litigation.11
THE CSX V. WILLIAMS LITIGATION
Procedural History
In CSX v. Williams, CSX sought to enjoin the enforcement
of the DC Act, alleging that the act: (1) violated the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (2) was preempted by federal
law; and (3) went beyond the authority granted to the DC local
government in the Home Rule Act.12 In a well-reasoned opin-
ion, U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan denied both CSX’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction.13 Additionally, the United States was denied its
Motion to Enforce a decision made by the Surface
Transportation Board (“STB”) against Washington, DC.14
Even though the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed the District Court’s denial of a Preliminary
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Injunction, ruling in favor of CSX,15 this article asserts that
Judge Sullivan used the correct analysis. A preliminary injunc-
tion requires the court to consider four factors: likelihood of
success of the moving party, irreparable harm to the moving
party, a balancing of the harms/risks, and the public interest.16
With respect to the likelihood of success, the District Court
reviewed all of CSX’s claims against the act and found it unlike-
ly that CSX would prevail on the merits.17 However, the Court
of Appeals disagreed, finding that CSX was likely to prevail on
the claim of federal preemption.18 Because it is not contested
that CSX will be unlikely to prevail on its claim of a violation
of the “dormant” commerce clause, and because the United
States will be unlikely to prevail on its Motion to Enforce the
STB’s opinion, this article will only discuss the issues sur-
rounding the claim of federal preemption. 
Issues of Federal Preemption
CSX and the United States claimed that the Federal
Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”), the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act (“HMTA”), and the Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”) preempted the DC
Act.19 The FRSA provides that “states may regulate in the area
of railroad safety and security
‘until’ the federal government
‘prescribes a regulation or
issues an order covering the
subject matter of the State
requirement,’” and that for local
hazards, states may impose
more strict regulations “as long
as they are not ‘incompatible’
with federal regulation, and do
not ‘unreasonably burden inter-
state commerce.’”20 The
District Court interpreted this to
mean that the DC Act would
survive a preemption challenge against the FRSA if the act was
filling a gap in federal law or if it was addressing a mainly local
hazard without interfering with federal law.21 CSX and the
United States argued that the DC Act facially violated the FRSA
because Final Rule HM-232, issued by the U.S. Department of
Transportation (“U.S. DOT”), addressed the same subject mat-
ter.22 However, HM-232 merely requires private industry “to
develop and implement voluntary security plans” [emphasis
added].23 As such, the District Court found that the rule did not
conflict with federal law; rather, it helped further it.24
The HMTA similarly allows states to regulate the trans-
portation of hazmats unless the non-federal regulation creates an
obstacle to complying with federal law or if it is not possible to
comply with both regulations.25 Again, CSX and the United
States argued that HM-232 preempted the DC Act under this
standard.26 According to the federal government, the purpose
behind such lax regulation is to allow for flexibility in how
industry provides for security.27 CSX and the United States
claimed that the DC Act hindered this flexibility.28 While the
District Court did not question the government’s policy decision
regarding the flexibility of security plans, it determined that the
DC Act neither presented an obstacle to the federal policy, nor
was it impossible for CSX to comply with both the DC Act and
the federal policy.29
The ICCTA, unlike the FRSA and HMTA, does not express-
ly allow for state regulation; CSX and the United States thus
argued that the ICCTA preempted any state attempt to regulate
the railroads.30 The District Court disagreed with this position,
stating that such a position “interprets the ICCTA in a ‘contextu-
al vacuum’, completely ignoring the existence of the surrounding
statutory framework, including the FRSA.”31 The District Court
went on to hold that the DC Act did not deal with interstate com-
merce or the infrastructure of the railroad – both of which would
fall under the jurisdiction of the ICCTA – the DC Act only dealt
with safety and security, and thus fell within the historical coop-
eration of state and federal regulation of the railroads.32
The District Court concluded that the DC Act would likely
not be preempted by any of the federal laws presented by CSX
and the United States.33 The Court of Appeals, however, did not
agree and ordered the reversal of the District Court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction.34 The Court of Appeals found that CSX
was likely to succeed in its argument that the FRSA would pre-
empt the DC Act.35 Accordingly, the court found a preliminary
injunction to be appropriate.36
The difference in opinions
between the District Court and
the Court of Appeals is based on
conflicting interpretations of
whether the current federal reg-
ulation HM-232, substantially
covered the subject matter of
the DC Act, and whether the DC
Act was an obstacle to the
implementation of the federal
regulation or “unreasonably
burden[ed] interstate com-
merce.”37 The Court of Appeals decided the District Court was
incorrect in determining what HM-232 covered, and that the DC
Act created both an obstacle to complying with HM-232 and
“unreasonably burden[ed] interstate commerce.”38 For example,
the Court of Appeals reasoned that because U.S. DOT specifi-
cally rejected routing requirements during the development of
HM-232, the rule substantially subsumes the subject matter of
the DC Act.39 As such, HM-232 likely preempted the DC Act.40
Pursuant to §20106 of the FRSA, however, both HM-232
and the DC Act can stand so long as the DC Act does not inter-
fere with compliance of HM-232 and it does not “unreasonably
burden interstate commerce.”41 Again, the Court of Appeals
agreed with CSX and the United States, determining that the DC
Act frustrated HM-232 by not allowing rail carriers the flexibil-
ity the regulation intended.42 In addition, the court found that the
DC Act likely would “unreasonably burden interstate com-
merce,” because if allowed to stand, other local governments
would enact a patchwork of similar bans that would interfere
with the national hazmat transportation system.43
While CSX and the United States successfully moved the
Court of Appeals to preliminarily enjoin the DC Act from being
31 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY





enforced, it has yet to be determined whether the District Court
will issue a permanent injunction. Though the Court of Appeals
decided that CSX and the United States are likely to succeed on
the claim of federal preemption, this reasoning was flawed. The
DC Act deals with the unique potential for a chemical catastrophe
to occur in a highly populated urban center that is also in the seat
of the federal government. Although HM-232 gives private indus-
try the responsibility of securing the nation’s railroad system, it
does not “substantially” cover the unique local safety risks that
face Washington, DC. Rather, the rule merely touches the subject
matter of security and does not “substantially subsume” it, as
required by caselaw.44 Additionally, the DC Act only prohibits the
most hazardous of chemicals transported through the Capitol
Exclusion Zone and allows an exception for permit holders. This
does not create a significant obstacle in allowing industry flexi-
bility in implementing self-determined security measures. 
Critics might argue that the DC Act essentially bans hazmat
transportation through the entire state, which would be a viola-
tion of the dormant commerce clause.45 However, this is not
what the DC Act does. The DC Act places tight regulations on
the transportation of hazmats through a particularly high-risk
area of the DC Council’s jurisdiction.46 As previously discussed,
under the current federal statutory scheme regulating the trans-
portation of hazmats, states are allowed to impose more strin-
gent regulations than those of the federal agencies. As such, the
District Court should not permanently enjoin the DC Act.
ALTERNATIVE MEANS TO PROTECT
THE CAPITOL AREA
If the DC Act is permanently enjoined, there are other pos-
sible means to secure transportation of dangerous chemicals in
and around the Capitol. Currently, CSX and the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) are working to cre-
ate a “virtual boundary” around the District’s rail corridor.47
Such a boundary would involve two hundred surveillance cam-
eras around the rail corridor that would allow for 24-hour mon-
itoring.48 Also involved in the plan are several rapid response
teams that would act in conjunction with the surveillance to
increase security of the corridor.49
While this “virtual boundary” might increase security, it
will not eliminate the threat. To more adequately address the
issue, bills have been introduced in Congress, yet none have
been passed.50 One of the more comprehensive bills is Senator
Joseph Biden’s (D-DE) Hazardous Materials Vulnerability
Reduction Act of 2005 (hereinafter “HMVRA”) and its House
companion bill.51 The main purpose of HMVRA would be to
require DHS to promulgate regulations to properly secure high-
risk urban corridors involving the transportation of hazmats,
including dangerous chemicals, via rail.52 These regulations
would include criteria for determining high-risk corridors,
which would then require that any hazmats be rerouted around
the corridor with few exceptions.53 Additionally, the Secretary
of Homeland Security would annually report to Congress on the
frequency of and contents of hazmat transportation and owners
of hazmat transportation operations would have to notify local
government officials when transporting hazmats through their
jurisdiction.54 The other sections of the bill provide for
increased hazmat transportation security not specifically related
to urban areas. Section 4 of HMVRA would authorize the
Secretary of Homeland Security to award grants to both local
governments and private railroad companies for the purposes of
training and providing safety equipment to those who work
transporting hazmats. Section 5 of HMVRA would require the
Secretary to report to Congress after studying potential new
security technologies, and section 6 would provide for whistle-
blower protection.55 Such legislation would be a tremendous
step forward in securing the transportation of hazmats, includ-
ing dangerous chemicals. Currently, the bill is still in commit-
tee, but the Bush Administration does not support it.56
CONCLUSION
In an era where defense against terrorism is a national prior-
ity, the chemical industry has the burden of addressing immense
security concerns while still providing a national service. The
government of Washington, DC has a unique obligation to pro-
tect not only a densely populated urban core, but also the seat of
the federal government. The transportation of any dangerous
chemicals or other hazmats, poses a threat in any location, but
the transportation corridor through the District poses a unique
risk that must be addressed. While the Administration has facial-
ly addressed the issue, the DC Council properly took action to
protect the people within its jurisdiction. Because of industry
complaint, this action has all but been destroyed, and now faces
a permanent injunction. It is this article’s position, however, that
the Terrorism Prevention in Hazardous Materials Transportation
Emergency Act of 2005 should not be permanently enjoined. In
conjunction with the DC Act, or in light of the Act being
enjoined, Congress should take action not only to protect itself,
but the city it calls home. Senator Biden’s bill, if passed, would
be a step in the right direction in limiting the transportation of
hazardous chemicals through Washington, DC. 
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2006, the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (“UNEP”) held the International Conference onChemicals Management (“ICCM”) in Dubai, United Arab
Emirates at which more than one hundred nations adopted a
plan for the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals
Management (“SAICM”). SAICM is designed to coordinate
management of chemicals, wastes, and other substances on a
global scale, setting up a global chemicals agency to coordinate
efforts. The program is dubbed as a voluntary initiative through
which “stakeholders” will engage in efforts to ensure safe man-
agement of chemicals. Centralization of chemical policy is
deemed important because of the number of chemicals in world
commerce today (estimates range up to 100,000) and because it
has been estimated that chemical production will increase by 80
percent within the next fifteen years.1
This issue has been under development at the United
Nations since 1992 and is now maturing into an international
initiative that promises far reaching impacts. Yet many of the
businesses that will likely be affected probably have not heard
of, or know little about, SAICM. That is not surprising given
minimal press coverage of the issue. To date, the New York
Times, USA Today, the Financial Times, and the Wall Street
Journal have largely ignored the issue. Yet inadequate press
coverage belies the importance of the issue. 
THE HISTORY OF SAICM
SAICM began as an item discussed in Chapter 19 of
Agenda 212 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, which are products of the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (“UNCED”),
Rio de Janeiro in 1992. It proposed a system for global chem-
icals management, outlining six program goals that include:
• Expanding and accelerating international assessment
of chemical risks;
• Harmonization of classification and labeling of
chemicals;
• Information exchange on toxic chemicals and chemi-
cal risks;
• Establishment of risk reduction programs;
• Strengthening of national capabilities and capacities
for management of chemicals; and
• Prevention of illegal international traffic in toxic and
dangerous products.3
The Rio meeting led to the creation of the Intergovernmen-
tal Forum on Chemical Safety (“IFCS” or “Forum”), which was
designed to facilitate these goals and set in motion a process for
implementation. The Forum is described as follows in a docu-
ment on its history:
The IFCS is a non-institutional arrangement whereby
representatives of governments meet, together with inter-
governmental and non-governmental organi[z]ations, to
consider all aspects of the assessment and management
of chemicals. The aim is to integrate and consolidate
national and international efforts to promote the objec-
tives of Chapter 19 of Agenda 21. The IFCS provides
policy guidance, identifies priorities, develops
strategies and, where appropriate, makes recommenda-
tions to governments, international organi[z]ations,
intergovernmental bodies and non-governmental
organi[z]ations involved in chemical risk assessment
and environmentally sound management of chemicals.4
In October 2000, the Forum met in Salvador da Bahia,
Brazil where representatives of 83 governments produced and
agreed to the Bahia Declaration, which reiterated and affirmed a
commitment to the goals in Agenda 21, and resolved to set up
institutions for implementing them.5 In addition, the Bahia
meeting produced a document setting the priorities for the pro-
gram.6 In 2002, the SAICM concept was endorsed by the World
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South
Africa, calling for completion of the program’s founding docu-
ments by 2005.7
The first preparatory meeting for SAICM, referred to as
“SAICM PrepCom1,” took place in Bangkok, Thailand, imme-
diately following another IFCS meeting. Since then the UNEP
has hosted two additional meetings – SAICM PrepCom2 in
Nairobi, Kenya, in October 2004; and SAICM PrepCom3 in
Vienna, Austria in September 2005. 
At the September 2005 meeting, it was expected that three
framing documents for the SAICM program would be complet-
ed, which would then be finalized in February 2006. These are:
the High Level Declaration,8 the Overarching Policy State-
ment,9 and the Global Plan of Action.10 These documents with
all the changes from the September meeting are included in the
report for Prepcom3.11
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SAICM
SAICM is supposed to be a voluntary initiative of world
governments to ensure the proper management of chemicals and
wastes through information sharing, harmonization of chemical
risk standards and labeling, and training. In addition, it is sup-
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posed to ensure ratification and implementation of environmen-
tal treaties, but it is unclear as to how those goals will be pursued. 
The objective of PrepCom3 (September 2005) was to pro-
duce a clean text that would be finalized at the Dubai meeting in
February 2006. However, during the September meeting there
apparently was considerable debate, with the United States tak-
ing a stand against language that set the “precautionary princi-
ple” as an object of the program.
Although there is no set definition for the precautionary
principle, it essentially demands that products be proven safe
before entering the marketplace. Currently, U.S. regulators fol-
low a more risk-based approach. They assess the risks of prod-
ucts and set regulations that allow an “acceptable” level of risk.
Under the present U.S. system, regulators must demonstrate
products are unsafe before removing them from the market.
Although this approach often produces very restrictive regula-
tions – including bans of many products – it provides some pro-
tection against arbitrary governmental coercion. 
In contrast, the precautionary principle reduces regulatory
accountability by shifting the burden of proof, demanding that
manufacturers prove that their products are safe before allowing
them to enter into, or continue in, commerce. Since nothing in
life is one hundred percent safe, the precautionary principle
means that governments can regulate products simply because
they decide that products might pose public health risks – mak-
ing regulation arbitrary in nature and subject to political whims.
U.S. negotiators advocated
a risk-based approach that is
more compatible with our regu-
latory tradition during the
September 2005 meeting. The
result of that meeting was a
document that included brack-
eted language that would be
subject to negotiation at the
Dubai meeting. Of note, at that
time the term “voluntary” was
also in brackets, throwing into
question stated intentions that
the program would be volun-
tary rather than binding international law. 
At the Dubai meeting, the policy declaration was approved,
and renamed as the Dubai Declaration. It created the SAICM
Secretariat housed in UNEP. In addition, nations pledged US
$10 million for a program called Quick Start, which is to pro-
vide assistance to developing nations. 
Opposition to some provisions by the United States and
others nearly halted the SAICM process, but a last-minute com-
promise agreement was negotiated and agreed to just before
midnight on the last day of the conference.12 Language on the
precautionary principle was removed and now the document
reads that the program will “take into account” the wording of
the Rio Declaration, creating confusion as to whether the pro-
gram will follow the precautionary principle. There is reason to
believe that it eventually will take a precautionary approach
since the Rio Declaration endorses the principle.
Additional compromises secured by the United States and
its allies included provisions to allow participating countries to
exempt food and medicine from SAICM provisions because
nations have domestic regulations governing such issues. The
United States also demanded that the voluntary nature of the
program be clear. Final language on that topic reads: “We
acknowledge that as a new voluntary initiative in the field of
international management of chemicals, the Strategic Approach
is not a legally binding instrument.”13
A number of environmental activists expressed dismay with
the result. Clifton Curtis of the World Wildlife Fund’s Global
Toxics Program says the agreement result is “akin to achieving
half a loaf of bread, not well baked.”14 According to news
reports, environmentalists complained that the program has
been rendered ineffective by officials from the United States,
Australia, Japan, Korea, and Canada.15
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SAICM
Despite the paucity of coverage, SAICM represents a poli-
cy whose scope is as extensive as that of the Kyoto Protocol on
climate change,16 which seeks to control use of the world’s ener-
gy. SAICM covers the other half of the universe. Whereas
Kyoto attempts to regulate the world’s energy, SAICM seeks to
manage matter, or all non-living physical objects in the uni-
verse. Nonetheless, it is deemed somewhat innocuous because it
is considered voluntary effort.
Despite its nonbinding nature, SAICM is likely to possess a
substantial policy role – setting
global standards that will likely
become models for imposition
by national governments to fol-
low and serve as the basis for
environmental treaties and other
international agreements. And
unlike the SAICM process, these
treaties and laws will be binding.
In fact, one of SAICM’s
key goals is to ensure that exist-
ing chemical and waste disposal
related treaties all become rati-
fied and are subject to implementation legislation in the various
nations. The United States is a likely target of
ratification/implementation efforts. It has yet to ratify a number
of treaties such as the Stockholm Convention of Persistent
Organic Pollutants,17 which bans a number of chemical inter-
nationally. In addition, United States has signed but not ratified
the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal,18 which regu-
lates shipment of hazardous wastes. 
SAICM supporters have indicated that the program is
designed to have important policy impacts. For example, Klaus
Toepfer, Executive Director of UNEP, commented that existing
chemical treaties alone are not enough, concluding: “it has been
clear for some time that simply ticking off groups of chemicals
one by one are becoming impractical. A new approach, a new
way forward for chemicals management was needed, which is
what SAICM now offers.”19
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SAICM’s “Global Action Plan” offers an idea as to the pro-
gram’s ambitious agenda for chemicals. It includes nearly 300
“concrete measures” for the various stakeholders to pursue.
These include many items that are restrictive in nature. For
example, among them are intentions to “restrict availability of”
or “substitute” “highly toxic pesticides;” “promote substitution
of hazardous chemicals;” “regulate the availability, distribution
and use of pesticides”; “halt the sale of and recall products” that
pose “unacceptable risks;” and “eliminate the use” of certain
“hazardous chemicals.”20
SAICM AND REACH
Another reason to believe that SAICM will have a substan-
tial regulatory role is that many see it as the perfect vehicle for
the EU to globalize its REACH proposal, which is expected to
become law in Europe by 2007. “REACH” stands for Registra-
tion, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals. This program
applies a precautionary ap-
proach to chemical regulation
that will be followed by govern-
ment regulation, demanding
that firms demonstrate safety
through a complicated registra-
tion and information collection
program that inevitably results
in the ban of some products. 
Such globalization may be,
in the minds of Europeans, a
way to “level the playing field.”
Such intentions for SAICM
were recently noted in one
European publication:
There can be no doubting the links between the future
European system for the registration, evaluation and
authori[z]ation of chemicals (REACH) and SAICM:
the two mechanisms share the same general objective
(minimi[z]ing the impact of chemicals on the envi-
ronment and health). Moreover, many of the recom-
mendations included in SAICM will also be imple-
mented in the context of the new EU regulation
(information on substances, minimi[z]ing risks, lia-
bility of industry in ensuring safety, etc.) … EU
sources also point out that the REACH process was
actually launched in the 1990s. At the international
level, the approach can be traced back to the
Johannesburg Summit Declaration of September
2002 in which the parties pledged to reduce the nega-
tive impact of chemicals by 2020. This concrete
objective spurred the EU into pressing ahead. Work at
the European and international level since 2002 has
therefore followed a convergent parallel path.21
Europeans had previously considered other ways to global-
ize REACH. For example, there is considerable evidence that
they planned to push international implementation of an early
version of REACH through the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development.22 Globalization of this program
would expand regulatory controls and impose heavy costs on
businesses around the world. Application of REACH in Europe
alone is destined to be expensive for Europe and its trade part-
ners. The European Commission-funded study estimated
REACH’s costs to fall somewhere between a low estimate of
€2.8 (over eleven years) to a high estimate of €5.2 billion (over
fifteen years).23 However, these studies only assess a fraction of
REACH costs. The likely benefits of the REACH program have
not been adequately demonstrated.24
SAICM AND PUBLIC HEALTH
While it is true that some of SAICM’s goals are reasonable,
such as ensuring that developing nations gain information
regarding the proper handling of chemicals, the program is like-
ly to fail when it comes attaining these goals. It will fail for the
same reasons centralized economic planning has failed: govern-
ment officials are too removed from problems and lack the
information necessary to solve
the many diverse problems.
Uniform policies will not work
in the various situations around
the world; such political
processes tend to serve organ-
ized players rather than the com-
mon good, and policy goals are
often based on misperceptions. 
Market economies are better
situated to address problems
associated with chemicals man-
agement and some of the larger
problems that hinder human well
being in developing nations. Indeed, many of the serious prob-
lems that SAICM proposes to address (the mismanagement of
dangerous substances because poor nations lack the resources to
pursue policies for proper handling) would be solved through the
promotion of economic growth, not through expensive global
governance. The costs of SAICM will likely have the opposite
result, by diverting resources from more important issues and by
undermining commerce and economic development.
In fact, most of the world’s serious environmental problems
are the effects of poverty in developing nations. According to a
2001 World Bank study, Environment Strategy Papers: Health
and Environment, the most prominent environmental problem is
inadequate sanitation. This is something that only economic
growth can address through improved infrastructure and
increased access to chemical disinfectants, such as chlorine.
Next on the list of problems is limited access to modern energy
sources, including such things as electricity and fossil fuels.
Lacking such amenities means that rural poor around the world
rely on burning biomass fuels (such as cow dung) in their homes
as an energy source. Resulting pollution leads to an estimated
1.7 million deaths associated with respiratory illnesses each
year.25 And as international bureaucrats at the United Nations
lament the potential that someone might consume trace levels of
chemicals found in plastic packaging, the absence of such sani-
tary packaging and refrigeration in developing nations kills tens
of thousands every year.
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SAICM is not the solution to such problems and arguably
represents a serious misallocation of limited resources. Indeed,
these nations are least able to afford such regulatory burdens
proposed by many of the world’s environmental treaties, and
many of the treaties promise to undermine economic growth.
For example, a study produced by the Liberty Institute in India
shows that the Basel Convention had proved counterproductive
and detrimental to development in poor nations.26
SAICM is also unlikely to improve public health in devel-
oped nations by reducing cancer rates as some believe it will do.
If chemicals were a source of health problems, one might expect
that as chemical use has
increased around the world,
there would be some measura-
ble adverse impact on life
expectancy, cancer rates, or
other illnesses. Yet in developed
nations, where chemical use has
greatly increased, people are liv-
ing longer, healthier lives.
According to the World Health
Organization (“WHO”) in its World Cancer Report, the average
worldwide human life span has increased from 45 years in 1950
to about 66 in 2000 and will most likely continue to increase to
77 years by 2050.27
Nonetheless many complain that chemicals are causing a
cancer epidemic in developed nations. But trace level chemicals
have never been shown to be a significant cause of cancer. The
WHO report estimates that at most one to four percent of can-
cers can be attributed to environmental pollution in developed
countries, citing a world-renowned study by scientists Sir
Richard Doll and Richard Peto.28
While Doll and Peto note that 80 to 90 percent of cancers
are caused by “environmental factors,” this phrase encompasses
anything other than genetics. It does not include pollution alone.
Environmental factors include smoking; diet; occupational
exposure to chemicals; “geophysical factors” such as naturally
occurring radiation; manmade radiation; medical drugs and
radiation; and pollution. According to Doll and Peto, pollution
accounts for only two percent of all cancer.29 Neither Doll and
Peto nor the WHO mention exposure to chemicals through con-
sumer products as a serious cause of cancer, which is a key
focus of the chemicals strategy. In addition, the EU policy will
not likely affect occupational exposures in the developed world
since, as the WHO notes, “most occupational carcinogens have
been removed from the workplace.”30
Doll and Peto report that tobacco use accounts for about 30
percent of all annual cancer deaths,31 and dietary choices
account for 35 percent of annual cancer deaths.32 The WHO
confirms these figures, attributing 30 percent of cancers to
smoking and 30 percent to dietary factors.33 The WHO notes
that chronic infections – which
are particularly a problem in
developing nations – cause
about eighteen percent of world-
wide cancers.34 Genetic factors
may lead to an additional four
percent of cancers. That means
less than twenty percent of can-
cers result from all other causes
including pollution, alcohol,
occupational exposures, medical drugs, radiation, immuno-sup-
pression problems, and reproductive factors and hormones.
Nonetheless, since cancer is a disease related to aging, the
developed world’s aging population does indeed present new
health challenges that are important to address. The WHO sug-
gests that cancer prevention efforts should focus on three fac-
tors: tobacco use, diet, and infections, which together account
for 75 percent of cancer cases worldwide.35 Efforts to encourage
people to change personal habits by eating better are likely the
most effective cancer prevention policy. 
CONCLUSION
Despite limited coverage and interest in the media, SAICM
represents a major international policy development. Businesses
may soon be caught by surprise after the SAICM Secretariat
begins to affect policy around the world. And despite the fact
that SAICM is primarily intended to assist developing nations
with the management of chemicals, developing nations stand to
lose the most from the program. 
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http://www.who.int/ifcs/documents/forums/forum3/en/
annex6.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
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jsummit/html/documents/summit_docs.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
ENDNOTES: SAICM
ENDNOTES: SAICM Continued on page 73
SAICM is also unlikely to
improve public health in
developed nations. . .
37 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior InformedConsent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicalsand Pesticides in International Trade (“Rotterdam
Convention”) is a multilateral environmental agreement with
the ultimate goal of protecting human health and the envi-
ronment.1 The Rotterdam Convention seeks to accomplish
this by enhancing sound chemical management through the
exchange of scientific, technical, economic, and legal infor-
mation between exporting and importing states.2 Fourteen
new harmful chemicals and pesticides have been added into
Annex III of the Rotterdam Convention,3 which enumerates
41 hazardous chemicals subject to Prior Informed Consent
(“PIC”) procedures of the importing countries.4 The PIC pro-
cedures require the importing country to formally consent
before accepting dangerous pesticides and industrial chemi-
cals in order to prevent their exportation.5
Many developing countries lack the necessary infrastruc-
ture and appropriate environmental regulations to handle haz-
ardous chemicals in an environmentally sound manner.6
Effective technical and financial assistance for developing
countries is necessary to achieve the Convention’s long-term
success.7 Since “developing nations are the main recipients of
international trade in chemicals that the Rotterdam
Convention addresses,”8 it is vital that importing nations have
the ability to evaluate the safety of the imported chemicals.
This may prevent developed countries from exporting danger-
ous chemicals to developing countries as a way to cheaply dis-
pose of them and avoid environmental regulations.9
Even though Articles 11(1)(c) and 16 of the Rotterdam
Convention address international cooperation and technical
assistance for developing countries to improve their chemi-
cals management, they do not explicitly require developed
countries to transfer technical support to developing coun-
tries, nor do they provide for specific measures to monitor
compliance.10 Many countries recommend close collabora-
tion with the Secretariat of the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal (“Basel Convention”), because it contains
a specific mechanism to support regional assistance to devel-
oping countries in managing hazardous wastes.11 The Basel
Convention aims to control the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes and utilizes a compliance mechanism to
help identify difficulties that arise in the implementation of
the Convention.12
Building mandatory and binding financial mechanisms is
an effective way to ensure that that the Rotterdam
Convention’s key goals are effectively carried out.13 Since the
Rotterdam Convention lacks provisions establishing a finan-
cial mechanism to promote the capacity-building activities of
developing countries, mandatory financial contributions
should be provided by developed countries to secure effective
regional technical assistance.14 Such options were recently
studied by the Conference of Parties (“COP”) to the Rotterdam
Secretariat.15 Some countries expressed disappointment with
the COP’s lack of flexibility regarding suggestions for finan-
cial re-structuring.16 While a special trust fund has already
been established for the Rotterdam Convention, which pro-
vides that both parties and non-parties may voluntarily con-
tribute to the fund, the COP failed to suggest how to further
enhance the existing fund and implement it successfully.17 The
performance of similar funds such as the Basel Technical
Cooperation Trust Fund indicates that voluntary contributions
are consistently lower than budgetary needs.18
In short, exporting countries are only obligated to advise
and assist importing nations “upon request and as appropri-
ate,”19 while training and technical support aid to developing
countries is not mandated. Developed nations should be obli-
gated to provide technical assistance for developing countries
and sound mechanisms for their implementation at all lev-
els.20 In addition, mandatory financial mechanisms should be
maintained in order to promote the successful implementa-
tion of the Rotterdam Convention in both developed and
developing countries.
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INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, the Basel Convention on the Controlof Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastesand their Disposal (“Basel Convention” or
“Convention”) was a forum for North-South dialogue; a place
where governments from all over the world worked together to
bring a halt to the unscrupulous trade in hazardous wastes. The
1990s witnessed international solidarity and enthusiasm for the
Convention’s potential. But as the 1990s wore on, an identity
crisis emerged amid globalization and an ever growing econo-
my. As the world became more prosperous and the cross-border
flow of goods and recyclables expanded, it appeared that the
converse was designed for the Basel Convention. From vision to
commitments, the Convention entered into a collision with
globalization. The Convention faces a constant struggle to
defend its relevance, competing with other issues for the atten-
tion of the international development and environmental com-
munities. This article is a story about our common future. In a
world of growing complexities and uncertainties, the Basel
Convention brings certainty, transparency, and traceability as a
means to protect human health and the environment worldwide. 
THE CHALLENGE OF HAZARDOUS WASTES
The 1989 Basel Convention, which entered into force in
1992, is the only global legal instrument to control transbound-
ary movements of hazardous and other wastes and to ensure
their environmentally sound management worldwide. As of
February 2006, 167 Parties and the European Community are
Parties to the Convention. Fourteen Basel Convention Regional
and Coordinating Centers established on all continents under the
authority of the Conference of the Parties facilitate and assist
Governments and other public and private stakeholders in the
implementation of the Basel Convention and related chemicals
convention or protocols.
During its short life, the Basel Convention has been the
place of many achievements. Its control system is applied
worldwide, and its underlying concept of environmentally
sound management is gaining broader acceptance. In short, the
Basel Convention is functioning. At the national level, many
countries have taken drastic measures to reduce environmental
and public health harms from hazardous wastes and to improve
performance of waste operators. In the past fifteen years, gigan-
tic steps have been made in waste and hazardous waste man-
agement worldwide. 
However, this progress is still not commensurate to the size
of this multifaceted problem. Advances in technology and high
consumerism accelerate the rate at which products become
obsolete. Available estimates suggest that over one hundred mil-
lion computers, monitors, and televisions become obsolete
every year, and this number is growing. In many countries, haz-
ardous products or substances make their way through the
household waste stream and often end up in improperly man-
aged disposal sites, which can impact human health and the
environment. This is a burden with which public authorities
have difficulties coping. 
The Basel Convention is an indicator of the global
response to hazardous waste issues. The increase in hazardous
waste and its illegal trafficking do not reflect a failure of the
Basel Convention. To the contrary, it points out the real need
COMMENTARY: THE BASEL CONVENTION, BACK TO THE FUTURE
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BOX 1: 
TRENDS OF INCREASING HAZARDOUS
WASTE PRODUCTION
• Effects of stabilizing non-hazardous industrial waste
generation is bearing fruit, while hazardous waste
generation will steadily increase due, in part, to the increase
in the production of chemicals.
• Chemical releases from large-scale industrial plants will
decrease, while such releases from small and medium size
enterprises is likely to increase.
• Chemicals dumped in landfills are increasing.
• More and more complex chemicals are being put into
products rendering such products potentially hazardous
upon disposal.
• The fast-growing streams of post-consumer goods and
end-of-life equipment are often overwhelming countries’
capacity to manage such wastes in a way to protect human
health and the environment.
• The quantities of household waste, as well as construction
and demolition wastes, will increase.
• Stricter environmental laws and occupational health
safety standards make the disposal of hazardous wastes
more expensive, resulting in an increase of illegal traffic of
these wastes to developing countries or massive influx of
used or end-of-life equipment. 
• Economic globalization results in globalized trade of
hazardous and other wastes. 
for bringing the Basel Convention to a new upward threshold
so that the Convention can adapt itself to the expanding prob-
lems. Any measurable and recordable progress at the world-
wide level requires a harmonized data set for policy-makers to
adequately address the challenges, and the Convention pro-
vides a means to progress towards such harmonization. At the
same time, the Convention is a unique forum where 167 coun-
tries and the European Community can work together and with
other public and private partners to lay the foundation for
bridging the technological gap among Parties. We have not
done a good job in promoting the Basel Convention’s rele-
vance in terms of environmental and human health improve-
ments. But this silence is not apathy.
THE CONTINUING ROLE OF THE CONVENTION
Some believe that the Basel Convention is moving towards
extinction, and that the reasons that stimulated negotiations for
the Convention in the late 1980s are re-surfacing and require a
renewed commitment to the irreplaceable role of this
Convention. The quantity of hazardous wastes generated is
steadily increasing and cannot be de-coupled from economic
growth. Illegal traffic in wastes, including hazardous wastes, has
reached unprecedented levels. The past is in front of us. Over
time, environmental conventions, like the Basel Convention,
which address specific problems tend to become disconnected
from the development agenda; and as such, disappear from deci-
sion-makers’ radar screens.
However, as the amount of global trade increases, so does
the need for the Basel Convention. Any transboundary move-
ment of hazardous wastes could also be considered a part of the
global trading system. Transactions involving hazardous wastes
can be a commercial service. Incineration plants or recycling
facilities operate as any other industrial establishment.
Collection, segregation, and transport of wastes are services to
the community. The safe and proper handling of all wastes and
the reduction of their quantities and hazardous qualities will
minimize risks of lead poisoning, waterborne diseases, and
harm from toxic, poisonous, or infectious substances. These
safer handling procedures will provide economic opportunities
for developed and developing countries. The development of
sound recycling schemes will generate employment and facili-
tate integration of the informal sector into the mainstream econ-
omy. In addition, such systems may contribute to the develop-
ment of best practices and sound regional recycling schemes. 
The implementation of the Basel Convention reinforces the
United Nations’ mission and work: the Convention provides its
added value to a highly complex and specialized field that no
other international body or agreement addresses at the global
level. The United Nations’ ongoing reform recognizes the need
to adjust the system in order to support an increasingly field-ori-
ented UN Secretariat. The Parties to the Basel Convention have
recognized this shift of emphasis in their 1999 Basel
Declaration on Environmentally Sound Management (“Basel
Declaration” or “Declaration”). In order for the Convention to
be effective, every country needs to establish hazardous waste
systems and infrastructures that protect human health and the
environment. Through the 2002 Draft Strategic Plan for the
Implementation of the Basel Convention, the Parties are giving
life to the Basel Declaration. For the past six years, Parties have
re-emphasized the importance of working at the national level,
involving municipalities, enriching nongovernmental organiza-
tions’ on-the-ground experiences, and building partnerships
with the private sector. The Basel Convention’s influence and
reach are growing worldwide and expanding regionally. 
THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE
RECYCLING MOVEMENT
The disposal or recycling of end-of-life equipment or post-
consumer goods is an emerging global issue. For instance, elec-
tronic wastes, or e-wastes, are the fastest growing waste stream
in the world: they represent both a high asset and a huge prob-
lem. The quick economic gain from exporting or importing e-
wastes overshadows its potential harm. Many governments are
reluctant to impose the Basel Convention’s strict control proce-
dures on trade when it brings in revenue and generates jobs. This
resistance is due in large part to a transformation of the waste
hierarchy promoted for many years (prevention, reuse, recycling,
energy recovery, and final disposal). To illustrate, industry wants
to make a profit from wastes, and at the same time, governments
in many developed countries are convinced that the environmen-
tal problems of the 1980s are behind them. As a result, govern-
ments focus on new policies to address wastes that reflect the
realities of today and the future and often forget the lessons
learned from the past. Such an approach strays from the empha-
sis on how wastes contaminate or pollute the environment and
instead, focuses on a life-cycle approach to materials.
Priority in Europe is now given to recycling strategies.
Development of regional recycling systems and networks is
gaining momentum. Companies cross borders to set up regional
recycling centers, exercise corporate social responsibility, and
extend producer responsibility. The G8 countries are promoting
the concept of the 3Rs (reduce, reuse, and recycle) towards a
sound material-cycle society. The European Commission is also
tabling a thematic strategy on the prevention and recycling of
waste. This strategy aims to transform Europe into a recycling
society. As a consequence, many governments are working
towards reducing barriers to trade and encouraging re-use and
recycling of materials. Establishing a loop for recyclables relies
on the dissemination of knowledge from facilities in different
parts of the world. 
However, the international flow of recyclables has a hidden
side. Countries are at different levels of economic development,
and recycling facilities operate at different standards depending
on the country. A sizeable part of local recycling is done in the
informal sector. For example, governments are dealing with the
issue of e-wastes differently, which leaves room for unscrupu-
lous trade. Rapidly developing international and regional recy-
cling schemes must be combined with a mechanism capable of
providing information about and monitoring such schemes to
ensure their accountability and soundness from environmental,
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health, and economic perspectives. The high quantities of e-
wastes exported to Asia and Africa are overwhelming importing
countries’ capacity to deal properly with these wastes. The
quantities in some areas are so voluminous that old computers
are being burnt to reduce size, generating massive and perma-
nent air pollution (particularly dioxins). Information is insuffi-
cient to provide a level of certainty to enable customs officers to
make a clear-cut demarcation line between usable products ver-
sus wastes and hazardous wastes. Above all, it is inevitable that
wastes will follow the path of least resistance. When it comes to
obsolete ships on their last voyage to recycling yards, diver-
gence of opinion on whether or not the Basel Convention should
apply results in legal and technical uncertainties. A level playing
field is needed in regards to handling end-of-life equipment.
The growing production of chemicals is one of the main
contributors to the increase in hazardous wastes. More and more
of these chemicals find their way into products, and these prod-
ucts, in turn, become hazardous wastes at the time of disposal.
This proliferation of chemicals means that among the e-wastes
exported to Asia or Africa, for instance, the chances of finding
electronic hazardous wastes such as cathode tube rays with lead-
containing glass, printed circuit boards with heavy metals, fluo-
rescent tubes (from crystal displays) with mercury, nickel-cad-
mium batteries, or plastic components with brominated flame
retardants are highly likely. No one can deny that these are haz-
ardous materials. It is also important to recognize that one can-
not leave waste to the sole principles of the market. Also clear-
ly demonstrated is the pressing need for traceability of materials
and transparency in the trade of recyclables.
In the case of end-of-life hazardous equipment destined for
recycling, the Basel Convention will improve certainty (what to
control), transparency (what moves across borders and how),
and traceability (through its prior written notification proce-
dure). A cross-border regional recycling system needs to inte-
grate the international obligations of the Basel Convention to
capture trade in hazardous wastes – not just a portion of the
Convention but the treaty as a whole. Indeed, the temptation is
great to use only parts of the Convention that are useful to eco-
nomic objectives, while ignoring those that are perceived as
obstacles to trade.
NEXT STEPS FOR THE BASEL CONVENTION
Economic globalization has encouraged the establishment
of global and regional recycling zones. The world of trade is fast
changing. The predictable bipolar division of the last century
has become more complex. How can the architecture of the
Basel Convention respond to these changes? Its future lies in the
capacity of Parties to anchor the Convention into regional reali-
ties. They have the tools to do this. Indeed, the Basel
Convention is unique in having established a regional network
composed of fourteen autonomous institutions operating on all
continents. The Convention should transform itself into a glob-
al convention for the environmentally sound management of
wastes in which the prior written advance notification procedure
remains central in achieving the goals of the Convention. The
goals include, but are not limited to:
• Minimizing the quantity and hazardous quality of
wastes;
• Treating and disposing of wastes within proximity
to where they are generated; and
• Reducing transboundary movements.
In addition to the three pillars above, predictability, trans-
parency, and traceability of trade in recyclables need to encap-
sulate the changing patterns of trade as a necessary set of meas-
ures to protect human health and the environment. The
Convention should provide the global standards for managing
all wastes. Today, in a large number of countries, hazardous
wastes are mixed with household wastes. As a result, neither the
hazardous wastes nor the household wastes can be managed
properly. The “all wastes” coverage should be based on two
basic principles, the life-cycle approach to materials and inte-
grated waste management (taking hazardous wastes out of the
household waste stream). 
Any regional recycling network or zone will operate under
the assumption that regulatory authorities would ease restric-
tions regarding the flow of recyclables. The net result would be
an increase in industrial waste exportation, and importation of
end-of-life equipment. Consequently, a large part of the respon-
BOX 2: 
UNANTICIPATED CAUSES OF WASTE
PROBLEMS
Since 2005, a multi-billion dollar international com-
modities market to trade carbon emissions has developed:
great financial opportunities for companies to either reduce
direct emissions or buy someone else’s unused allowance.
Carbon dioxide is naturally occurring and is a by-product (a
waste) of industrial processes, in particular when burning
fossil fuels or biomass. Reduction of emissions will have a
beneficial effect in reducing waste releases. However, as side
effects, we will witness an increase in the disposal of obsolete
or inefficient electrical equipment, like generators. Likewise,
shifts in industrial processes in the oil, cement, pulp, paper ,
and other concerned sectors to meet CO2 reduction will gen-
erate different types of wastes and hazardous wastes.
Whatever we do, positive or negative, has an impact on the
quantity and property of wastes. 
Similarly, when you send used computers to Africa to
narrow the digital gap, you enable people to gain access to a
powerful tool for their own development. At the same time,
however, these used computers will become wastes in Africa,
and African communities will have the burden to dispose of
them when they reach the end of their useful life. So, there is
a lesson to learn about this. We need to constantly keep in
mind the need to address the issue of wastes in development
and environmental models. Otherwise, we create a liability
and often displace the waste problem to others. 
sibility would remain with private operators in terms of protect-
ing human health and the environment. Because of the cross-
border nature of the trade in recyclables, national standards will
not be enough. In order to bring consistency to environmental
standards and best practices among all countries, a global, or at
least regional, playing field must be achieved. Reaching this
goal would require establishing a regional certification scheme
for the environmentally sound management of hazardous and
other wastes that could be delivered by independent institutions
such as the Basel Convention regional centers. Such a certifica-
tion scheme will be built on the environmentally sound princi-
ples adopted at the global level by the Parties to the Basel
Convention and should provide incentives to improve perform-
ance of the recycling industry in reaching acceptable common
environmental standards. Environmentally sound management
implies a continuous improvement in environmental perform-
ance. All of this is feasible and centers around values, ethics,
solidarity, and commitment.
CONCLUSION
We cannot close the book now. We have not finished our
story: it will remain an endless tale of hope and frustrations.
Dollars and cents will continue to be the catalyst. Governments
are sizing down budgets; the environment is no longer at the top
of people’s concerns. Unemployment and insecurity are driving
the agenda. Internationally, developed countries – the so-called
donor countries – have their eyes on climate change issues.
Development co-operation rightly focuses on poverty reduction.
The Basel Convention is below the threshold level of political
awareness. But, in the meantime, the world continues to build a
toxic heritage for future generations. 
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Job growth, increased tax revenue, and urban renewal arejust a few of the benefits municipalities receive by rede-veloping abandoned “brownfields.” Brownfields are
“property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which
may be complicated by the presence … of a hazardous sub-
stance, pollutant, or contaminant.” 1 Yet, while the benefits for
municipalities are numerous, liability concerns among private
investors make it difficult for potential developers to finance
such cleanup projects. Fortunately, a recent ruling by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s Environmental Appeals
Board (“EAB”) may relieve some lender’s concerns.2
Although clean-up costs are the responsibility of current
or past owners, rather than prospective developers, the poten-
tial tort liability to residents and owners of nearby brownfields
property are a major deterrent for private investors.3 Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”),4 commonly known as
“Superfund,” strict, joint, and several liability for past contam-
ination is imposed on all parties within the “chain of title” from
the onset of contamination.”5 For instance, in Interfaith
Community Organization v. Honeywell International, Inc.,
Honeywell, a recent successor of a brownfield site, was held
liable under CERCLA for damages resulting from the prior
owners’ contamination that affected surrounding property
owners.6 Moreover, in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., the
Eleventh Circuit held that a “secured creditor may incur CER-
CLA liability… by participating in the financial management
of a facility … indicating a capacity to influence the treatment
of hazardous waste.”7 Because investors can be held liable
under CERCLA for damages incurred as a result of prior con-
tamination that emanated to other properties, they hesitate to
invest in brownfield redevelopments.8
While cases such as Fleet and Interfaith are rare, the per-
ception of lender liability, especially third-party tort claims, is
high among financial institutions.9 The American International
Group, Inc. (“AIG”) testified before Congress that “third party
liability for property damage and bodily injury due to pollution
issues, go to the heart of what concerns many would-be
Brownfield redevelopers.”10
However, on October 28, 2005, the EAB denied Grand
Pier Center, LLC, a Chicago redeveloper, reimbursement from
the EPA for $200,000 the company incurred by cleaning up an
off-site sidewalk area.11 Grand Pier argued that they were sole-
ly responsible for costs incurred cleaning up contamination on
the property they owned, but they were not responsible for the
clean-up cost of the public sidewalk.12 The EAB held instead
that the “facility” encompasses all areas where the contamina-
tion occurred, including Grand Pier Center’s property and the
adjacent off-site sidewalk area.13 The Grand Pier ruling clari-
fies that developers will be expected to address all contamina-
tion associated with a brownfield, including adjacent proper-
ties and right-of-ways.14
While it may appear this ruling makes developers more
vulnerable, in reality it alleviates some investors’ concerns
over third-party liability, because lenders can be assured there
will be no lingering contamination. Eliminating concerns over
third-party liability from lingering contamination will strength-
en investor confidence; thus, brownfield redevelopment can
continue to revitalize communities and provide sustainable
economic growth. 
RECENT EPA RULING MAY INCREASE BROWNFIELD FINANCING
by Mark Wilson*
* Mark Wilson is a JD candidate, May 2008, at American University,
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INTRODUCTION
Cocaine politics continues to take a toll on Colombiansocial, political, economic, and legal stability. Coca1 isindigenous to the Andean Mountains and for hundreds
of years, native populations and immigrants to the region have
consumed its leaves for both medicinal and customary purpos-
es.2 The United States consumes cocaine at a rate of over 300
metric tons per year.3 Each year approximately 6,548,000 North
Americans consume cocaine, annually spending $43.6 billion. 4
In an effort to curb this consumption, and because coca is the
base of cocaine, the American and Colombian governments
have combined forces using pesticide in an attempt to eradicate
the problem at its perceived source, the coca plant.5
The legal, social, and politi-
cal effects of spraying Glyphosate
on coca plants demonstrate flaws
in the policy of relying on a
chemical to perform a govern-
ment function. Glyphosate is a
legal chemical, most famously
the base of Monsanto’s Round-
Up. The chemical is produced in
the United States, mixed in
Colombia,6 and sprayed by
American planes on the
Colombian countryside.7 Despite
this lawful chain, images,
accounts, and notions of stripped
tropical forest as well as bereft
local farmers and indigenous
communities raise questions as to
the legality of spraying Glyphosate.8 This article explores the
effect of the spraying of Glyphosate with special attention to the
issue of property rights. Through an analysis of Colombian
expropriation laws, this article will argue that government
reliance on aerial spraying of coca crops results in an illegal
chemical expropriation. 
THE USE OF GLYPHOSATE: A CHEMICAL
EXPROPRIATION?
Part of Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative (“CEI”) involves the aerial spraying of illegal coca
cultivations with Glyphosate.9 The Colombian Government is
currently spraying a Glyphosate cocktail on coca crops through-
out its territory, from the Amazon River Basin to the Northern
Caribbean coast.10 This program is meant to eliminate the culti-
vation of coca by killing the plant before it can be converted to
cocaine, illegally transported, and consumed in the lucrative
American market.11
For decades in Colombia, three extra-military armed
groups have battled with drug lords, the State, each other, and
the civilian population, resulting in as many as 30,000 deaths in
some years 12 and 2.5 million displaced persons (second only to
Sudan in number of displaced persons).13 These violent groups
as well as political and diplomatic wrangling fuel a devastating
guerilla conflict.14 Armed groups and drug lords rely in large
part on capital from the illegal drug trade,15 as well as extor-
tion, kidnappings, and forced displacement.16 To dam the flow
of illegal capital, the Colombian government cooperates with
the United States in an attempt to eradicate the illegal cultiva-
tion of the coca plant.17
Dusting planes, Blackhawk
helicopters, American military
agents, and U.S. Department of
Defense contractors work in unison
with Colombian forces and under
U.S. Congressionally mandated
guidelines18 to apply Glyphosate to
coca cultivations using aerial spray-
ing.19 The aerial eradication pro-
gram in Colombia sprayed a record
136,551 hectares of coca and over
3,000 hectares (7,000 acres) of
opium poppy in 2004.20 In 2005,
Colombia cultivated 80,000 of the
158,000 hectares cultivated in
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.21
Though scientists from the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Organization of
American States have found Glysophate’s negative environ-
mental and human consequences to be negligible, controversy
persists.22 A sprayed field takes approximately six to eight
months to recover productive crops.23 The use of a second
chemical in the Glyphosate cocktail, Cosmoflux, allows the
Glysophate to penetrate the waxy leaves of tropical plants.24
Spray pilots apply the herbicide at altitudes of less than one
hundred feet,25 and “while every effort is made to minimize
human and mechanical mistakes, occasional errors are unavoid-
able.”26 As such, many neighboring cultivations, both illicit and
licit, have been destroyed. Glysophate spraying has allegedly
resulted in harm to “food plots, including bananas, beans, plan-
CHEMICAL TAKING: 
GLYPHOSATE AND THE ERADICATION OF DUE PROCESS IN COLOMBIA
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tains and yucca, as well as chicken and fish farms.”27 Further,
according to some sources, an investigation by the municipal
police of Valle del Guamuez found “that as of February 2001,
fumigations killed 38,357 domesticated birds, 719 horses, 2,767
head of cattle, 128,980 fish, and 919 other animals such as pigs,
cats, and dogs.”28
The Colombian Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo) has
received 5,844 claims for damage to food crops since late 2001,
claims that, under the Colombian Drug Commission Resolution
00017 guidelines, only warrant attention if they are found in licit
crop zones.29 Of those, the U.S. Department of State reports that
28 claims were paid with total compensation of $159,000.30 The
process of review has thus resulted in compensation payments
to less than 0.5 percent of the claimants at $5,678.50 a payment.
These figures leave questions as to the role of due process for
property owners whose lands were destroyed incidentally, while
neither hearings nor compensation exist for those lands sprayed
purposefully by the eradications. 
Though the spraying is for a public purpose, the resulting
temporary disruption in productivity may constitute an illegal
temporary taking by the Colombian government. Although the
Colombian government has implemented laws that mirror inter-
national and U.S. expropriation laws, the aerial spraying does
not meet legal standards contained therein.31 Do these laws
allow the elimination of due process standards by substituting a
government presence with the use of Glyphosate?
GOVERNMENT EXPROPRIATIONS: 
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
COLOMBIAN EXPROPRIATION LAW
In order to be legal, any government expropriation must
protect the individual property owner’s rights. Private property
rights, enshrined in the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment
and extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
allow for the taking of private property by a government action
only when that taking serves a public purpose, follows due
process, is nondiscriminatory, and is accompanied by just com-
pensation.32 International standards closely replicate this formu-
la.33 For example, Article 21 of the American Convention on
Human Rights, “Pact of San Jose,” to which Colombia is a sig-
natory, provides for expropriation protection.34 Colombian
national laws provide for protection against an expropriation,
regulatory expropriation, and temporary expropriation without
due process and compensation.35 These standards create a bal-
ancing test between the use of police power for a public purpose
on one side and the proprietor’s privacy interest on the other.36
The Colombian standard for expropriation resembles inter-
national and U.S. laws on the subject and requires previous pay-
ments to property owners and direct legislative and judicial
involvement.37 Colombian expropriation laws are found in
Article 58 of its Constitution.38 Private property may not be vio-
lated save for public utility or social interest. Where such a con-
flict exists, the private right must give way to the social inter-
est.39 The law further mandates that the State may expropriate
lands when the legislature establishes the need to meet a public
purpose or a social interest. This finding must then be executed
through a judicial sentencing and accompanied by previous
indemnification.40 Article 34 of the Colombian Constitution cre-
ates an exception to the basic standard established in Article 58
by permitting expropriation as part of a criminal sentence,
allowing seizure of goods obtained through illegal enrichment.41
OF TEMPORARY TAKING AND INCIDENTAL DAMAGES
In Colombia, as in the United States, a temporary taking is
a legal exercise of police power as long as it is accompanied by
compensation and protection of due process rights.42 For exam-
ple, Article 59 of the Colombian Constitution specifically
declares that in times of war the government may temporarily
expropriate lands without prior indemnification.43 Decree 1420,
Article 21, Paragraph 6 mandates that “for estates that are used
for productive activities which will be subject to an affectation
causing a temporary or definitive restriction to the generation of
income derived from their development, independently from the
assessment of the estate, a compensation for loss of income will
be recognized, for up to a maximum of six (6) months.”44 This
decree, intended for use in environmental regulation, requires
compensation and due process protections for temporary takings
of a “right of way” as well as “economic activity in the effected
estate.”45 Article 90 of the Constitution provides that the State
will be liable for any illegal damages caused by the actions or
omissions of public authorities.46 This standard requires gov-
ernment compensation for temporary takings as well as inciden-
tal damages to adjacent properties during a temporary taking.47
This decree in conjunction with Article 34 of the Colombian
Constitution demonstrates a legal responsibility on the part of
the government to conduct a due process complaint hearing
before a temporary expropriation or to provide post-expropria-
tion indemnification if a temporary taking is effected under exi-
gent circumstances, for instance during a time of war.48 These
laws parallel U.S. laws, where the Supreme Court has held that
the standard bar on incidental damages to surrounding property
subject to a taking does not apply in temporary takings.49
The geography of the Andes Mountains is ideal for growing coca with its














In standard expropriations, as well as the temporary taking
and incidental damages taking, Colombian laws meet interna-
tional standards and parallel U.S. laws on the subject. However,
coca fields sprayed by Glyphosate as well as the incidental dam-
ages occurred to neighboring farms, and indigenous groups’
lands result in a “chemical expropriation” that does not meet
those standards. According to the official count, this equated to
at least 137,000 hectares of chemically expropriated lands in
2004. Are due process protections absent from this action?
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES: DUE PROCESS
CASUALTIES OF COLOMBIA’S MANY WARS
Colombia has been effective in creating a stable investment
climate in part because of Article 58 of its Constitution.50 Even
in times of war, the Colombian Constitution protects private
property rights faced with a temporary taking.51 But Law 793 of
2002 creates a special harbor for expropriations of property
“directly or indirectly” related to illicit drug activity without
compensation.52 Recently, President Alvaro Uribe Velez stated,
“many times we have considered the fact that these lands belong
to a campesino (low income land worker) or a small-farm
owner, but this problem of coca in Colombia…financing terror-
ist groups, we cannot get stuck in just fumigation because we
fumigate in one place and it comes
back in another.”53
Law 793 parallels attempts in
U.S. law to allow broad police
power expropriations in drug
cases, attempts that were struck
down in United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property.54 The
U.S. Supreme Court weighed
heavily the possibility of mistaken
seizures resulting from a lack of
evidentiary findings.55 Both the
Constitutional Court of Colombia
and the Supreme Court of the
United States have upheld the
notion that, barring exigent cir-
cumstances, both a government audience and compensation
must off set any government taking. If exigent circumstances do
exist, these Courts have held, then where a hearing could not be
held prior, it must be held after to determine if the expropriation
requires compensation. 
In 2003, the Colombian Constitutional Court affirmed that the
“public purpose” of illicit-property expropriations without com-
pensation, codified into law 793, outweighed private property
interests.56 The Court authorized Law 793, declaring that through
this law, the government has properly “establecen las reglas que
gobiernan la extinción de dominio,” or that this law establishes
rules that govern the execution of eminent domain.57 Because this
law provides for a legislative and judicial procedure, namely a
hearing to verify the illicit connections of the condemned proper-
ty, the Court found that it met a due process standard. The effect of
this law is to allow government exercise of eminent domain on
property proven to be directly or indirectly connected to illicit
behavior without payment of just compensation. 
The temporary chemical expropriations caused by the use
of Glyphosate in Colombia do not meet this standard, nor any of
the others presented above. Here, no legislative or judicial hear-
ings take place. The failure to provide them cannot be excused
by the exigent circumstances of the war on drugs, nor by the
temporary nature of the taking. Yet, a “temporary restriction on
economic activity” of six to eight months occurs as a result of a
chemical spraying and no compensation is awarded, and post-
expropriation hearings are provided for only those properties
sprayed incidentally, as opposed to any property sprayed.58
Lastly, of the thousands of claims presented under the
rubric of Resolution 00017 to the national Ombudsman, only a
small fraction has been paid. As previously discussed,
Colombian law requires compensation for temporary taking of
the economically productive activities of an estate.59 While
Decree 1420 deals with environmental concerns, the tests it
describes clearly exist to meet the expropriation standards set
out in Articles 58, 59, and 34 of the Constitution. Resolution
00017, however, does not meet these standards and thus expos-
es a due process gap in the current use of Glyphosate.60 Failure
to provide hearings or pay compensation strongly contradicts
Colombian expropriation law on
several accounts. 
In contrast to the legal regime
set up in Resolution 00017, Law
793 could be interpreted to require
that property owners accused of
growing coca be brought before
the court for a pre-expropriation
hearing to establish a direct or
indirect connection to illicit activi-
ty.61 Further, Articles 58, 59, and
34 of the Colombian Constitution
most likely would require a hear-
ing for all proprietors whose land
have been taken, not merely those
who may have suffered incidental damage.62 Lastly, even in the
exigent circumstances of the War on Drugs, in keeping with
other wartime powers, the state must take steps to correct a tem-
porary taking after the fact through compensation or a hearing
to establish why compensation is not given.63
THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF WAR:
CIVILIANS IN A JUDICIAL NO MAN’S LAND
The due process problems of these temporary “chemical
takings” are rooted in the oft-noted absence of the State in large
swaths of the Colombian countryside. As a result of this
absence, the legal infrastructure cannot or does not support hear-
ings on and enforcement of expropriations, by fumigation or
otherwise on licit or illicit crops.64 Recent attempts at augment-
ing State presence have met with frustrating results.65 On
December 28, 2005, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
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attempted to protect manual coca eradication workers in a
National Park.66 The surrounding towns of La Albania,
Palestina, and Playa Rica suffered similar attacks and have been
deserted by the banana farmers and others who lived in the
area.67 Emptied towns, displaced persons, and banana and coca
fields peppered with anti-personnel mines are not the only casu-
alties of this type of power vacuum.68 This scene is repeated
throughout the Colombian countryside and has been for many
decades, leaving expectations of a prompt hearing less realistic
with every abandoned town.69
While the total hectares of coca cultivations reduced dra-
matically from 2001 through 2004 thanks to the use of
Glyphosate, recent analysis demonstrates that Colombia con-
tinues to be the highest exporter of coca and had a three per-
cent increase in hectares of coca cultivation in 2005.70 This
new figure combined with the slowed trend of reduction in the
2003 and 2004 shows a tide change in the effectiveness of the
program.71 It appears that President Uribe Velez was correct
in his observation that use of Glyphosate merely results in
cultivation in other areas.72 The U.S. State Department recent-
ly acknowledged that coca cultivations have not been stopped
and that, in fact, attempts to eliminate them are creating a
“ballooning” of the same problem into neighboring Peru,
Bolivia, and Ecuador.73
CONCLUSION
The use of Glyophosate by the parties implementing CEI
does not act as an effective substitute for the presence of the
State in those areas where it is being sprayed. Rather,
Glyphosate spraying results in a new kind expropriation, a
“chemical taking.” The resulting State deficit is made evident in
an erosion of due process rights. While debate continues on the
effectiveness of Glyphosate in fighting coca, it is evident that
the government requires a normalized legal regime with
stronger judicial system to hear the due process concerns of
affected citizens and the political will to use them. Failure to do
so creates a discriminatory effect whereby affected parties are
forced to bear both the high economic burden of eliminated cap-
ital flows from coca and the social burden of a guerilla war.
Using Glysophate as a means of enforcing the police arm of the
state does not address the political, judicial, and economic
deficit exposed by the temporary chemical taking. 
Legal remedies for the chemical takings reach the interna-
tional realm through the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights. However, legal remedies cannot address all the political
problems that the use of Glyphosate demonstrates. If
Colombia’s troubles, as has been postulated, are a result of a
lack of government presence, the use of Glyphosate, whether
legal or not, only serves to deepen those troubles by widening
the breach between citizen and government. 
ENDNOTES: Chemical Taking in Colombia Continued on page 75
INTRODUCTION
Nanotechnology, the design and manipulation of materialsat the atomic scale, may well revolutionize many of theways our society manufactures products, produces ener-
gy, and treats diseases. Hundreds of large and small nanotechnol-
ogy companies are developing a wide variety of materials for use
in electronics, medical diagnostic tools and therapies, construc-
tion materials, personal care products, paints and coatings, envi-
ronmental cleanup, energy production and conservation, environ-
mental sensors, and many other important applications. The
National Science Foundation predicts that the global market for
nanomaterial products could reach $1 trillion within a decade.1
Deliberate exploitation of properties evident only at the
nanoscale is central to these applications. Such properties
include the large surface area of various nanomaterials, which
arise from their tiny particle size, absorption and radiation of
highly specific wavelengths of light, ability to penetrate cellular
barriers, and high tensile strength and durability. Carefully con-
trolled, these properties may provide highly beneficial products.
However, these new and enhanced properties also raise the pos-
sibility of unintended and adverse consequences, both for
human health and for the environment. For example, the same
binding properties that allow nanomaterials to deliver therapeu-
tics to cancer cells might also allow nanomaterials with these
properties to deliver toxic substances to aquatic organisms.
Likewise, the electrical properties that drive applications in
computers may lead to oxidative damage in living tissues. It is
in the best interest of companies and society that these potential
harms are identified prospectively, and are addressed, ideally
through material design, or alternatively, through safeguards on
production, use, or disposal. 
Available data, while limited in scope, clearly indicate both
that some nanomaterials have hazardous properties and that
growing numbers of nanomaterials are reaching the market.
Unfortunately, it is far from clear whether existing federal regula-
tory programs will provide an effective means of addressing
nanomaterial risks, particularly in the foreseeable future. As an
interim measure, several voluntary initiatives to develop stan-
dards for the safe production, use, and disposal of nanomaterials
are now underway. The rigor of such standards, the degree to
which mandatory safeguards are adopted, and the extent to which
risk-related data are generated prior to widespread dispersion of
nanomaterials will jointly indicate whether previous technologi-
cal mishaps will be avoided in developing nanotechnology.
WHY “GETTING IT RIGHT THE FIRST TIME” IS IN
THE NANOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY’S INTEREST
Environmental law is replete with illustrations of how igno-
rance failed to produce bliss for industry, workers, consumers,
the public, and the environment. When the harmful effects of
asbestos were widely recognized, years after the material had
been extensively distributed in commerce, many makers and
users of asbestos products found themselves embroiled in cost-
ly litigation brought by victims and their families. As of 2002,
more than half a million people had filed claims related to
asbestos exposure.2 Notably, five corporations have spent more
than $1 billion each on asbestos litigation; indeed, one compa-
ny alone recently agreed to pay more than $4 billion to settle
pending claims for asbestos exposure.3 Standard & Poor’s has
estimated that the total cost of liability for asbestos-related loss-
es could reach $200 billion.4
Tort liability is not the only route by which actions that are
lawful today can become major headaches for industry tomor-
row. In 1980, the U.S. Congress enacted the Superfund law,
under which dumpsite operators, along with those who generate
or transport the wastes, are legally responsible for cleaning up
properties contaminated by toxic wastes, regardless of whether
the contamination arose from illegal activities.5 Indeed, under
Superfund’s “joint and several liability” provisions, a company
that contributes any amount, no matter how small, to the con-
tamination of a Superfund site may, theoretically, be held liable
for the cleanup of the entire site (though the company can then
seek cost-recovery against other contributors).6 To date, the
industry has expended more than $20 billion in remediation and
related costs.7
Even without conclusive proof linking a new technology or
material to an environmental or health harm, companies may be
severely penalized for failing to demonstrate the safety of their
products at the onset. When European nations contested the
safety of bioengineered foods, their refusal to accept imports of
such foods cost U.S. farmers an estimated $300 million annual-
ly in lost crop export revenues. 
Each of these examples illustrates that the failure to identi-
fy and address the risks – real or perceived – of new technolo-
gies and materials can lead to immense costs, from financial and
managerial perspectives, as well as from human and environ-
mental standpoints.8
At present, most consumers have such limited familiarity
with nanotechnology that they have formed few impressions.
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However, a recent study provided basic information on nan-
otechnology to representative groups of citizens in three loca-
tions. After reviewing that information, a substantial majority of
participants said that although they anticipate major benefits
from nanotechnology, they are concerned that industry is push-
ing products into the market without conducting adequate safe-
ty testing.9 As nanotechnology products continue to increase
their presence in the market and in the news, such views may
become more widespread. Indeed, although relatively few stud-
ies have been conducted on nanomaterials, the initial results
have identified surprising, hazardous properties, i.e. intrinsic
abilities to cause adverse effects. At the same time, the rapid
pace of commercialization suggests that the potential for human
and environmental exposure will grow dramatically. Available
information on both of these elements of risk – hazard and expo-
sure – is briefly summarized below. Complicating the process of
both obtaining and evaluating such information is the lack of an
agreed-upon system for naming and uniquely describing nano-
materials of various structures and the limited ability to detect
and characterize nanomaterials in many biological and environ-
mental media.
NANOMATERIAL HAZARDS: FLASHING YELLOW LIGHTS
The inherent nature and novel properties of certain nano-
materials, and the results from many of the relatively small
number of nanotoxicity studies conducted to date, lead to con-
cerns about nanomaterials’ health and safety impacts. Many of
the very properties that make
nanomaterials useful also raise
the potential for these materials
to present novel mechanisms and
targets of toxicity. For a given
mass of particles, surface area
increases dramatically as the
diameter of the individual parti-
cles decreases. This increased
surface-area-to-mass ratio
appears to be a critical feature in
understanding some aspects of
the toxicity of nanomaterials. For example, in a study compar-
ing the toxicity of conventional versus nano-sized particles of
titanium dioxide, the nanoparticles appeared significantly more
toxic than the conventional particles when the dose was report-
ed on a mass basis, but this distinction essentially disappeared
when the dose was reported on a surface area basis.10 The high-
er surface area also leads to higher particle surface energy,
which may translate into higher reactivity.11 Lastly, the combi-
nation of high surface area and small size may give nanoparti-
cles unusual, catalytic reactivity, such as those seen with gold
nanoparticles.12 This combination of enhanced surface area and
enhanced surface activity lends far greater complexity to the
characterization of nanoparticles when compared to bulk and
conventional substances, and also precludes easy extrapolation
about potential toxicity.
Moreover, at least some nanoparticles can readily penetrate
cell membranes, which enables them to deliver targeted drug
therapies. Evidence suggests that some nanoparticles can also
cross physiologic barriers (including the lung-blood, blood-
brain, and placental barriers), and can enter body compartments
that neither larger particles nor smaller molecules can readily
access. One study of twenty nanometer polystyrene beads sug-
gests that they enter cells by passing directly through mem-
branes, without requiring specific transport mechanisms. Once
inside the cells, the nanoparticles distribute throughout the cyto-
plasm and appear to bind to a variety of key cellular structures.13
Surface modifications may allow nanoparticles to bind to
cell surface receptors and potentially to interact with internal
cell structures.14 Subtle variations in nanoparticle surfaces,
whether due to intentional coating prior to entry into the body,
unintentional surface binding, or coating degradation once
inside the body, can have dramatic impacts on where and how
nanoparticles gain entry into organs and cells, as well as where
and how they are transported after entry. These complexities
increase the difficulty of understanding nanomaterial hazards.
In addition to these inherent characteristics, the limited
empirical data available adds to the concerns. As of yet, no stud-
ies on any nanomaterial’s reproductive toxicity, immunotoxici-
ty, developmental toxicity, or chronic health effects, such as
cancer, have been published, although some are underway.15
The limited number of short-term studies completed to date
demonstrate a variety of adverse effects. Studies in which sin-
gle-walled carbon nanotubes (“SWCNTs”) were implanted into
the lungs of rodents have consistent-
ly demonstrated that they cause
unusual lung granulomas and have
shown other signs of lung inflamma-
tion.16 Moreover, one study found
that SWCNTs also cause dose-
dependent, diffuse interstitial fibro-
sis, a form of lung disease.17 A study
of multi-walled carbon nanotubes
(“MWCNTs”) showed similar lung
toxicity, especially after the
MWCNTs were finely ground.18
Single- and multi-walled carbon
nanotubes also induce oxidative damage to skin cells, which can
result in membrane damage that leads to cell death.19 These
studies raise questions of potential toxicity at the beginning and
end of the carbon nanotube (“CNT”) lifecycle. This can occur
through workplace exposures or when CNT-containing products
undergo weathering, erosion, or grinding during recycling or
disposal.
The toxicity of C60 fullerenes (commonly known as bucky-
balls) is particularly unclear at present. Computer modeling sug-
gests that fullerenes can bind to DNA and have “negative impact
on the structure, stability, and biological functions of DNA mol-
ecules.”20 As a result, if fullerenes gain access to cell nuclei,
they may interfere with critical cellular machinery. While
fullerenes are insoluble as single particles, they can form crys-
talline aggregates that are readily soluble in water; these aggre-
gates appear to be toxic to bacteria.21 In addition, studies in fish
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Presently, quantitative
data on exposure to
nanomaterials are
almost nonexistent.
have shown that fullerenes can be transported via the gills from
water to the brain, where they can cause oxidative damage to
brain cell membranes.22 Uncoated fullerenes have also been
found to cause oxidative stress in in vitro testing systems, i.e.
cell-based systems as distinguished from whole-organism
ones.23 However, some scientists have questioned whether
observed toxicity is caused by contaminants, specifically organ-
ic solvents, rather than the fullerenes themselves, and have
pointed to studies that show negligible toxicity and even protec-
tive effects from pristine fullerenes that are made into water-sol-
uble aggregates, without the use of organic solvents.24 This
alternate hypothesis, however, disregards indications that the
fullerene aggregates produced without solvents are significantly
larger, and thus less able to penetrate cells, than those formed
with solvents. This ongoing debate highlights the importance of
understanding nanomaterials’ physical form, as well as the lim-
itations of current scientific understanding about nanomaterial
toxicity. 
Finally, quantum dots can be composed of a variety of
inherently toxic materials, includ-
ing cadmium and lead. Because
some of the key potential applica-
tions of quantum dots include
diagnostic imaging and medical
therapeutics, quantum dots have
been studied relatively extensive-
ly in biological systems.
However, only a small portion of
this research has focused on
potential toxicity, and those stud-
ies performed to date have mainly
been in vitro assays. While results
have been somewhat inconsistent,
studies that used longer exposure
times were more likely to demon-
strate significant toxicity.25 Inorganic elements typically make
up the core of quantum dots, but these elements are generally
coated with organic materials, such as polyethylene glycol, in
order to enhance their biocompatibility or target them to specif-
ic organs or cells. While many coatings initially decrease toxic-
ity by one or more orders of magnitude, the coatings might
degrade when exposed to air or ultraviolet light, which could
lead to toxicity increases. While the presumption has been that
this cytotoxicity is caused by leakage of cadmium or selenium
from the core, there is evidence that some of the molecules used
as coatings may have independent toxicity.26
NANOMATERIAL EXPOSURES: A LIFECYCLE VIEW
Some nanomaterials now on the market, and others in
development, can clearly result in human and environmental
exposures to nanoparticles. Examples include uses in drugs and
cosmetics, and remediation of groundwater contamination.
However, other products may also lead to substantial expo-
sure, though the exposure does not necessarily occur during a
product’s useful life. For example, nanotubes or other nanoma-
terials embedded within resins or other matrices may be incor-
porated into tennis rackets, automobile running boards, or other
products. Although risk of exposure to these nanotubes (which,
as noted above, have been shown to damage lung tissue)27
appears minimal during product use, pre- and post-use exposure
must also be considered. Such exposure may occur during the
manufacture of the product and its components, or during dis-
posal, recycling, or reclamation. Human and environmental
exposure during these other stages may be substantial. For
instance, although computer users are highly unlikely to inhale
carbon nanotubes bound in their computer screen, the exposure
potential may dramatically increase if recyclers ultimately grind
up those screens for other uses, such as road aggregate. Human
exposure is most obvious for the workers doing the grinding, but
may also harm road-construction workers, travelers, and neigh-
bors as the road’s surface weathers with time and traffic.
Occupational exposure to researchers and students may also
occur in research and development settings. In sum, it is neces-
sary to consider a product’s complete lifecycle in order to under-
stand the effects of exposure and address risks effectively. 
Presently, quantitative data on
exposure to nanomaterials are al-
most nonexistent. However, sources
indicate that numerous nanomateri-
al-containing products are entering
commerce, thus creating the poten-
tial for human and environmental
exposure at various stages of their
lifecycles. According to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”), “a survey by EmTech Re-
search of companies working in the
field of nanotechnology has identi-
fied approximately 80 consumer
products, and over 600 raw materi-
als, intermediate components and
industrial equipment items that are used by manufacturers,”
though detailed results of this survey do not appear to be pub-
lic.28 Lux Research, a nanotechnology research and advisory
firm, projected in 2004 that: “Sales of products incorporating
emerging nanotechnology will rise from less than 0.1 percent of
global manufacturing output today to fifteen percent in 2014, to-
taling $2.6 trillion. This value will approach the size of the in-
formation technology and telecom industries combined.”29 More
informally, an eBay search using the word “nano” produces
items such as golf clubs, tennis racquets, face lotions, and sun
blocks; notably, however, these references may reflect marketing
initiatives rather than actual nanomaterial use. Certain nanoma-
terials are also readily available for direct purchase, as illustrat-
ed by a Google search producing sources for nanotubes, bucky-
balls, quantum dots, and metal oxide nanoparticles.
Other information suggests that nanomaterial uses and
exposures in the United States are about to increase significant-
ly. For example, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology concluded in a 2005 report that the United
States is the world leader in nanotechnology by a variety of
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measures, including public and private spending, numbers of
start-up companies, and numbers of scientific research articles.
The NanoBusiness Alliance states that there are 613 companies
involved with nanotechnology within the United States, while
noting that “it is notoriously difficult to track commercial devel-
opments in nanotechnology, so [the Alliance] cannot be precise-
ly sure.”30 Likewise, the dramatic growth in the number of nan-
otechnology patents issued by the U.S. Patent Office suggests
that increasing numbers of nanomaterials are being introduced
into the market.31
With the commercialization of more products containing
nanomaterials comes the risk for more human and environmental
exposure, which lends urgency to the need for understanding the
potential hazards of nanomaterials. It also raises the questions of
whether, and how carefully, regulators are reviewing the lifecycle
impacts of these new materials before they reach the market.
NANOMATERIAL RISKS: WILL EXISTING REGULATORY
PROGRAMS PROTECT WORKERS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT?
Effectively managing nanomaterials’ potential risks will
prove to be a challenge for existing occupational and environ-
mental regulatory frameworks for
at least five reasons. First, in most
of the current regulatory pro-
grams, standards and their exemp-
tions are based on mass and mass
concentration. Because of their
high surface-area-to-mass ratios,
and enhanced surface activity,
nanomaterials are likely to prove
potent at far lower concentration
levels than envisioned when these
thresholds were initially set. 
Second, although regulators
can often reasonably predict at
least some types of toxicity for
new conventional materials based
on extrapolation from convention-
al materials having a similar chemical structure, too little is cur-
rently known about nanomaterials to enable such extrapolation.
Third, it appears that many nanomaterials are being devel-
oped in a decentralized fashion, with a significant percentage of
production coming from small, dispersed facilities. As a result,
the sheer number of facilities involved will hamper the gather-
ing of information on which materials are produced, and the
purpose and specific applications of the materials, as well as
directing compliance and enforcement efforts to where they are
needed. Additionally, much of the production, processing, and
use of these materials will take place in facilities that may lack
the expertise and resources to understand and comply with envi-
ronmental and occupational safeguards.
Fourth, some potential nanotechnology applications may
fall through the cracks among the jurisdictions of multiple reg-
ulatory programs. For example, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (“FDA”) reviewed sunscreens using nanoparticles of titani-
um dioxide for potential of immediate health effects on con-
sumers.32 However, neither the FDA nor the EPA appears to
have reviewed how titanium dioxide nanoparticles could affect
aquatic ecosystems once these sunscreens wash off.
Lastly, the pace of the regulatory process lags far behind the
speed at which nanomaterials are being introduced into the mar-
ket. While substances marketed as pesticides,33 fuel additives,34
or drug or food additives35 regularly receive significant scrutiny
when first introduced, most other substances do not.36 As a
result, occupational and environmental protections are general-
ly developed only after problems are identified or strongly sus-
pected in regulatory proceedings that typically take several
years to complete. A more detailed discussion of specific regu-
latory issues under key U.S. laws follows.
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(“OSHAct”),37 four types of regulatory mechanisms are avail-
able for protecting workers from overexposure to chemicals:
substance-specific standards, general respiratory protection
standards, hazard communication standards, and the “general
duty clause.” Each is examined below.
As a practical matter, sub-
stance-specific occupational stan-
dards are unlikely to be set in the
absence of extensive toxicology
data. Currently, the vast majority of
standards adopted have been based
on findings of human epidemiolog-
ical studies, which follow wide-
spread exposure and take years, or
even decades, to conduct. Given the
relative paucity of health data on
nanoparticles, it is unlikely that any
nanoparticle-specific standards will
be established in the reasonable
future. In their absence, inhalable
nanoparticles will automatically be
covered by the 5 micrograms per
cubic meter (“mg/m3”) standard that applies to “particulates not
otherwise regulated,” sometimes called “nuisance dust.”38
Unfortunately, these mass-based standards, developed for con-
ventional particles, are unlikely to protect workers from adverse
effects of nanoparticle exposures; indeed, one study has sug-
gested that exposure to carbon nanotubes at 5 mg/m3 for sever-
al weeks would be analogous to exposure levels found to cause
lung granulomas and inflammation in rats.39
Second, the respiratory protection standard requires
employers to provide workers with respirators or other protec-
tive devices when engineering controls are not adequate to pro-
tect health.40 The standard provides guidance in selecting spe-
cific personal protective equipment and in implementing work-
place respiratory protection programs. Only respirators certified
by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health may
be used, and employers must assess the effectiveness of the res-
pirators they supply. The current lack of validated means to
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measure and characterize the form and size of nanoparticles in
the air, as well as the uncertainties regarding respirator per-
formance, especially in relation to particles between 30 and 70
nanometers and potential agglomerates around 300 nanometers,
will complicate implementation of this standard.41
Third, OSHAct’s hazard communication standard42 stipu-
lates that all producers or importers of chemicals are obligated
to develop Material Safety Data Sheets (“MSDSs”), which are
intended to provide workers with available information on haz-
ardous ingredients in products they handle and educate them on
safe handling practices. However, even when accurate and up-
to-date, MSDSs have significant limitations; most notably, there
is no requirement to either generate data on potential hazards or
disclose the absence of any data. Moreover, in some instances,
a nanomaterial’s MSDS has simply adopted the hazard profile
for a presumedly-related bulk material. For example, an MSDS
for carbon nanotubes identifies the primary component as
graphite, and cites information on the hazards of graphite, with-
out acknowledging any dissimilarity between the two sub-
stances.43 From a scientific perspective, this makes no more
sense than considering carbon nanotubes equivalent to dia-
monds. While graphite, diamonds, and carbon nanotubes are all
composed of carbon, the physical and chemical properties of
these three substances are quite distinct, reflecting their radical-
ly different molecular structures.
Finally, OSHAct’s general duty clause44 is intended as a
backstop to protect workers from certain exposures that are
widely known to result in toxic effects but are not addressed
specifically by an OSHA standard. The general duty clause,
however, applies only to “recognized” hazards, a difficult crite-
rion to meet in light of the current paucity of toxicity data on
specific nanomaterials.
U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act
Beyond the occupational realm, the array of potential envi-
ronmental regulatory authorities initially appears impressive.
These include the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the
Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, which addresses
management of hazardous and other solid wastes, and the Toxic
Substances Control Act (“TSCA”), which covers commercial
chemicals other than those used as drugs, food additives, cos-
metics, fuel additives, and pesticides. Yet, most existing regula-
tions under these statutes are not directly relevant to nanomate-
rials. Moreover, adopting new standards would require that the
EPA launch lengthy, data-intensive rulemaking processes that
would take years to complete.45
Certain provisions of TSCA, however, currently apply and
may be the most immediate way for the EPA to regulate at least
some nanomaterial applications. Enacted in 1976, TSCA author-
izes the EPA to regulate chemicals that are processed, imported,
manufactured, distributed in commerce, used, or disposed of in
the United States upon finding that they pose an “unreasonable
risk.”46 As further discussed below, TSCA also has certain pro-
visions under which the EPA can review the safety of new
chemicals before they enter commerce. “New” chemicals, as
defined by the TSCA, are those not included in the initial
Inventory of Chemicals in Commerce completed in 1980, or
subsequently added to the Inventory after going through the
new-chemical review process.47 As of 2005, the EPA had
reviewed more than 40,000 new chemicals prior to their intro-
duction into commerce, and had restricted or otherwise regulat-
ed 1,600, or four percent, of these chemicals.48
At first blush, TSCA appears to provide the EPA with a fair-
ly broad authority to regulate new chemicals. As noted in the
Conference Report accompanying TSCA’s enactment: 
[T]he most desirable time to determine the health and
environmental effects of a substance, and to take action
to protect against any potential adverse effects, occurs
before commercial production begins. Not only is
human and environmental harm avoided or alleviated,
but also the cost of any regulatory action in terms of
loss of jobs and capital investments is minimized. For
these reasons the conferees have given the
Administrator broad authority to act during the [pre-
manufacture] notification period.49
Specifically, section 5 of TSCA requires the producer of a
“new” chemical substance to send EPA a “Pre-Manufacture
Notification” (“PMN”) before beginning to produce a sub-
stance. At least in theory, PMNs allow the EPA to review and
assess the potential risks of a new material before it reaches the
market and, if necessary, to require that a producer provide fur-
ther information, or limit the chemical’s use.
Unfortunately, there are no baseline data requirements for
PMNs, and 85 percent of PMNs are submitted without any
health data.50 Although the EPA can request additional data, it
rarely does so; instead, it typically conducts its review based on
use of structure-activity relationship models. This model esti-
mates the toxicological properties of an unstudied substance,
based on the extent of molecular structural similarity to sub-
stances with known toxicological properties. Existing models
have little applicability to nanomaterials, because the models
are based on the properties of bulk forms of conventional chem-
ical substances, and because nanomaterials’ novel and enhanced
properties result from characteristics other than their molecular
structure, e.g. size or shape. It remains to be seen whether the
EPA will require actual toxicity data on nanomaterials to be sub-
mitted as part of the PMN review process.
Other key questions also remain unresolved, including the
extent to which nanomaterials qualify as “new” chemicals, which
is necessary to trigger PMN requirements. Under TSCA, a “new”
chemical is one that is not already listed on the TSCA Inventory
of chemicals in commerce and is of “a particular molecular iden-
tity.”51 Although it is obvious that a nanomaterial constitutes a
“new” chemical if its molecular formula is not already on the
TSCA Inventory, some parties assume that a nanomaterial quali-
fies as “existing,” i.e. not new and therefore not subject to PMN
review, if its molecular structure is identical to a substance
already on the Inventory. By this logic, carbon nanotubes would
not require PMNs, because graphite is already listed on the TSCA
Inventory. As of January 2006, only about ten PMNs or PMN
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exemption requests had been submitted to the EPA, even though
a much larger number of nanomaterials appear on the market in
the United States.52 Of these, the EPA had approved only one: a
low-release/low-exposure PMN exemption for a carbon nan-
otube,53 under which the manufacturer typically must submit a
full PMN once production exceeds a specified volume.
Environmental Defense has urged the EPA to clarify that
nanomaterials with existing molecular structures still constitute
“new” substances unless their chemical and physical properties
are demonstrably identical to those of the conventional sub-
stance. This definition is based on the grounds that only sub-
stances with the same properties, as well as the same molecular
structure, share “a particular molecular identity.”54
Environmental Defense also urged the EPA not to apply mass-
based, or other exemptions in the PMN program, unless the
underlying scientific rationale is appropriate when applied to
nanomaterials.55
In addition to its pre-manufacture review provisions, TSCA
also provides for certain information-gathering authorities. For
example, section 8(a) authorizes the EPA to require that manu-
facturers provide use and exposure information; section 8(e)
requires manufacturers to submit any information indicating
that a substance may pose a “significant risk” to health or to the
environment; and section 8(d) authorizes the EPA to require
manufacturers to submit all toxicity-related studies already in
their possession. As further discussed below, the EPA is current-
ly conducting a multi-stakeholder process on nanomaterial risks
in order to design a voluntary initiative and consider possible
uses of TSCA authorities.
Finally, section 6 of TSCA theoretically authorizes the EPA
to restrict the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce,
use, and disposal of chemical substances if “there is a reasonable
basis to conclude” that its manufacture, distribution in com-
merce, use, or disposal “presents or will present an unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment.”56 However, as a
practical matter, the procedural requirements associated with
section 6 are so complex that these provisions have seldom been
used.57
Federal Consumer Products Laws
As noted above, TSCA does not cover certain chemical sub-
stances. In particular, TSCA does not cover pesticides, which
the EPA regulates under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act. TSCA additionally does not cover food, food
additives, drugs, cosmetics, or medical devices, which the FDA
regulates under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
However, although cosmetics are excluded from TSCA, they are
not subject to FDA pre-market approval authority.58 As also is
noted above, fuel additives, including a nanomaterial-based
additive now under review by the EPA,59 are covered by specif-
ic provisions of the Clean Air Act.
Unlike TSCA, the other programs require companies to
submit specified data on the safety of new products before they
are introduced into commerce. By definition, however, only
nanomaterials used for these specific types of applications are
covered by these particular programs. Moreover, the FDA
acknowledges that, even if a product involving nanotechnology
falls within its ambit, the agency may not even be aware that the
product contains a nanomaterial, “if the manufacturer makes no
nanotechnology claims regarding the manufacture or perform-
ance of the product.”60
Finally, the Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”), like
TSCA, does not require pre-market testing of new products.61
As a practical matter, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission, which administers the CPSA, focuses largely on
injuries and poisonings, rather than chronic toxicity issues.62
ADDRESSING NANOMATERIAL RISKS: 
NEXT STEPS
Given the limitations of existing regulatory tools and poli-
cies, three distinct kinds of initiatives are urgently needed: first,
a major increase in nanomaterial risk research; second, rapid
development and implementation of voluntary standards of
care, pending development of adequate regulatory safeguards;
and third, updates of existing policies to address the shortcom-
ings described above in addressing nanomaterial risk manage-
ment. A wide array of stakeholders must be involved in all com-
ponents of these processes, including labor groups, health
organizations, consumer advocates, community groups, envi-
ronmental organizations, as well as large and small businesses
and the academic community.
INCREASE GOVERNMENTAL INVESTMENT IN RISK
RESEARCH
The U.S. government, as the largest single investor in nan-
otechnology research and development, needs to spend more
time and money to assess the health and environmental implica-
tions of nanotechnology, and to ensure that the critical research
needed to identify potential risks is conducted expeditiously.
Through the National Nanotechnology Initiative, the federal
government spends more than $1 billion annually on nanotech-
nology research and development.63 Of this amount, environ-
mental and health implications research accounted for only $8.5
million (less than one percent) in fiscal year (“FY”) 2004.64 This
funding is expected to increase to $38.5 million (less than four
percent) in FY 2006.65
The U.S. government should spend at least $100 million
annually on risk research for the next several years. While an
annual expenditure of $100 million represents a significant
increase over current levels, it is still less than ten percent of
the overall federal budget for nanotechnology development.
Moreover, this amount is a modest investment compared to
the potential benefits of risk avoidance and the $1 trillion role
that nanotechnology is projected to play in the world econo-
my by 2015.
Given the wide-ranging set of research issues that need to
be addressed, and the significant uncertainties associated with
the anticipated results, there is no single “magic number,” nor
precise method to determine the right dollar figure that should
be expended. Nevertheless, $100 million per year represents a
reasonable, lower-bound estimate of what is needed. Experts
broadly agree that addressing the potential risks of nanotechnol-
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ogy will be an unusually complex task. Despite its name, nan-
otechnology is anything but singular; it is a potentially limitless
collection of technologies and associated materials. The sheer
diversity of potential materials and applications, which is a
source of nanotechnology’s enormous promise, also poses
major challenges with respect to characterizing potential risks.
A wide range of stakeholders are calling for increased
research. In a rare example of convergence from sectors that
often have highly divergent views, representatives from the
environmental, manufacturing, investment, and insurance com-
munities have all advocated dramatic increases in federal fund-
ing on the health and environmental implications of nanotech-
nology. For example, in June 2005, the CEO of DuPont and the
President of Environmental Defense coauthored an Op-Ed in the
Wall Street Journal, calling for an increase in such funding.66
That same month, the American Chemical Council’s Chemstar
Panel on nanotechnology and Environmental Defense issued a
Joint Statement of Principles, stating that “[a] significant
increase in government investment in research on the health and
environmental implications of nanotechnology is essential.”67 A
recent report on nanotechnology by Innovest, an investment
research and advisory firm, “strongly support[ed] calls by oth-
ers in the investment community for increased government
funding of toxicology research,” and noted that the National
Nanotechnology Initiative’s “lack of priority for this issue rep-
resents a missed opportunity to minimize uncertainty.”68
Additionally, several of the world’s largest insurance firms,
including Swiss Re,69 Munich Re,70 and Allianz,71 have called
for greater scrutiny of the potential risks of nanotechnology.
Experts’ assessments, testing costs associated with hazard
characterization programs for conventional chemicals, and com-
parison to the research budgets for a roughly analogous risk
characterization effort on risks of airborne particulate matter
further buttress the call for greatly expanded health and envi-
ronmental research spending.72
Current federal initiatives on nanotechnology have made
significant achievements in accentuating and accelerating the
enormous potential benefits of nanomaterials. To date, however,
federal agencies have not fulfilled their equally critical role in
identifying, managing, and ideally avoiding the potential down-
sides. A far better balance between these two roles must be
struck if nanotechnology is to deliver on its promise, without
delivering unintended and unforeseen adverse consequences.
But the U.S. government should not be the sole, or even the
principal, funder of nanomaterial risk research. Other govern-
ments are also spending heavily to promote nanotechnology
research and development, and they too should allocate some
portion of their spending to address nanotechnology risks.
Indeed, the United Kingdom’s Royal Society and Royal
Academy of Engineering, in its seminal July 2004 report,
Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Opportunities and
Uncertainties, calls for the U.K. government to devote £5-6 mil-
lion (US $9.5-11.3 million) per annum for ten years, to do its
part to develop the methodologies and instrumentation needed
to set the stage for actual testing of nanomaterials.73
Although government risk research plays a critical role in
the development of basic knowledge and methods for character-
izing and assessing the risks of nanomaterials, private industry
should fund the majority of the research and testing on the prod-
ucts they are planning to bring to the market. In turn, govern-
ments should focus on providing the “enabling infrastructure”
for nanotechnology research. Such research cuts across a broad
range of disciplines, and will have broad impacts on society. In
particular, the government can mobilize the research industry to
create a database of representative, model nanomaterials. The
government can also develop methods and tools needed to char-
acterize, detect, and measure nanomaterials; to assess their bio-
logical fate and behavior; and to assess acute and chronic toxic-
ity. Most importantly, the government can coordinate this
research, and disseminate the results, thereby increasing effi-
ciency and reducing redundancy. Clearly, all parties involved
will benefit if governments and industry coordinate their
research to avoid redundancy and optimize efficiency.
DEVELOP VOLUNTARY STANDARDS OF CARE
Given that federal agencies are unlikely to develop and
implement adequate regulatory programs for nanomaterials
quickly enough to address the products now entering or poised
to enter the market, voluntary “standards of care” for nanomate-
rials must play a role in guiding the safe use of nanomaterials in
the near term. These standards should include a framework and
a process by which to identify and manage nanomaterials’ risks
across a product’s full lifecycle, taking into account worker
safety, manufacturing releases, product use, and product dispos-
al. In addition, these standards should incorporate feedback
mechanisms, including environmental and health monitoring
programs, to check the accuracy of judgments made about a
nanomaterial’s risks, and the effectiveness of risk management
practices. Such standards should be developed and implement-
ed in a transparent and accountable manner, including public
disclosure of the assumptions, processes, and results of the risk
identification and risk management systems.
Several voluntary programs are currently at various stages
of evolution, though their eventual outputs are still far from
clear. In November 2005, a workgroup of an EPA advisory com-
mittee proposed a framework for a voluntary program aimed at
producers, processors, and users of nanomaterials. The group
also recommended using certain TSCA regulatory authorities to
address nanomaterial risks.74
In addition, both ASTM International75 and the American
National Standards Institute (with the International Standards
Organization)76 have recently initiated multi-stakeholder efforts
to develop voluntary standards for nanotechnology. Both initia-
tives are at an early stage, and have not yet produced substantive
drafts.
Finally, Environmental Defense and DuPont are working
together to design and demonstrate a framework for the respon-
sible development, production, use, and disposal of nanoscale
materials. While the project will initially pilot-test the framework
on specific nanoscale materials, or on applications of interest to
DuPont, the organizations intend to develop a framework that
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can be adapted for use by a broad range of stakeholders.
But voluntary standards by themselves are only a temporary
expedient; in the longer term, regulatory programs will be
essential to securing long-term public confidence and support
for nanotechnology. Here again, a wide range of stakeholders
believe that a nanotechnology regulatory scheme is needed. In a
survey conducted by the Wilson Center, 55 percent of the 1,250
respondents stated that government control beyond voluntary
standards was necessary, while only eleven percent felt that vol-
untary standards were adequate.77 According to a recent report
on nanotechnology by Innovest, “[a] significant portion of the
more than 60 companies we interviewed indicated an interest in
having some sort of standards in place. In many cases, they felt
that science-based regulation would provide a more level play-
ing field.”78 In a Joint Statement of Principles submitted to the
EPA, both Environmental Defense and the Nanotechnology
Panel of the American Chemistry Council stated that the respon-
sible regulation of nanomaterials “will best assure that nanoma-
terials are being developed in a way that identifies and mini-
mizes potential risks to human health and the environment.”79 In
an Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal, Environmental Defense’s
President, Fred Krupp, and Dupont’s Chairman and CEO, Chad
Holliday, agreed that “both public and business interests will
inevitably compel regulatory protection to ensure product safe-
ty and to create a level playing field for business.”80
CONCLUSION
As recently noted by a columnist for the Motley Fool
investment newsletter, “the scientific community will inevitably
determine that at least some nanoscale materials pose unneces-
sarily high risks.”81 If the public, however, were to discover that
companies knowingly hid or downplayed the risks, it could not
only lead to lawsuits, but might also create a serious backlash
against all things nano. The best-case scenario might be over-
regulation, while the worst case may be that many nanotechnol-
ogy-related products are banned altogether.
In an ideal world, adequate data on nanomaterials’ hazards
and exposure would already exist, allowing governments to
establish appropriate safeguards through a transparent public
process that would generate long-term public confidence in nan-
otechnology. In reality, such data are extremely limited, and reg-
ulatory programs are undeveloped. Substantially greater
amounts of government and corporate support for research into
the health and environmental effects of nanomaterials are
urgently needed, along with rapid development of voluntary
standards of care that can help address the issues until meaning-
ful regulations can be put into place.
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Bisphenol-A (“BPA”), the endocrine-disrupting chemi-cal used to create polycarbonate plastics, such as babybottles, microwavable plastics, and children’s toys,
may interfere with human brain development.1 BPA is con-
sumed when it leaches from plastic containers into foods or
drinks as they are heated or when they become broken or
cracked.2 BPA has been linked to a numerous adverse effects,
including an increase in breast and prostate cancer cell
growth,3 obesity when exposed early in life, gestational dia-
betes in women,4 damage to human brain development, dimin-
ished sperm production,5 early puberty,6 and insulin-resistance,
which leads to diabetes.7
An ongoing concern in the scientific community is the
effect of prenatal and childhood exposure to BPA and other
endocrine-disrupting chemicals (“EDCs”). The relation of
these chemicals to “abnormalities in human sexuality, gender
development and behaviors, reproductive capabilities, and sex
ratios” is a major distress among scientists.8 Although high-
level exposure to EDCs clearly has gender-related effects on
human development, today’s debate centers around low-dose
exposures, “generally defined as doses that approximate envi-
ronmentally relevant levels.”9 BPA studies have demonstrated
that exposure at quantities lower than the EPA’s reference dose
has detrimental effects on fetal development.10 Additionally,
the possibility that harmful effects from exposure to EDCs can
be passed down through generations is extremely alarming.11
The current U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) standard for tolerable levels of BPA exposure was set
in 1982 and is known as the “reference dose.”12 This dose, 50
mg/kg/day, reflects the level of BPA that the EPA has deter-
mined is safe for human exposure. However, studies indicate
that lower exposure doses of BPA have profound impacts on
human development that can last throughout adulthood.13
Despite the fact that BPA’s presence is highly widespread – it
was detected in the blood and urine of 95 percent of people
tested in the United States – the EPA’s standard remains
unchanged.14 The restriction of this chemical should be the
EPA’s top priority.
As part of the agency’s Endocrine Disruptors Research
program, the EPA Office of Research and Development will
examine the effects of EDC exposure.15 In response to a 2000
peer reviewed report, which found that “low-dose effects had
been sufficiently documented at that point in time for the EPA
to consider revisiting its current testing paradigm on the issue
of low-dose adverse affects,” the EPA “is currently funding
three research grants in the area of low-dose EDC exposures.”16
On a grassroots level, there are various ways to limit our
exposure to BPA. For instance, some stores have decided to
stop selling the popular water bottle, Nalgene.17 Nalgene bot-
tles are composed of lexan polycarbonate resin.18 In 1998, Dr.
Patricia Hunt of Case Western Reserve University stumbled
upon an unexplainable result of aneuploidy19 in one of her
experiments.20 It was traced to a harsh detergent that was used
to clean the polycarbonate mice cages and water bottles.21 The
detergent caused the plastic to leach BPA, and this accident
was duplicated in another study.22 Even though another study
conducted in 2003 confirmed Dr. Hunt’s results, the polycar-
bonate industry has harshly criticized Dr. Hunt’s findings.23
Additionally, California’s Assembly recently proposed Bill
319, which would have banned some products that contained
BPA and phthalates24 intended for use by children.25 Assembly
Bill 319 “sought to limit some transitional phthalates that have
been shown to be especially deleterious to normal development,
especially sexual development,”26 but was unfortunately
defeated on January 19, 2006.27 However, it provides a useful
model for other states looking to take action on BPA exposure.
Becoming informed consumers allows individuals to limit
the exposure to themselves and their families, and to inform
others in their communities of the risks of using plastics con-
taining BPA. Additionally, the EPA should re-evaluate its risk
assessment process, and more state legislatures should try to
ban BPA. In short, the public must take the responsibility for
making wise decisions when purchasing merchandise com-
posed of plastic.
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INTRODUCTION
Dramatic advances in chemical research and develop-ment during the 20th century have made it possible tosynthesize molecules that were once unimaginable and
that have never previously existed. Chemists have produced
millions of unique chemicals. Tens of thousands of these are in
commerce, and thousands are produced in excess of one million
pounds annually. Inventories grow by several thousand new
chemicals annually. With over $587 billion in global annual
sales, and a projected increase of 85 percent in the next twenty
years, this far-reaching industrial sector creates materials for
myriad consumer products, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, and
industrial manufacturing.1
THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
Commercially successful chemicals usually do what they
are intended to do, but many are unintentionally hazardous.
Unfortunately, with the exception of pesticides and pharmaceu-
ticals, the large majority of industrial chemicals in commerce
today have never been fully studied for their toxicity to people
or wildlife, despite widespread exposures.2 This has been a
source of trouble. 
Sometimes chemicals act in surprising ways – either
because their behavior is unpredictable or because no one has
bothered to investigate their properties. In the 1960s, for exam-
ple, scientists discovered that the insecticide dichloro-diphenyl-
trichloroethane (“DDT”) contaminated human breast milk
throughout the world. It also
turned up in Antarctic penguins,
thousands of miles from where
DDT was used. Now we know that
the behavior of DDT is similar to
other chemical compounds that
are fat soluble, persistent in the
environment, and bioaccumulate
in the food web. Once loose in the
world, these chemicals travel to
the far reaches of all global
ecosystems, contaminate most liv-
ing things, and persist for decades or longer. Whatever toxic
properties they have will be widely expressed. 
Recent reports have identified similarly-behaving com-
pounds in the blood of almost all newborn infants and adults.
Examples of these compounds include brominated flame retar-
dants and fluorinated chemicals used in Teflon and other non-
stick, stain-resistant products. But persistent bioaccumulative
compounds are not alone. Non-persistent but pervasive and con-
tinuously-used compounds such as plasticizers, organic metals,
pesticides, solvents, and many others add to this complex cock-
tail with unknown hazardous properties.3
Available data show that individually some industrial
chemicals alter gene expression; brain development; immune,
reproductive, and endocrine systems; and can cause birth
defects and cancer. Often, exposures in developing organisms
(humans, wildlife, and laboratory animals) during critical win-
dows of vulnerability can have permanent impacts at doses far
lower than those necessary to cause health effects in adults.
Some impacts are heritable and can be passed from generation
to generation.4
Although it is certain that industrial chemicals contribute to
disease and disability in the general population of humans and
wildlife at current levels of exposure, the extent to which they
are responsible for individual cases and disease patterns is often
uncertain and vigorously debated. Some uncertainty results
from the inherent complexity of biological organisms and the
limits of science. However some uncertainty is plainly due to
lack of good information, because chemical manufacturers often
refuse to develop and provide it to the public.5
A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
Our current political and common law legal systems pre-
sume that people and corporations are allowed to do whatever
they want, within some contested constraints of safety and the
rubric of cost-benefit analyses. In these systems, the burden of
proof falls most often on people who raise safety concerns
rather than promoters of technolo-
gies. Underlying these systems is
also a presumption that economic
growth, as measured by the gross
domestic product, is always benefi-
cial. These ideas were fully devel-
oped during the 19th century and
continue to underpin our industri-
alized economy.6
The world is now very differ-
ent from what it was 150 years ago.
Over six billion people inhabit the
planet and mid-level projections anticipate nine billion within 50
years. Humans have altered planetary systems in fundamental
ways. For example, climate, soil, water and air quality, fisheries,
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forests, pollinators, wetlands, coral reefs, and biological diversi-
ty are under severe stress. Industrial chemicals universally con-
taminate global ecosystems and their inhabitants with troubling
but inadequately understood consequences. The reach of modern
human technologies over great sweeps of time and space requires
a re-evaluation of their ethical underpinnings. 
In the United States and
many other countries, dominant
ethical frameworks that influence
decision making are largely based
on human rights and utilitarian
cost-benefit analysis. The tension
that sometimes develops between
the rights of individuals and
aggregate costs and benefits is
resolved in political and judicial
settings. However, several impor-
tant ethical principles that are
essential to human survival over the long term are missing. They
include acting with a respect for living things, a realistic under-
standing of interconnectedness, an acknowledgement of the lim-
its of the earth to assimilate human activity without becoming
inhospitable to human existence, and moral responsibility. To be
sure, all human activities and technologies should be subject to
more extensive ethical screens, but the focus here is on chemi-
cal manufacturing and moral responsibility for safety testing. 
In common-law proceedings, parties may be held legally
responsible for harm that they cause others, though even here
costs and benefits are weighed. But the idea of moral responsi-
bility either to take or refrain from some activity is different.
Philosopher Hans Jonas argues that modern technology has
introduced actions of such novel scale, objects, and conse-
quences that the framework of former ethics can no longer con-
tain them.7 Jonas begins with the undeniable moral responsibil-
ity inherent in the parent-infant relationship.8 Extrapolating
from that starting point, Jonas then persuasively argues that,
since future generations will exist, the power of our technolo-
gies to reach far into time and space is sufficient to establish a
similar moral responsibility to future generations.9 This is not an
argument based on rights of future generations, but rather on our
moral responsibility to them. 
Much of our behavior suggests
that we do not recognize responsi-
bilities to future generations. We
continue to draw down the earth’s
natural capital, squander resources
into scarcity, and contaminate
ecosystems with untested chemi-
cals. We seem to be unable to rec-
ognize natural planetary limits and
the need for restoration and regen-
eration. Optimists hold that recur-
rent damage and scarcity will forev-
er drive us to invent our way successfully out of one crisis after
another, but they are living in an imaginary 19th century world
without limits. 
CONCLUSION
Meeting a moral responsibility to future generations
requires comprehensive attempts to try to understand the
impacts of newly acquired powers. The chemical industry cre-
ates and disperses thousands of novel substances, many of
which are known or likely to have biologic activity in humans
and wildlife, with far-reaching consequences for human and
ecological health. This technological prowess creates a moral
responsibility to thoroughly test existing and newly developed
chemicals for their safety before releasing them into the world.
Some uncertainty will always remain, but it is precisely the
scope and scale of technologies, coupled with uncertainty, that
establish the moral responsibility for prospective, unbiased,
comprehensive evaluation with future generations in mind.
1 Patricia L. Short, Global Top 50, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, July
18, 2005, at 20-23, available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/coversto-
ry/83/8329globaltop50.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
2 Pesticides are regulated under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
Rodenticide Act and some pre-market safety assays are required.
Pharmaceuticals are regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
and premarket testing and clinical trials are required. But the large major-
ity of industrial chemicals are regulated under the Toxic Substances
Control Act (“TSCA”) administered by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”). Although TSCA authorizes the administrator
to require pre-market safety testing of newly proposed chemicals, formal
rule making rarely occurs and must be balanced against costs and bene-
fits. Many pre-TSCA, untested chemicals were simply allowed to remain
in commerce when TSCA was adopted. Many of them remain in use
today and have not undergone even screening safety assessment. See
David Roe, Dr. William Pease, Karen Florini, & Dr. Ellen Silbergeld,
Toxic Ignorance, available at http://www.healthy-
communications.com/environmentaldefense.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2006). 
3 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, THIRD NATIONAL
REPORT ON EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS, July, 2005, avail-
able at http://www.cdc.gov/exposurereport/3rd/ (last visited Mar. 10,
2006).
4Matthew D. Anway, Andrea S. Cupp, Mehmet Uzumcu, & Michael K.
Skinner, Epigenetic Transgenerational Actions of Endocrine Disruptors
and Male Fertility, SCIENCE, 308(5727), 2005 at 466.
5 See Roe, supra note 2. It should also be noted that a voluntary chemical
testing program negotiated between chemical manufacturers and the EPA
has provided limited basic screening data for a small number of high vol-
ume chemicals, but has little prospect for providing any comprehensive
data like, for example, neurodevelopmental toxicity testing. See EPA’S
VOLUNTARY CHILDREN’S CHEMICAL EVALUATION PROGRAM, available at
http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/vccep/index.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
6 J. Guth, Transforming American Law to Promote Preservation of the
Earth, THE NETWORKER, V.11-12 (Mar. 2006), available at
http://www.sehn.org/Volume_11-2.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
7 See HANS JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF AN
ETHICS FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (Univ. of Chicago Press 1984). 
8 See JONAS, id.
9 See JONAS, id.




their inhabitants. . .
57 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
Chemical weapons present a great risk to internationalsecurity as a result of the low costs and ease withwhich they can be purchased, used, manufactured, and
stored.1 One of the most notorious examples of chemical
weapons use occurred on March 16, 1988, when Saddam
Hussein unleashed a mixture of mustard gas and nerve agents
on Kurdish civilians in Halabja, Iraq.2 At least 5,000 civilians,
including women, children, and the elderly, died immediately
as a result of the attack and 10,000 more were blinded,
maimed, or disfigured.3 In subsequent years, thousands more
died from debilitating diseases and birth defects associated
with the after-effects of chemical weapons.4
A study conducted in Halabja of the long-term effects of
chemical weapons exposure showed that “[t]hese chemicals
seriously affected people’s eyes, and respitory and neurologi-
cal systems. Children are dying … of leukemia and lym-
phomas … [there is a] large proportion of pregnancies [with]
major malformations … [which] suggest[s] that the effects
from these chemical warfare agents are transmitted to suc-
ceeding generations.”5 This indicates that chemical weapons
exposure causes “long-term damage to the DNA”6 and can
affect the ability of an ethnic group to produce healthy off-
spring. By affecting the reproductive health of an ethnic group,
countries that use chemical weapons, particularly against civil-
ian populations, arguably commit crimes against humanity that
rise to the level of genocide.7
The Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC”) prohibits
the use of chemical weapons and further mandates that State
Parties shall not “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stock-
pile or retain chemical weapons.”8 Each State Party must
undertake to destroy all chemical weapons and production
facilities.9 The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (“OPCW”) is the enforcement body of the
Convention,10 and State Parties must grant the OPCW access
to conduct inspections inside their territory.11 A State Party
may also call upon the OCPW to inspect the territory of anoth-
er State Party to investigate allegations of non-compliance.12
The CWC is widely criticized for its failure to ensure ade-
quate compliance; the primary complaints are: (1) its inability
to enforce its provisions over countries that have not yet ratified
the treaty; (2) its failure to impose its provisions with respect to
terrorist groups; and (3) that the OPCW only has power to issue
sanctions after a violation is found, but cannot authorize mili-
tary force.13 These criticisms are not particular to the CWC, but
to all international treaties, and describes the problems of an
international system that is largely based on comity.
While far from perfect, the CWC is an effective step
towards the ban of chemical weapons. First, while the OPCW
is not authorized to use force, it can consult with the UN
Security Council to request military action if needed.14
Second, the CWC makes it difficult for non-Party States and
terrorist groups to acquire both the chemicals and the equip-
ment needed for their manufacture.15 The CWC induces its rat-
ification by limiting the transfer of controlled-chemicals,
which a non-State Party may need for industrial purposes.16
Third, the CWC slows chemical weapon proliferation by iso-
lating a small number of “rogue states,” such as Iraq, Libya,
and North Korea, which brings shame onto these countries,
along with political and economic pressures.17
As with all treaties, the CWC cannot ensure complete
compliance. The looming threat to international security posed
by chemical weapons warrants a complete ban on such
weaponry. Further, the incredible and unnecessary suffering
caused by chemical weapons, such as those used in Halabja, in
addition to the devastating consequences extending to subse-
quent generations, shows that the use, development, or transfer
of such weapons should be considered a universal crime
against humanity. The international community should consid-
er the prohibition against chemical weapons to be a jus cogens
norm, a law that is so fundamental to international law that no
State may derogate from it. 
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INTRODUCTION
From New Delhi in the north, to Calcutta in the south, arepetitive striking image is found in India’s metropolises.One reporter writes of a “hostile zone” in Calcutta where
“high brick walls block the views of activities going on with-
in.”1 What hides behind those walls, however, tells a chilling
tale of what happens to the discarded electronics of developed
countries. These electronic waste (“e-waste”) scrap yards have
become common in India. Within these landfills children “as
young as eight-years-old tear apart electronic components with
bare hands, while vats of acid lying just a few feet away bubble
like giant black cauldrons, spewing out strange-smelling
fumes.”2 Another report tells of a teenager cutting into a car bat-
tery with a torch – wearing no mask or protective clothing.3
Workers in these scrap yards expose themselves to hazardous
materials seven days a week, for twelve to fourteen hours a day.4
These are common stories of individuals ranging from
eight-years-old to the elderly, all dismantling e-waste dumped in
India by developed countries. India’s less stringent environmen-
tal standards allow for frequent, unregulated e-waste dumping
within its borders.5 Moreover,
dumping e-waste in India and
other developing countries allows
all parties involved to make
money. In the United States, it
costs approximately twenty U.S.
dollars to recycle an old computer.
However, when waste brokers sell
that same computer for export, they make about five U.S. dol-
lars a piece, while the recycling in India costs just four dollars.6
WHAT IS E-WASTE?
E-waste can be defined as “a collective name for discard-
ed electronic devices that enter the waste stream.”7 E-waste
includes refrigerators, cellular phones, personal stereos, air
conditioners, computers, and consumer electronics.8 Over one
thousand different “substances and chemicals, many of which
are toxic and are likely to create serious problems for the envi-
ronment and human health if not handled properly,” can be
found in e-waste.9
The world is currently in an e-waste crisis, with technology
rapidly advancing and older models becoming obsolete faster
than they can be dealt with. In New Delhi alone, about 25,000
workers are employed in scrap yards, “where 10,000 to 20,000
tons of e-waste are handled every year.”10 It was estimated that
in 2005, one personal computer was discarded for “every new
one put on the market.”11
HOW MUCH E-WASTE IS THERE?
India and other developing nations are easy targets for e-
waste dumping by developed countries due to the fact that “gen-
erous import policies on second-hand computers, aimed at help-
ing charities and schools, is being abused.”12 Under the guise of
donating used electronics, especially computers, developed
countries are able to discard e-waste far more cheaply than dis-
posing of it within their own borders. Toxics Link, a New Delhi
based organization dedicated to environmental justice and a
toxic-free environment, estimates that 20,000 kilograms of e-
waste finds its way through India’s borders every day.13 In the
United States, an estimated 40,000 computers are discarded
every year, and it is believed that another 300 million to 700
million units are being stored in houses and businesses waiting
to be dumped.14 Furthermore, experts estimate than “more than
500 million computers will become obsolete in the [United
States] alone between the years 1997 and 2007.”15 Worldwide,
twenty to fifty million tons of e-waste are generated annually.16
It has been estimated that e-waste is increasing by three to
five percent per year.17 In 2002, the Basel Action Network
(“BAN”) released a report stating
that over five percent of municipal
solid waste was comprised of elec-
tronic waste.18 According to BAN,
the U.S. government does not know
how much e-waste is exported
every year; however, estimates
based on other studies conclude
that 10.2 million computer units were sent to Asia in 2002
alone.19 Toxic Links discovered that 70 percent of electronic
waste present in recycling facilities located in New Delhi, India,
has been exported or left by developed countries.20
WHERE DOES E-WASTE COME FROM?
BAN notes that electronic waste in the United States is gen-
erated by three major sectors: “individuals and small business;
large businesses, institutions, and governments; [and] original
equipment manufacturers.”21 Much of the electronics that
households and small businesses discard is not broken, but sim-
ply obsolete or outdated.22 With constantly advancing technolo-
gy and upgrades, computer owners are now buying new com-
puters and disposing of their old ones about every two years.23
Employee computers at large institutions are upgraded on a
regular basis. For example, in 2002, Microsoft had approximate-
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ly 50,000 employees worldwide24 with all employees having at
least one computer of their own. According to a Microsoft
spokesman, the company replaces each computer every three
years.25 U.S. law forbids large users from disposing of their com-
puters in landfills (unlike individuals and small business) and
therefore, “this e-waste goes to the re-use/recycling/export mar-
ket.”26 Finally, equipment manufacturers also contribute to the e-
waste problem in the United States because, when products do
not “meet quality standards, [they] must be disposed of.”27
However, it is important to note that the Indian Supreme
Court, in compliance with the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their
Disposal, prohibits the exportation of haz-
ardous waste into India.28 Thus, the e-waste
coming into India enters under a deceptive
guise or illegally.29
HOW TOXIC IS E-WASTE?
E-waste includes over one thousand
different substances, and this article
would not be complete without discussing
these hazards and the serious health risks
that they present.30 Scrap yard workers are
exposed to these toxins on a daily basis
through their unprotected dismantling of
e-waste in an effort to extract gold, plat-
inum, and copper. Without proper recy-
cling, 315 million computers will release
550 million kilograms of lead, 900,000
kilograms of cadmium, and 180,000 kilo-
grams of mercury into the environment.31
Other chemicals released include barium,
toners, phosphor and additives, and beryl-
lium.32 Each of these toxic substances is found in different parts
of computers and other electronics.
Lead can be found in “glass panels and gaskets in computer
monitors” as well as being used as
the “solder in printed circuit
boards.”33 Lead causes damage to
humans’ nervous, blood, and repro-
ductive systems.34 In children, lead
has been found to impede brain
development, causing what one doc-
tor terms “brain drain.”35 Lead has
no biological function and should
not be present in the human body;
however, a person living in areas
surrounded by e-waste will have about eight to ten micrograms
of lead per deciliter.36 In children, a measurement of anything
close to ten micrograms of lead per deciliter can lower the IQ.37
Cadmium compounds accumulate in the human body,
causing potentially irreversible effects on human health, espe-
cially the kidneys.38 Cadmium is generally found in “SMD chip
resistors, infra-red detectors, and semiconductor chips.”39
Additionally, it is estimated that nearly one-fourth of the
world’s yearly consumption of mercury is by electronic equip-
ment.40 Mercury can cause damage to the brain and kidneys, as
well as a developing fetus.41
Functioning as a radiation protector, barium is used in the
front panels of computers.42 While long-term effects of expo-
sure to barium are not documented, studies have found that
short-term effects of barium exposure include “brain swelling,
muscle weakness, damage to the heart, liver, and spleen.”43
Plastic printer cartridges containing toner are one of the
most common forms of e-waste.44 Carbon black is the main
ingredient of the black toner.45 Entering the human body through
inhalation, carbon black causes respiratory irritation if a person
is subjected to prolonged exposure.46 The International Agency
for Research on Cancer classifies carbon
black as a possible carcinogen.47
Phosphor “is applied as a coat on the
interior of the [cathode ray tube face-
plate]” and it “affects the display resolu-
tion and luminance of the images that is
seen in the monitor.”48 Contained within
the phosphor coating on cathode ray
tubes are heavy metals such as cadmium,
zinc, and vanadium.49 While the hazards
of phosphor used for this purpose are not
reported, the U.S. Navy issued a directive
regarding this coating: “NEVER touch a
CRT’s phosphor coating: it is extremely
toxic. If you break a CRT, clean up the
glass fragments very carefully. If you
touch the phosphor, seek medical atten-
tion immediately.”50
Beryllium is found on motherboards
and finger clips in computers, used to
“strengthen the tensile strength of connectors and tinyplugs while
maintaining electrical conductivity.”51 Beryllium is classified as a
human carcinogen since exposure to it can cause lung cancer.
Workers can develop beryllicosis, a disease that primarily affects
the lungs, if they are constantly
exposed to beryllium, even in
small amounts.52 Beryllium expo-
sure also causes a type of skin dis-
ease, such as the inability to heal




boil, crush, or burn electronic
parts to extract valuable materials like gold, platinum, and copper
that can then be resold.54 Each component that is retrieved has its
own value and market.55 The monetary value for each of these
materials hardly seems worth the health risks the workers endure
everyday; however, most of these workers have no other steady-
paying jobs and must find some way to support their families.
In a 2002 study, Toxics Link followed the money trail for
each component of a broken down computer and monitor,
finding that the majority of the profit is taken by the trader,
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A woman in India recovers metals from circuit
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not the worker collecting the e-waste.56 When a local trader
buys a single computer with monitor for US $10 to $15, he
can then earn up to US $50 in profit by selling the disassem-
bled parts.57 For example, a trader can buy a circuit board for
thirteen cents per kilogram, and then resell it for ten cents per
kilogram after the metals, such as lead, copper alloy, and
gold, are recovered.58 A profit is made when acid battery man-
ufactures buy the recovered lead for US $2.17 per kilogram.59
The copper recovered fetches US $1.74 per kilogram from
copper wire manufacturers.60
In order to retrieve all of these valuable materials, workers
subject themselves daily to hazardous conditions as fumes are
released into the environment and absorbed into their bodies by
the melting of computer parts. Long-term health risks have not
been documented for e-waste workers, but the effects of these
toxic chemicals are clear. One worker in New Delhi said that the
pay in e-waste work is good “compared to what he could make
doing other kinds of labor” – he earns around 3,000 rupees, or
US $66, a month, “working six days a week in eight-hour
shifts.”61 That kind of repeated exposure will most certainly
lead to health problems. In some areas, doctors have noticed an
increase in lung ailments in labor-
ers, attributed to “the burning
wires.”62 A study by the
Chittaranjan National Cancer
Institute found that people in New
Delhi are nearly “twice as likely to
suffer from lung ailments as those
in the countryside.”63 Though traf-
fic pollution is the primary cause,
“doctors say the smelting electron-
ic parts at factories on the city’s
edges should not be discounted.”64
Without stricter regulations and enforcement, hundreds of
thousands of India’s poor will be forced to endure these condi-
tions – conditions that would not be tolerated in the United
States or other developed countries. 
E-WASTE MANAGEMENT: INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTIONS AND REGULATIONS
The Basel Convention is a major international agreement
that addresses the need to regulate e-waste. Adopted in response
to the “public outcry against the indiscriminate dumping of haz-
ardous wastes in developing countries by developed-world
industries,” India ratified the treaty in 1992.65 However, the
Convention is helpless to restrict the import of waste from
nations that have not ratified the Convention, such as the United
States.66 States that have ratified the Basel Convention need to
endure complex government-level processes before they can
export non-working computers.67 The goal of these regulations
is to ensure proper disposal in the importing countries; howev-
er, even countries that have ratified this Convention often ignore
these procedures.68
Currently, under U.S. domestic law it is legal to export
potentially hazardous e-waste from the United States. In fact,
the U.S. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”)
appears to encourage the export of hazardous e-waste by
exempting it from export controls of any kind.”69 According to
the BAN report, RCRA “has exempted more and more toxic
wastes simply because they are claimed to be destined for recy-
cling operations.”70
The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent
(“PIC”) Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and
Pesticides in International Trade entered into force on February
24, 2004.71 The procedures of the Convention require exporters
to obtain the prior informed consent of importers before pro-
ceeding with the transaction, providing an international method
to monitor and control the trade of hazardous materials.72 While
the accession of the Rotterdam Convention by India has
occurred, the United States has failed to ratify the treaty.73
The EU has enacted two model regulations in the disposal
and reuse of e-waste. Each member state of the European
Community must implement both the Directive on Waste
Electrical and Electronic Equipment (“WEEE”) and the
Directive on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous
Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment (“RoHS”)
into their national laws.74 The pri-
orities of WEEE are to prevent the
creation of e-waste and also to
encourage companies and individ-
uals to reuse or recycle e-waste to
reduce disposal.75 The RoHS
directive complements the WEEE
Directive and restricts the use of
certain hazardous materials in new
equipment in order to protect
human health.76 Beginning July 1,
2006, manufactures are not per-
mitted to use lead, mercury, cadmium, hexavalent chromium,
polybrominated biphenyls, or polybrominated diphenyl ethers
in creating their new electronic equipment.77
Conversely, the United States has failed to create a domes-
tic law regulating e-waste. However, California, Maryland,
Maine, and Washington [state] have created their own set of
laws. For example, the California Electronics Waste Recycling
Act was signed into law in 2003, and then amended in
September of 2004.78 The Act establishes a program to safely
dispose of video display products, like televisions and comput-
er monitors.79 As of January 1, 2005, California consumers
began paying a fee at purchase when buying video displays, the
money is then funneled into a special account from which qual-
ified recyclers and collectors are paid to cover their costs.80
Similarly, the Maryland Department of the Environment
requires the registration of certain computer manufacturers.81
Manufacturers that sell an average of more than one thousand com-
puters annually are required to pay a $5,000 fee, or reduce the pay-
ment by creating a free recycling program for consumers.82
Likewise, municipalities in Maine have until July 20, 2006 to
ensure that discarded televisions and computer monitors generated
by households are recycled, or the manufacturers will be required
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to pick up the tab.83 The latest e-waste legislation has been enacted
by Washington State on March 8, 2006,84 Requiring manufactures
to carry the cost of collection, transportation, and recycling of old
computers, monitors, and televisions, the statute also prohibits
exporting e-waste to developing countries.85
On March 3, 2005, U.S. Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and
Jim Talent (R-MO) introduced a
bill that would incentivize the safe
disposal of outdated electronics.86
Included in the proposed bill is a
directive authorizing the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
to recommend a national program
based a cost-benefit analysis of
various e-waste recycling pro-
grams. However, the proposed leg-
islation lacks a complete ban on
the export of hazardous waste to
developing nations. 
INDIAN DOMESTIC LAWS AND E-WASTE
Currently, e-waste is not defined in Indian domestic environ-
mental law.87 In 2003, India amended the Hazardous Waste
(Management and Handling) Rules of 1989.88 The rules advise
that “waste generated from the electronic industry is considered as
hazardous waste.”89 That means that once e-waste becomes haz-
ardous waste, it is covered under the hazardous waste rules; how-
ever, the hazardous waste contained in the electronics must first be
taken out for it to be considered “hazardous waste.”90 Though this
law is in place and has been amended as recently as 2003, there is
no specific legislation for the handling of e-waste in India.91
Additionally, the Supreme Court in India set up India’s
Supreme Court Monitoring Committee on Hazardous Wastes
(“Committee”) in November 2003.92 The goal of the Committee
is to pursue “certain serious and chronic situations relating to
the management of hazardous wastes.”93 The Committee recent-
ly returned hazardous wastes that were wrongly imported into
India in accordance with Basel Convention.94 Zinc from
Bangladesh and a container full of garbage from Ireland were
part of the returned waste.95
THE FUTURE OF E-WASTE IN INDIA
In New Delhi, the Indian government has plans for three
potential waste dumps.96 The sites would be used for “scientific
disposal of hazardous household waste and e-waste generated
from processing of electronic goods.”97 The Energy Resources
Institute (“TERI”) estimates that fifteen to twenty acres of land
will be needed to develop a scientific landfill site, at a cost of
about 310 million Indian rupees, to deal with the over 45,000 tons
of e-waste in New Delhi.98 TERI further estimates that overhead
expenses will cost around 30 mil-
lion Indian rupees annually.99
Additionally, the United
Nations Environment Programme
started a two-year project in India in
September 2005 called “Environ-
ment and E-waste India.”100 The
project’s goals are to reduce the
environmental and health impacts
“due to improper e-waste recycling
in India.”101 The project also pro-
vides support in implementing
national policies as well as improv-
ing income opportunities, “particularly of poor communities, by
changing the working conditions and job security in informal e-
waste recycling sectors.”102 This project should, hopefully, rid
India of the “backyard scrap yards” and allow Indian to run a
more environmentally sound e-waste recycling program. 
CONCLUSION
With the rate of electronic obsolescence increasing each
year, it is imperative for the international community to take a
stronger stand against dumping toxic e-waste into developing
countries. Dismantling e-waste is a relatively new phenomenon,
resulting in individuals dangerously exposing themselves to
toxic substances. Without proper controls and regulations from
India and the international community, India’s population will
face a certain environmental and public health crisis.
Uninformed imports of hazardous waste material into
developing countries should be banned. These countries do not
have the resources to deal with the massive quantities of e-waste
coming into their territories. It is not a morally or legally sound
practice to allow those that have not benefited from electronic
products bear the burden of dealing with the dangers of their
unregulated disposal. 
The United States has
failed to create a
domestic law regulating
e-waste.
1 Indrajit Basu, India: A Dump Yard for Electronic Waste, UNITED PRESS
INT’L, Apr. 15, 2004, available at http://washingtontimes.com/upi-break-
ing/20040415-114709-1913r.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
2 Basu, id.
3 Associated Press, India Becoming World’s Toxic Trash Bin, STRAITS
TIMES, Jun. 6, 1995, available at http://www.recyclingpoint.com.sg/
Articles/1995Jun6IndiaToxictrash.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
4 Toxics Link, E-WASTE IN INDIA: SYSTEM FAILURE IMMINENT – TAKE
ACTION NOW! (2004), available at http://toxicslink.org/docs/06040_rep-
sumry.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2006). 
5 The Basel Action Network, EXPORTING HARM: THE HIGH TECH
TRASHING OF ASIA (2002), available at http://www.svtc.org/cleancc/
pubs/technotrash.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2006) [hereinafter BAN].
6 Basu, supra note 1.
7E-waste Crisis: Around the Corner, INDIA TOGETHER, May, 2003, avail-
able at http://www.indiatogether.org/2003/may/env-ewaste.htm (last visit-
ed Mar. 5, 2006) [hereinafter INDIA TOGETHER].
8 BAN, supra note 5.
ENDNOTES: INDIA’S TOXIC LANDFILLS
ENDNOTES: India’s Toxic Landfills Continued on page 79
62SPRING 2006 
Methylmercury is a potent neurotoxin that can causeserious neurological and developmental damage.1Emissions from coal-burning plants are the main
source of mercury pollution in the United States.2 When mer-
cury emissions deposit into water, they bioaccumulate as
methylmercury in the tissue of fish, exposing fish consumers
to high magnitudes of mercury.3 The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) notes that some Native Americans
are among the highest risk groups for mercury contamination
due to their heavy fish consumption.4
Four Maine Indian tribes are parties in a series of legal
challenges filed against the EPA and consolidated in New
Jersey v. EPA in December 2005.5 The lawsuits are a response
to two new mercury rules announced by the agency in March
2005.6 The tribes, along with some environmental groups and
states, allege that these rules weaken emissions regulations,
threaten human health, and permit three times as much mercu-
ry pollution as would occur in full compliance with the Clean
Air Act (“CAA”).7 For the tribes opposing the new regulations,
reducing mercury pollution is about more than health. The
Penobscot nation hopes that by eliminating mercury contami-
nation they can “salvage a cultural identity.”8 “Fishing is one
of the social and cultural ties that bind our tribal communities
together,” explains the Houlton Band of Maliseet’s chief,
“[and] that link has been stretched very thin because of mercu-
ry contamination.”9
The two rules issued on March 15, 2005 fall under the
CAA. The first rule, passed pursuant to CAA section 112(c),10
removes mercury from the list of the most stringently regulat-
ed chemicals.11 Essentially it reclassifies mercury as non-
toxic.12 Called the “Section 112 rule” by the EPA and “delist-
ing” by opponents, this provision is an essential precursor to
the cap-and-trade system proposed by the second regulation,
the Clean Air Mercury Rule (“CAMR”).13 The cap-and-trade
approach, which falls under CAA section 111,14 allows power
plants to purchase emissions credits rather than reduce their
own emissions.15
The National Tribal Environmental Council, one of many
groups to submit comments on the cap-and-trade provision,
expressed concern that it will create hot spots of mercury dep-
ositions.16 EPA’s Children’s Health Protection Advisory
Committee noted that the proposed rule may create new hot
spots and fail to address existing ones.17 The EPA recently
opened the delisting rule for reconsideration after receiving
two petitions, from over a dozen states, environmental groups,
and Indian tribes,18 and hopes to have a decision on the final
rule by May 2006.19 EPA is also reconsidering the CAMR cap-
and-trade.20 Both provisions are pending review in the case
before the D.C. Circuit.21
If mercury output is not curtailed, the burden shifts to con-
sumers to protect themselves from contamination by avoiding
fish consumption. Currently, 45 states have issued fish consump-
tion advisories,22 which cover 35 percent of all lakes and 24 per-
cent of all river miles nationwide.23 For an Indian tribe whose
members may eat up to ten times as much fish as the average
American,24 fish advisories create “a harsh choice: either risk the
health of tribal members by continuing a now dangerous cultural
tradition, with all the language, behavior, and spiritual connec-
tions that go with it, or heed the warnings and see centuries-old
components of culture and religion slip away.”
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Following several years of successful political integration,the adoption of a single currency, and an expansion fromfifteen to twenty-five Member States in 2004, the
European Union now boasts a single market comprised of over
455 million people. The emergence of an expanded single mar-
ket has coincided with a sustained effort on the part of the EU
to advance environmental protection through the increased
products regulation. While not without some controversy, the
EU has in recent years adopted legal measures that condition
market access for automobiles, household appliances, electron-
ic equipment, and biotech products on compliance with new
product-based environmental requirements. In the coming
years, the EU is expected to adopt
additional measures that would
similarly regulate imports of chem-
icals, energy using products, and
certain timber products. 
Environmental law practition-
ers in the United States will want to
take note of these new product-
based measures for several reasons.
First, as the EU is the largest trading
partner of the United States, these
new product-based measures are
critically important to U.S. compa-
nies. Second, in conditioning market
access to adherence with new prod-
uct standards, the EU is, in effect,
establishing global product stan-
dards, as few U.S. companies can
afford to ignore a potential con-
sumer market that is now much larg-
er than the United States or even all of North America. In this
regard, in-house counsel and environmental health and safety
managers face new and difficult challenges as they work to under-
stand and anticipate new product-based mandates in Europe.
To better understand the significance of the EU’s new
emphasis on product regulation, it is helpful to review some of
the more significant legislation that has been enacted or pro-
posed in recent years.
END-OF-LIFE VEHICLES DIRECTIVE
Consistent with the EU’s policy on waste management,
which seeks to avoid waste by improving product design and
increasing the recycling and re-use of waste, the EU adopted the
End-of-Life Vehicles Directive (“ELV Directive”) in 2000.1
Among other things, the ELV Directive requires Member States
to establish systems for the collection and recycling of all end-
of-life vehicles and sets ambitious re-use and recycling goals.
The ELV Directive also imposes several design mandates on
automobile manufacturers by requiring Member States to ensure
that vehicles “put on the market” after July 1, 2003, do not con-
tain lead, mercury, cadmium, or haxavalent chromium, except
as allowed under the limited exemptions set forth in Annex II of
the Directive. The legislation also calls on manufacturers to
implement design changes to facilitate dismantling, re-use, and
recycling, and to increase the quantity of recycled material used
in vehicles and other products. The EU’s ELV Directive has
driven changes in automotive component design and supply
chain management not only in Europe but across the globe.
WEEE AND ROHS
DIRECTIVES
The EU has recently adopted
two new directives aimed at the
design and end-of-life management
of a wide range of household appli-
ances, information technology and
telecommunications equipment, con-
sumer electronics, lighting products,
and other electrical equipment.
Under the Directive on Waste
Electric and Electronic Equipment
(“WEEE Directive”), Member States
are to establish new systems for
managing WEEE (defined broadly).2
The new systems are to allow con-
sumers to “take back” their used
electrical and electronic equipment
to retailers selling the equivalent
type of equipment. Retailers, in turn, are obliged to accept the
products free of charge. The WEEE Directive also establishes
new product marking, registration, and ambitious materials
recovery rates for collected products. 
A companion directive establishes new material bans for a
wide range of recent electrical and electronic equipment “put of
the market” after June 30, 2006. Under the Directive on the
Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in
Electrical and Electronic Equipment (“RoHS Directive”), manu-
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facturers and importers are barred from placing on the market
electrical and electronic equipment containing lead, mercury,
cadmium, hexavalent chromium, polybrominated biphenyls
ethers (“PBB”), and polybrominated diphenyl ethers (“PBDE”).3
Limited exceptions to these prohibitions for certain applications
are set forth in an Annex to the Directive. By conditioning mar-
ket access for thousands of products ranging from dishwashers to
cell phones on new environmental requirements, the EU has, in
effect, set new global product standards that will drive design
changes for covered products regardless of where they are man-
ufactured and sold. Member States are now in the process of
implementing both of these directives at the national level.
PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BIOTECHNOLOGY
With respect to biotechnology products, the EU has had a de
facto moratorium on the approval of new biotech crops arising
out of the lengthy process currently in place for approvals. In
September 2003, the EU adopted new requirements for labeling,
traceability, and placing on the market of biotech crops and food
and feed products derived from biotech crops.4 The new EU reg-
ulations require that all pre-packaged products containing more
than trace amounts of genetically modified organisms (“GMOs”)
bear a label reading: “This product
contains genetically modified
organisms” or “This product con-
tains genetically modified [name of
organism(s)].” The regulation fur-
ther requires that all covered oper-
ators (i.e. those who place a biotech
product on the market or receive a
biotech product placed on the mar-
ket within the EU) be able to iden-
tify their supplier and the compa-
nies to which they have supplied
the products. Operators must keep
documentation of each transaction
involving biotech crops for five years and must make such
records available to public authorities on demand. 
The EU has recognized that, as a practical matter, it is vir-
tually impossible to ensure that a small amount of biotech prod-
uct will not commingle with a conventional product in the
course of harvesting, storing, transporting, or processing the
products. The EU, however, has set particularly low thresholds
for the so-called “adventitious” (or technically unavoidable)
presence of traces of GMOs in conventional products. The EU’s
tolerance for unapproved varieties that have not been endorsed
by a European Community Scientific Committee is zero. The
extent of the EU’s impact in the Ag-biotech arena is significant
and could have a dramatic impact on global trade in agricultur-
al products if other governments decide to follow the EU’s
approach to regulating agricultural commodities.
EUP DIRECTIVE
In July 2005, the EU adopted a directive establishing a
framework for setting eco-design requirements for energy using
products (“EuP Directive”).5 The EUP Directive establishes a
framework under which the EU will establish product-specific
eco-design and performance standards through subsequent
implementing measures. The legislation will require conformity
with future implementing measures and standards as a condition
to market access for covered energy using products. This
Directive has the potential to regulate a wide range of energy
using products marketed in Europe and contemplates new envi-
ronmental performance and product design requirements.
REACH
The EU is also developing legislation that would create a
new EU regulatory framework for chemicals. The legislation is
known as REACH (shorthand for Registration, Evaluation,
Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals), and is expected to
be finalized in 2007. The legislation is an effort to address “exist-
ing chemicals” – those chemicals in production prior to 1981 and
for which limited health and safety information is available.
REACH would replace over 40 existing directives and regula-
tions, and would require companies that produce and import
chemicals to assess the risks arising from use of the chemicals
and take necessary measures to manage any risks they identify.
As proposed, the new regime would impose new requirements
on a wide range of U.S. companies
seeking to import or use chemicals
in Europe, including products con-
taining chemicals.
IMPACTS BEYOND EUROPE
With its push into new prod-
uct-based environmental require-
ments, the EU is breaking ground
on a new generation of environ-
mental legislation that looks
beyond the environmental impacts
associated with production and
manufacturing alone. The EU’s
approach to product regulation is also serving as a catalyst for
similar environmental initiatives in the United States and else-
where. For example in the past year, legislation addressing the
management of end-of-life electronics has been introduced in 28
states and in the U.S. Congress. California, Maine, Maryland,
Washington, and the Province of Alberta in Canada have all
recently adopted new laws addressing e-waste.
With respect to material bans, legislation passed in California
in 2003 calls for the adoption of regulations that will prohibit the
sale of certain types of electronic devices in California where the
product is prohibited from being sold in Europe under the RoHS
Directive. California, Illinois, Maryland, and Oregon have also
recently adopted new restrictions on the use of certain brominat-
ed flame retardants in products. At the federal level, some mem-
bers of Congress are pressing for amendments to the Toxic
Substances Control Act (“TSCA”) based in part on work under-
way in the EU on the REACH proposal.
While the EU has moved quickly to enact new laws target-
ing products, questions remain about the overall environmental
benefits to be gained and the impacts on international trade. For
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example, in the course of recent Congressional hearings on e-
waste, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reported that
the disposal of electronic waste in modern municipal landfills
presented few environmental risks. The EU’s actions to slow the
introduction of products derived from biotechnology has been
challenged by the United States under World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) rules as an illegal restraint on trade. Similarly, Japan
has threatened to bring a WTO challenge against the EU if the
REACH proposal is adopted in its current form.
CONCLUSION
For the near term, it appears that the EU will continue to set
the pace when it comes to product-based environmental regula-
tion. In the United States, it seems likely that an increasing num-
ber of state legislatures and even members of Congress will take
a closer look at Europe’s new emphasis on regulating products.
Other countries outside of Europe, most notably the People’s
Republic of China, are also following the EU approach by
adopting their own product-based environmental requirements.
Whether these new national and sub-national initiatives gravi-
tate toward harmonized product standards or instead evolve into
a patchwork of competing mandates that undermine internation-
al trade remains one of the most important environmental and
economic policy questions of the next decade. 
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INTRODUCTION
Perfluorooctanoic acid (“PFOA”) is everywhere – and inmore ways than one would probably think. PFOA is anessential processing aid in the production of fluoropoly-
mers, or high-density plastics, which are used to create comput-
er chips and aerospace parts as well as everyday consumer prod-
ucts such as paints, food wrappers, stain-resistant furniture, car-
pets, paper products, weatherproof clothing, and Dupont’s
Teflon® non-stick cookware.1
PFOA is also disturbingly ubiquitous in the blood of the
general population in the United States, and pervasive through-
out the environment, even appear-
ing in Arctic animals.2 In February
2006, researchers at Johns Hopkins
University found PFOA present in
the umbilical cord blood of 99 per-
cent of 300 newborn infants.3 The
chemical is bioaccumulative,
meaning it remains in human bod-
ies and in the environment for an
extended period of time.4
Despite its widespread preva-
lence in the environment and in blood, there is no scientific con-
sensus on how PFOA enters the system, or on its toxicity in
humans. In addition, although it is known that the chemical has
been deliberately released through factory emissions, it is not
clear how consumer products might degrade to release PFOA.5
Studies to understand the chemical, its pathways, and human tox-
icity are underway, but the production and release of PFOA is cur-
rently unregulated by the government. 
THE EPA’S INVESTIGATION OF PFOA
Concern over the prevalence of PFOA in human blood
and in the environment, the lack of understanding concerning
the chemical’s pathways, as well as studies linking PFOA to
cancer in lab animals, prompted the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) to begin formal investigation of
the chemical in 2003.6 During the investigation, evidence
released in a separate lawsuit revealed that DuPont – the
largest North American producer of PFOA – failed to report
data to the EPA regarding the presence of the chemical in
human fetal cord blood and local tap water for more than
twenty years.7 The EPA charged DuPont with two violations
of the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”) section 8(e),
legislation which requires companies to report within fifteen
days any evidence that a chemical may pose a substantial
health risk.8
Most seriously, DuPont withheld information that PFOA
could be transferred from a woman to her fetus via the placen-
ta, the rate of this transfer, and levels of PFOA in newborns and
two-year olds.9 In 1981, DuPont scientists at a West Virginia
Teflon® plant found PFOA in blood samples taken from preg-
nant Teflon® plant workers as well as in local drinking water.10
In addition, DuPont failed to report
serious birth defects in two infants
who were monitored by company
medical staff.11
The EPA settled its case against
DuPont in December 2005 for $10.25
million in administrative fines, the
largest environmental penalty ever
won by the EPA.12 DuPont pledged
another $6.25 million to environmen-
tal programs.13 The company main-
tains that it did not intentionally withhold information from the
EPA, and thus did not admit legal liability.14
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN THE
EPA AND DUPONT
In January 2006, the EPA launched a landmark voluntary
stewardship program, enlisting DuPont and seven other compa-
nies to reduce their emissions of PFOA and its presence in con-
sumer products by 95 percent of year 2000 levels by 2010, and
aiming toward 2015 for its elimination.15 Although DuPont con-
tinues to hold that PFOA is non-toxic and undetectable in its
Teflon products when used normally, the company agreed to the
EPA program citing that “the presence of PFOA in people’s
blood raises questions that should be addressed.”16
DuPont’s cooperative response proved timely – only two
days later, after reviewing the EPA’s draft risk assessment of
PFOA, the agency’s Science Advisory Board (“SAB”) deter-
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in the blood of the
general population. . .
mined that the EPA should classify PFOA as a likely carcinogen;
a recommendation that exceeds the EPA’s assessment that there
is only suggestive evidence that PFOA is carcinogenic.17 The
SAB recommended that, in order to provide a more scientifical-
ly rigorous risk assessment of PFOA, the EPA should conduct a
heightened investigation of the links between PFOA and liver,
testicular, pancreatic, and breast cancers, as well as the chemi-
cal’s effects on the nervous and immune systems.18
CONCLUSION: IS THE REAL DANGER IN TSCA?
Should the public be made to wait for increased information
on PFOA through the EPA’s PFOA
risk analysis, until the chemical,
omnipresent in the environment and
in the bloodstream, is (or is not)
determined to be toxic to humans?
Critics like the Environmental
Working Group (“EWG”) argue
that such a delay is unacceptable,
and that the TSCA is to blame for
this dangerous lag.19 Under TSCA,
the EPA has few options to gain
information on potentially harmful
chemicals other than initiating
largely voluntary consultations with
chemical companies.20 These options render TSCA a largely
toothless statute,21 according to the EWG. 
The EPA is, however, moving to add PFOA to the list of
Toxic Release Inventory, which would give the EPA regulatory
authority to track the release of PFOA in the environment by
requiring companies to report emissions of the chemical.22 The
EPA will likely classify PFOA as a persistent, bioaccumulative,
and toxic (“PBT”) chemical, which requires reporting of the
chemical in smaller releases than non-PBT chemicals.23
Nevertheless, the EPA is still a long way away from limit-
ing production and/or banning the
chemical. Currently, only five chem-
icals out of 80,000 chemicals in




chromium.24 For PFOA to take a
place among this list, the EPA will
likely require much more research
on the dangers and toxicity of
PFOA, an effort which is only newly
underway in the year 2006 – more
than 50 years after the chemical was
first produced. 
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Both civil society and the international community rec-ognize the importance of global poverty alleviation.From grassroots movements demanding debt relief to
international support of UN Millennium Development Goals, a
global consensus places the plight of poor countries on its agen-
da. In 2001, the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) launched
the “Doha Round” of trade negotiations (also known as the
“Development Round”) aiming to benefit developing countries.
However, the Development Round has not delivered practical
results for the developing countries.
It has done little to address concerns
about agricultural subsidies in devel-
oped countries, has not prioritized
the agendas of developing countries,
and has failed to reform the WTO
dispute procedures to mitigate power
inequalities between developed and
developing countries. These disputes
led to the collapse of the talks in
Cancun, Mexico in 2003, and result-
ed in both sides walking away from
the negotiations without reaching a
development consensus.
Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew
Charlton recently released a book that aims to bridge the gaps
felt by both developed and developing countries. Fair Trade For
All presents a broad agenda by which trade policies can inte-
grate developing countries into the world market. With the pre-
sumption that trade is good for development, Stiglitz and
Charlton suggest a carefully managed trade liberalization agen-
da. They criticize the Washington Consensus’ simple prescrip-
tion of rapid liberalization and privatization of markets as caus-
ing instability and inequality, and instead propose an alternative
model that emphasizes fairness. They contend that the assump-
tion that broad market liberalization makes countries better off
is based upon nonexistent variables such as full employment,
perfect capital and risk markets, and perfect competition that
most developing countries lack.
Before examining their proposal, Stiglitz and Charlton
remind their readers that developed countries progressed by
using a wide range of policy instruments which “[w]ould make
their WTO ambassadors blush” in light of today’s negotiations
with developing countries. The book explores lessons from
Latin America’s import substitution and East Asia’s export ori-
ented strategies, and argues that a uniform model is inappropri-
ate because the benefits of liberalization depend on factors
unique to the particular circumstances of individual countries.
Moreover, the developing world is
limited by pervasive market fail-
ures that impede the effectiveness
of a simple liberalization scheme,
such as a lack of credit and insur-
ance markets and an undersupply
of public goods. 
The authors view fairness as a
central tenet of trade negotiations.
They propose that the distributive
impact of any trade agreement
must be assessed in light of any
proposals that could have negative
effects on development. On the
basis of fairness, such proposals
must not be placed on the agenda. The authors task the WTO
Secretariat with ensuring that such analysis is tailored to the
unique circumstances of individual developing countries. 
Because developed nations are better positioned than devel-
oping countries from the negotiating table to the dispute resolu-
tion process, Stiglitz and Carlton urge that this power relation-
ship not be exploitative. Fair Trade for All advocates trans-
parency in the negotiating process to ensure fair agreements
result. Responding to criticisms that participation in the WTO is
voluntary, the authors counter that agreements must be entered
into democratically by the developing countries, without fear of
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retaliation such as the withholding of development aid.
Moreover, the authors propose that a pro-development trade
agenda be limited to poverty reducing issues. While many inter-
national problems can be broadly defined to encompass trade-
related issues, issues such as intellectual property rights and pro-
tection of foreign investors should not be resolved during trade
negotiations because developing countries have limited capaci-
ty to analyze such additives. 
The central trade agenda Stiglitz and Charlton propose in
Fair Trade for All is simple and
straightforward: all WTO members
should provide free market access to
all goods from developing countries
poorer and smaller than themselves.
Their proposal opposes traditional
reciprocity agreements and requires
open access for any country with a
smaller GDP and GDP per capita. The
proposal is intended to create a well-
defined, transparent, and enforceable
system of market access using objec-
tive criteria, and would result in sig-
nificant trade opportunities between
developing countries. The proposal is progressive in that it
requires very little from the poorest countries and poses no obli-
gation to open markets to countries more developed than itself.
This allows developing countries to engage in some degree of
protectionism for goods from countries richer than themselves.
Developing countries have been reluctant to commit to large
reductions in tariffs due to concerns over floods of cheap
imports hurting local producers. Instead, the authors’ proposal
ensures that the largest and richest countries liberalize the most. 
In addressing the failure of the 2003 Cancun meeting, Fair
Trade for All recommends that developed countries eliminate
agricultural subsidies to ensure competitiveness for the devel-
oping countries’ agricultural sectors – currently Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development expenditures on agri-
cultural subsidies are almost six times the total aid to develop-
ing countries. Stiglitz and Charlton approach agricultural liber-
alization to favor the least developed countries by recommend-
ing a rapid reduction on tariffs for goods produced and con-
sumed in developing countries, and a slower reduction on sub-
sidies for those goods consumed in the developing world.
Accordingly, they propose the WTO focus on liberalizing the
commodities in which price increases have had the largest pos-
itive effects on producers and the smallest effects on consumers. 
Additionally, the authors pro-
pose that the WTO enforce envi-
ronmental policies, pointing to the
Shrimp-Turtle case in which the
United States placed trade restric-
tions upon imports of shrimp cap-
tured by practices harming migra-
tory turtles. In noting that the
WTO Appellate Body has recog-
nized the right of trade action to
protect the environment, the
authors propose that where multi-
lateral environmental agreements
contain the right to use trade poli-
cy to enforce the agreement, countries should use the WTO as a
tool of enforcement. 
Overall, Fair Trade for All succeeds in presenting a simple
agenda for developing countries to ensure benefits in the trade
negotiation process. Implicit in the book is that the developed
world must make accommodations to mitigate the entrenched
power asymmetries in the WTO to ensure fairness and positive
outcomes in trade. Fair Trade for All advocates that developing
countries utilize a precautionary approach to liberalization and
discourages the use of the WTO negotiation process as a method
to pressure developing countries to adopt policies and programs
that may not result in direct gains for the developing world. This
book is an excellent tool for those who desire policy prescriptions
with empirical evidence to pursue an agenda for fairer trade. 
WTO members should
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ASIA
TOXIC SPILL AT CHINESE FACTORY HIGHLIGHTS
WIDESPREAD RISK OF SPILLS IN CHINA
Since an explosion on November 13, 2005 at Jilin
Petrochemical Corporation’s benzene factory in the northeastern
city of Harbin, 45 other pollution accidents were reported to
China’s State Environmental Protection Administration
[“SEPA”],1 including six “major disasters.”2 The Harbin explo-
sion poured one hundred tons of the carcinogenic benzene and
nitrobenzene into the Songhua River in a plume of contaminat-
ed water 150 kilometers long.3 Ten thousand people were evac-
uated4 and four million people had no public water services for
several days.5 On February 14, 2006, another major spill in the
Yuexi River left 20,000 residents of the Sichuan village of
Guanyin without water when high concentrations of fluorine,
amine-nitrate, and phenol were discovered in the river.6
The Harbin spill raised national concern in China about the
damage China’s industrial boom may be inflicting on the envi-
ronment.7 In response, SEPA has demanded that officials report
spills within an hour of their outbreak.8 SEPA’s own director Xie
Zhenhua was forced to resign when officials failed to report the
spill for three days, resulting in dozens of lawsuits.9 Moreover,
in a recent nationwide survey, SEPA found that China has
21,000 chemical plants situated on its major rivers.10 Over 70
percent of China’s rivers and lakes are polluted; water sources
in 90 percent of cities are contaminated.11
AMERICAS
INCREASED MOVEMENT OF GREENLAND’S GLACIERS
MAY INDICATE CLIMATE CHANGE
Researchers at the University of Kansas and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (“NASA”) Jet
Propulsion Laboratory recently released a study revealing that
the rate of ice streaming into the sea from glaciers in Greenland
has doubled in the past decade, in part due to climate warming
and ice dynamics.12 Through the use of satellite data to follow
the glaciers,13 the researchers indicated that widespread
increased glacier movement is “clearly a climate signal.”14
Greenland’s glaciers lost 59 trillion gallons of ice in 2005, as
compared to 24 trillion gallons in 1996, and Greenland’s largest
glaciers have increased their speeds by approximately 57 per-
cent over the past decade.15
The study further reveals that the ice dumped from these
glaciers may be contributing more to rising sea levels than pre-
viously predicted.16 Streaming ice, together with the melting of
Greenland’s ice sheet, may annually contribute to seventeen
percent of the global sea-level increase.17 This contribution to
the global sea-level rise “is a problem of considerable societal
and scientific importance.”18 With the possibility of rising glob-
al temperatures, the contribution to sea-level rise from
Greenland’s glaciers will likely continue to increase.19
RISING ETHANOL DEMAND BOOSTS BRAZIL’S SUGAR
CANE INDUSTRY
Due to rising ethanol demand, Brazil’s state-run oil compa-
ny, Petreleo Brasileiro SA (“Petrobras”), has announced the pos-
sibility of building an ethanol pipeline through Brazil’s primary
ethanol producing areas to a refinery located near São Paulo.
The estimated price tag would be US$226 million and would
transport one billion gallons of ethanol per year.20 Petrobras
Chief Executive Sergio Gabrielli stressed that ethanol is cheap-
er to produce in Brazil, whose current ethanol supplies derive
from sugar cane, than in the United States, which produces its
ethanol from corn.21 Gabrielli further contended that Brazil is
“the only country in the world that has the technology to build
an ethanol pipeline,” thus making the project significant for the
global ethanol market.22
Some industry analysts question Brazil’s ability to emerge
as a consistent ethanol supplier in the global fuels market.23
While Brazil’s sugar cane industry is the largest in the world,24
its supplies are currently stretched, and the sugar cane industry
is projected to need US$10 billion investment capital for new
mills and more sugar cane to meet ethanol demands.25 The
International Energy Agency predicts that by 2025 ethanol may
account for ten percent of the global gasoline supply, as coun-
tries begin to increasingly look to ethanol as a fuel source,26
either to meet carbon dioxide emissions targets set by the Kyoto
Protocol or to break from oil dependencies.27 Brazil can serve as
an example for other countries wanting to switch to ethanol-
based fuel, as Brazilian laws require that its domestic gasoline
contain 25 percent ethanol and as the majority of Brazilian vehi-
cles currently are able to use either ethanol or traditional gaso-
line sources.28
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AFRICA
SECURITY PROBLEMS HAMPER AID EFFORTS IN
SOMALIA
As southern Somalia faces its worst drought in more than a
decade, security issues have hampered aid efforts there.29
Rainfall, cereal production, and pastoral land have all
approached seven-year lows,30 while famine threatens more
than two million people in the region, including 400,000 inter-
nally displaced people.31 Moreover, since March 2005 some 35
acts of piracy in Somali waters, including the hijacking of a ves-
sel chartered by the World Food Programme,32 have forced aid
agencies to deliver food by land, where it is vulnerable to
seizure by local militias.33 Making things worse, Somalia has
had no central government to enforce the rule of law for fifteen
years, allowing rival warlords to loot the country and fuel inter-
nal conflicts.34
EUROPE
WTO REJECTS EU’S BAN ON BIOTECH CROPS
This February, the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
ruled in favor of the United States, Argentina, and Canada that
the European Union illegally banned imports of genetically
modified crops.35 European governments resisted the use of
genetically altered seeds to resist pests, disease, and drought,
claiming that biotech crops threaten human health and the envi-
ronment.36 However, the ruling might not signal immediate
changes in the EU’s policies since the EU can appeal or simply
refuse to comply and accept the requisite penalties.37
The EU has a history of disregarding WTO decisions that
conflict with its food policies.38 For example, in 1998 the WTO
ruled that the EU’s ban on hormone treated beef, based on a
heightened cancer risk, was not sufficiently rooted in science.39
However, the EU opted to pay US $116 million in fines rather
than comply with the WTO’s beef ruling.40 According to an EU
poll, over fifty percent of the EU’s 450 million consumers con-
sider gene-engineered foods to be dangerous.41
EUROPE’S QUEST FOR OIL INDEPENDENCE
Britain and Sweden have set lofty goals to reduce oil con-
sumption. For instance, Sweden plans to be a completely oil-
free economy by 2020.42 A Swedish government official stated,
“The plan is a response to global climate change, rising petrole-
um prices, and warnings by some experts that the world may
soon be running out of oil.”43 Sweden leads Europe in the race
for oil independence with 26 percent of its energy coming from
renewable sources (the EU averages six percent). Only 32 per-
cent of Sweden’s energy comes from oil, down from 77 percent
in 1970.44
Meanwhile, Britain plans to meet its Kyoto obligation of
reducing emissions twenty percent by 2010 by using the three
million tons of excess wheat it produces each year to make
bioethanol.45 However, Britain’s plan could prove costly, as
bioethanol is twice as costly as gasoline production, and could
likely prove viable only with the help of government subsi-
dies.46 In addition, petrochemical companies own many of
Britain’s gas stations and have little interest in endorsing a prod-
uct that would reduce their sales.47 Yet, the British government
recently ordered that petrochemical companies make a certain
portion of their products (close to three percent) from renewable
resources.48
MIDDLE EAST
YEMEN ON VERGE OF WATER CRISIS
Yemen, one of the most water scarce countries in the world,
is on the verge of a water crisis.49 The water table in Yemen is
falling by more than two meters a year.50 Additionally, Yemen’s
population is one of the fastest growing in the world, com-
pounding the problems of a water shortage.51 Yemeni engineers
suggest that additional desalination plants could be built along
the coastline to augment the potable water supply.52 A national
plan announced in 2004 for 2005-2009 calls for confronting the
shortage through a mixture of legal and political measures, as
well as privatization and investment.53 Observers are skeptical
that the plan can be implemented, especially since Yemen lost
part of its funding from the World Bank54 and was suspended
from the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation’s Threshold
Program in late 2005, both citing corruption. 
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